POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Steve A. Yetiv — **Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Some Antecedent Causes**

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

STEVE A. YETIV argues that the successful containment and reversal of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was related to developments put in motion by the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 to 1988. He shows that it is important to consider how causes remote in time can help explain the foreign policy outcomes we observe and improve our ability to understand political events and to make and evaluate policy.

GALIA GOLAN analyzes Moscow's behavior in the Persian Gulf crisis, the first international crisis in the era of Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy. She argues that domestic pressures created a serious challenge to the new foreign policy, causing Gorbachev to steer an uneven course for Soviet policy during the crisis.

LEE SIGELMAN and JAMES S. TODD examine the congruence between the policy views of newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and those of black Americans nationwide. Drawing where possible on public opinion surveys, they provide a new perspective on claims that there is widespread support among blacks for neoconservative positions.

MARGARET WEIR examines the demise of full employment as a political objective since the 1940s and the limited scope of employment policy in the postwar United States.

JAMES G. RICHTER examines how domestic politics in the United States and in the Soviet Union helped perpetuate confrontational behavior during the cold war unnecessarily. He argues that virulently hostile, reciprocal images became embedded in the domestic politics of each superpower, inhibiting periodic attempts by leaders of both countries to relieve tensions.

ALAN S. ZUCKERMAN, MICHAL SHAMIR, and HANNA HERZOG analyze activists in the Israeli Labour and Herut parties. Using data drawn from surveys and interviews, they detail the place of political careers, ethnic ties, and faction in the world of party politics.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ reviews a book by Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier dealing with the shape and evolution of the political systems of eight Latin American countries. He criticizes their approach from within the book's own analytical premises.

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The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Some Antecedent Causes

STEVE A. YETIV

Conflicts in world politics, as in other contexts, tend to produce winners and losers. In the recent Gulf war, for instance, Iraq and its primary Arab allies – the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yemen, and Jordan – were widely viewed as the losers. By contrast, the United States and regional states such as Syria, Israel, and Egypt emerged as the winners. Although labels such as "winner" and "loser" are crude and ambiguous, they do reflect the risks attendant in world politics. Actors gamble to advance their fortunes, and wrong policy choices can produce dire short- and long-term consequences for their foreign and domestic interests.

While some scholars of world politics are concerned with understanding why and how international events either lead to positive or negative outcomes for particular actors, this curiosity raises a prior analytic problem. How can we explain conflict outcomes? At a basic level, we can conceptualize conflict outcomes, or the outcome of a conflict between two or more actors, as the result of two types of basic causes: proximate and remote. Although some readers are probably familiar with these concepts, it would not hurt to note that proximate causes can be viewed as an integral part of the conflict itself. Thus, for instance, we might explain Israel's defeat of Syria in Lebanon in 1982 by noting the supremacy of its air force. By contrast, a remote cause can be viewed as one that

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is put in motion well before the beginning of the development that it affects. Hence, at the extreme, we might argue that conciliatory U.S. foreign policy toward Japan after World War II could help explain Japan's international economic competitiveness today.

The purpose of this article is to show how the successful containment and reversal of Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait was related to developments put in motion by the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) long before Iraq ever invaded Kuwait. It shows that these developments laid part of the security-political foundation for the American-led Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This effort serves four goals.

First, it helps illustrate the importance of considering remote causes in our attempts to explain international developments. The thesis here is that while some scholars have paid attention to the role of remote causes in explaining the *outbreak* of conflicts,[1] they have tended to neglect the role of remote causes in explaining the *outcomes* of conflicts. Thus, it would be helpful to pay closer attention to the often obscured role of remote causes if we intend to have a more complete understanding of the outcomes we observe.

Second, this article suggests something about the use of military force. It shows how Iraq's use of force against Iran in 1980 sowed some of the seeds of Iraq's demise in 1990–1991 against the U.S.-led coalition. Therefore, it demonstrates empirically the notion that the costs of the use of military force are not time bound, but can manifest themselves in the long term. The thesis here is that in evaluating the utility of the use of military force, scholars have tended to ignore its long-term implications.[2]

Third, the work here helps provide a more complete account of the outcome of Operations Desert Shield and Storm. While some observers have suggested that the Iran-Iraq war was related to Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait, they have not implied, much less attempted to show how and to what extent the Iran-Iraq war was also related to the successful containment and reversal of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Fourth, this work offers an analytic account of some key developments in the Persian Gulf region in the last decade.

The Case Study and Counterfactual Methods

To accomplish the present goals, this article employs both the case study and counterfactual methods. The role of the counterfactual method in political anal-

[1] Such analyses have a pedigree extending at least as far back as Thucydides, who believed that the second Peloponnesian war resulted from Sparta's fear of the growth of Athenian power. For a general discussion of remote and proximate causes, see Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), esp. 1–4.

[2] For a partial exception, see Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978), esp. 67–70. They examined the implications of the use of armed forces for a three-year period

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ysis is often unacknowledged. However, scholars use it regularly to evaluate causal hypotheses in which a hypothesized causal factor—in this case the Iran-Iraq war—is assumed to have been absent. By holding all other things constant and by subtracting from or adding to the historical process one variable, we are offered some grounds for hypothesis testing.

To be sure, counterfactual analysis has its limits. For instance, we would not gain too much by imagining how Athens would have fared against Sparta if it had some Iraqi Scud-B missiles. But within reasonable bounds, the counterfactual method is valuable when experimental control is not possible, which is a common condition of political analysis. We can never be certain of what would have happened in the absence of any event or variable. However, as James Fearon points out, our arguments can be judged as plausible or implausible based on our use of historical detail and of theories about state behavior.[3]

This article uses the case study method to determine the primary effects of the Iran-Iraq war. Based in part on this analysis, it then advances the present thesis by examining this counterfactual: what would have been the outcome of the Gulf crisis triggered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had the Iran-Iraq war never taken place?

The article first shows how the Iran-Iraq war was related to Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait. This analysis is important for various reasons that become more clear as the article proceeds. The body of the study is then devoted to an assessment of how the Iran-Iraq war was related to the successful containment and reversal of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

How Was the Iran-Iraq War Related to Iraq's Kuwait Invasion?

The Iran-Iraq war contributed to Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait in five basic ways. First, American support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war made Iraq more self-assured and confident and thus more likely to invade Kuwait than it otherwise would have been. On this point, however, we should also note that Iran's threat to the region, particularly after its significant military victory at the Faw peninsula in early 1986, left Washington with few good options but to support Iraq in order to prevent an Iranian victory in the war. A Pax Irani in 1986–1987 probably would have been as threatening to American and regional interests as a Pax Iraqi in 1990.[4]

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following their use, but even they did not consider the long-term and broader impact of the use of force on the interests of its user.

[3] The present discussion of the counterfactual method is based in part on James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991): 169–195.

[4] Of course Washington should have taken a stronger stance against Iraq after the 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, but prior to it, Iran's regional threat had to be checked.

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Second, Iraq emerged from the war with a considerably more developed military capability. Its regular army, for instance, quadrupled in size to 955,000 men and the number of aircraft under its control increased by well over one-third.[5] That Iraq's huge standing army could not be effectively reintegrated into the shaky Iraqi economy also made a military adventure more attractive for President Saddam Hussein.

Third, the war weakened Iran militarily. For instance, coupled with the near cutoff of western supplies of major equipment and spare parts, the war decreased Iran's air power by about 90 percent.[6] That Iraq did not have to contend with a powerful Iran on its border probably made an invasion of Kuwait more plausible for Iraq.

Fourth, the Iran-Iraq war devastated Iraq's economy and left Iraq heavily indebted to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, both of which had loaned it monies for its war against Iran. Estimates suggest that Iraq began the Gulf war with U.S. $35 billion in reserve and ended the war $80–100 billion in debt.[7] Adding its Iran-Iraq war reconstruction and debt repayment costs and its basic yearly expenditures, it would have taken Iraq nearly two decades to recover under optimal conditions.[8] In theory, by invading Kuwait, Iraq would erase its war debt, control Kuwait's oil wealth, and increase world oil prices. In reality, Iraq did attempt to justify the invasion partly in economic terms. For instance, Iraq's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, claimed shortly after the invasion that Iraq had to "resort to this method" because its economic situation had deteriorated and it had no alternative.[9]

Fifth, despite the fact that Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, Iraq believed or at least argued that it had sacrificed its treasure to stave off the Iranian threat to the entire Arab Gulf. And like Athens which had contained the Persian threat to all of Greece in ancient times, Baghdad felt, albeit with much less justification than Athens, that it deserved the allegiance and support of the states that benefited from its military action. Iraq argued that Kuwait not only refused to renounce Baghdad's war debts and to loan Iraq more monies for economic reconstruction in the post-Iran-Iraq war period, but that it lowered oil prices by pumping too much oil, some of which was from oil fields over which Iraq laid joint claim.

The arguments above suggest that some of the reasons for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait can be traced to the Iran-Iraq war. However, it is plausible to believe that

[5] For trends in Iranian and Iraqi military power from 1980 to 1988, see Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and the West: Strategic Relations and Military Realities* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988): 82.

[6] Ibid.

[7] See Kamran Mofid, "The Economic Reconstruction of Iraq," *Third World Quarterly* 12 (January 1990): 52–54.

[8] See Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," *Survival* 33 (January/February 1991): 19.

[9] See *Cairo MENA*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Near East and South Asia (NES), 13 August 1990, 5.

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Iraq might very well have invaded Kuwait even if the Iran-Iraq war never occurred. This is implied by Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran, which triggered the Iran-Iraq war in the first place. More important, it is strongly suggested by the fact that Iraq attempted to annex Kuwait in the 1930s, laid claims to Kuwait until 1963 when it temporarily recognized Kuwait's independence, and invaded and occupied northern Kuwait in 1973.[10] It is important to point this out. Indeed, it would make little sense to use the counterfactual method to show that the Iran-Iraq war is linked to the successful containment and reversal of Iraq's Kuwait invasion if the absence of the Iran-Iraq war would have also resulted in the absence of the Kuwait invasion and thus of Operations Desert Shield and Storm.

The Iran-Iraq War and the Outcome of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

To show how the Iran-Iraq war was related to the successful containment and reversal of Iraq's Kuwait invasion, it is necessary to establish a plausible connection between the Iran-Iraq war and its effects (intervening variables) and between these effects and the success of U.S.-led operations against Iraq. The following six sections of this article are devoted to this task. Each section identifies one major effect of the Iran-Iraq war. We begin with those effects of the war that were less important in benefiting U.S.-led operations and then work our way toward the more important ones.

The Development of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The Saudi-led GCC, composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain was founded in May 1981. This political-security grouping developed through the 1980s largely in response to the Iranian threat that was dramatized by the Iran-Iraq war. The GCC states perceived Iran as implicated in the December 1981 coup attempt in Bahrain and interpreted this as an attack on their collective interests.[11] In the aftermath of the coup, several GCC states signed bilateral security agreements,[12] and Bahrain proposed the formation of a GCC rapid deployment force (RDF).[13] This proposal gained currency in 1982 after Iran scored military gains, and by October 1983 the Peninsular Shield joint GCC military exercises commenced. While militarily unimpressive, the exercises represented a novel attempt to coordinate GCC mili-

[10] On the Iraq-Kuwait territorial dispute, see Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 403–405, 569–570.

[11] See *Manama WAKH*, FBIS, Middle East and Africa (MEA), 25 February 1982, C-3.

[12] For a description of these agreements, see *Manama WAKH*, FBIS, MEA, 22 February 1982, C-3. Also, see *Riyadh Domestic Service*, FBIS, MEA, 24 February 1982, C5.

[13] See *Manama WAKH*, FBIS, MEA, 23 December 1981, C1.

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tary maneuvers and to develop the Gulf RDF as a shock absorber[14] that could buy time for regional or over-the-horizon reinforcements. Finally, the eruption of the tanker war between Iran and Iraq in 1984 intensified efforts to integrate GCC air defenses. The Saudis agreed to share Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs) intelligence with geostrategically exposed Kuwait[15] and later with other Gulf states.

The GCC did not support Kuwait effectively against Iraqi intimidation in the period preceding the actual invasion of Kuwait. GCC states did not want to provoke Iraq and believed as did America, Egypt and even Kuwait that Saddam Hussein would not invade Kuwait. Even after Iraq's invasion, GCC states managed only to hold innumerable emergency council meetings in order to support Kuwait politically and to reaffirm their pact,[16] which in any event were overshadowed by the more prominent role of the Arab League.[17]

At best the GCC played only a questionable military role against Iraq. In some quarters, this impotence was viewed with disdain.[18] Yet, observers who implied that the GCC should have played a major military role missed the point. The GCC was not created to match Iraq or Iran militarily. Among other things, it lacked the manpower and battlefield experience for such a task. And although it is currently increasing its military capabilities in order to be able to meet future threats more effectively, it had ever since its creation depended on America to ensure its security.

The development of the GCC, however, was not irrelevant for Operations Desert Shield and Storm. The U.S.-led coalition did not need the GCC to conduct its political-security operations against Iraq, provided the Saudis were willing to cooperate. But throughout the 1980s the GCC helped increase the internal stability of pro-American Gulf states and enhanced their military coordination. It also improved their defense and strategic interaction with Washington[19] and gave them a political forum within which to coordinate their policies. In addition, the GCC was the vehicle by which the otherwise reserved Saudis assumed a greater role in regional politics and security. Since the U.S.-led coalition benefited from quick and effective security-political cooperation from Arab Gulf states, particularly the Saudis, it is reasonable to believe that Operations Desert Shield and Storm would have proceeded less smoothly had the GCC never formed.

[14] *Manama WAKH*, FBIS, MEA, 7 February 1984, C1.

[15] A good discussion of the tanker war's effect on GCC security appears in R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf," *Current History* (January 1985): 41.

[16] For example, see *Cairo MENA*, FBIS, NES, 6 August 1990, 2. Also, see *Riyadh SPA*, FBIS, NES, 6 December 1990, 1.

[17] See, for instance, FBIS, NES, 3 August 1990, 1, 19.

[18] For instance, see "A Ghostly Shield," *The Economist*, 28 July 1990.

[19] This was manifested when the Saudis deterred a limited Iranian air attack in 1984 and an Iranian naval attack on their offshore oilfields in 1987. Both times they had U.S. support. On the air attack, see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, *Iran and Iraq at War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), 167. For details on the naval attack, see Patrick E. Tyler, "Saudis Turn Back Iranian Flotilla Near Oil Terminal," *Washington Post*, 4 October 1987.

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Saudi Influence and Capability Increased

The development of the Saudi-led GCC began a trend toward increased Saudi influence in the Gulf, which was accelerated by the war-related July 1987 Mecca riot. Overall, the war, while posing significant short-term threats to Saudi interests, prepared the Saudis for the challenge Iraq posed in 1990–1991.

The Mecca riot, in which over 400 Iranian pilgrims were killed by Saudi security units, was the most significant war-related political instability in the Gulf in the 1980s. The Saudis touched off the riot when they moved in to stop a forbidden political demonstration by Iranian pilgrims in front of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Despite the evidence to the contrary,[20] Iran denied that it instigated the subversion, blamed the Saudis, and called on Iranians as "the implementers of divine principles" to overthrow the Saudi royal family in revenge.[21] This caused alarm across the Gulf.

Reflecting royal family views, Saudi Prince Nayef asserted that Iran aimed to challenge Saudi rule over Islam's holy places,[22] thus damaging Saudi ties to other GCC states. This would have facilitated Iran's efforts to woo these states into supporting its war position against Iraq. Iran also wanted to use Mecca to challenge U.S. regional influence and to retaliate against Washington for reflagging Kuwaiti tankers;[23] Riyadh was a less risky target than the United States.

However, the riot, and Ayatollah Khomeini's ensuing invective in which he described Saudi King Fahd as an "infidel" unable to keep peace at the sacred heart of Islam, made the Saudis ready to sever relations and reportedly go to war.[24] While the later never occurred, Riyadh did adopt an uncharacteristic activism against Iran and eventually broke diplomatic relations citing Mecca and Iran's threat against Gulf navigation as the reasons. This was significant, because Riyadh had attempted throughout most of the Iran-Iraq war to accommodate Iran.

Relations between the two countries remained tense. Indeed, the Mecca riot was a primary cause of Iran's launching of about sixty armed speedboats at a Saudi offshore oilfield in October 1987. Riyadh responded with a full military

[20] For this evidence, see Cordesman, *The Gulf And The West*, 370–371.

[21] John Kifner, "Iranian Officials Urge 'Uprooting' of Saudi Royalty," *New York Times*, 3 August 1987.

[22] For an interview with the prince, see *Kuwait Al-Siyasah*, FBIS, NES, 25 August 1987, J1–5. Also, see Edward Cody, "Saudi Charges Iran Plotted to Upset Control of Shrines," *Washington Post* 26 August 1987. A brief summary of the Saudi view of the Mecca riot appears in *Middle East Contemporary Survey* (hereafter referred to as *MECS*), vol. xi, 1987, 589–591.

[23] On link between the Haj and U.S. reflagging, see Chubin and Tripp, *Iran and Iraq at War*, 175–176.

[24] On the Saudi view, see *Paris Radio Monte Carlo*, FBIS, NES, 28 August 1987, J1. Also, see comments by Saudi Prince Nayef, *Riyadh SPA*, FBIS, NES, 27 August 1987, J1–12. For a summary of events, see *New York Times*, 29 August 1987.

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mobilization including land troops and was reportedly ready to "make a stand" against Teheran.[25]

Oddly enough, the crisis at Mecca put in motion several developments that laid part of the security-political foundation of Operations Desert Shield and Storm. It pushed the Saudis to take major measures to improve their own security[26] and also moved them closer to Washington. The Saudis expressed fear in interviews over how close to war with Iran they had come, and, in the words of a Saudi official, wanted America to "insure our total security by insuring Iran's total paralysis."[27] As a result, Riyadh provided Washington with more direct and comprehensive military cooperation.[28]

In addition, the Mecca crisis motivated Riyadh to encourage Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE to improve their ties to Egypt, an effort that included a Saudi initiative to arrange an aid package to Egypt with help from Kuwait and the UAE.[29] As will be discussed, Egypt's increasing reintegration into the Arab world would later benefit U.S.-led operations against Iraq.

Overall, the Iran-Iraq war clearly helped prepare the Saudis for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It pushed them to assume a leadership role in the Gulf and to cooperate more meaningfully with U.S. forces. It also helped them develop and ready their forces for conflict. Indeed, Saudi defense minister Prince Sultan even went so far as to say in September 1990 that Riyadh had "military technologies capable of destroying the Iraqi army" and that Iraq knows that the Saudis have the "power, will and determination capable of deterring it."[30] While this statement was made from behind the American deterrent and was hyperbolic, and although changes in Saudi Arabia's military capability were not vital to the success of Operations Desert Shield and Storm, these changes did benefit American-led operations.

More importantly, the present analysis suggests that had the Iran-Iraq war not taken place, Riyadh would have been less confident and capable, and less trusting of Egyptian and American ability and determination. Certain implications follow from this analysis, particularly if it is considered in tandem with aspects of alliance theory.

Scholars who study alliances have shown that states are more likely to appease

[25] On Iran's attack and the Saudi response, see John Kifner, "Sea Attack by Iranians Reportedly Foiled," *New York Times*, 4 October 1987. Also, for a summary of the post-Mecca crisis competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Islamic world, see *MECS*, vol. xii, 1988, 177–180.

[26] For instance, in July 1989, they even decided to take over a floating U.S. force projection facility as a means of deterring threats from Iran. Patrick E. Tyler, "Saudis Negotiate for Gulf Barge Base," *Washington Post*, 1 August 1989.

[27] Quoted in Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudis Seeking an Arab Alliance Against Iran," *New York Times*, 16 October 1987.

[28] See Cordesman, *The Gulf And The West*, 380.

[29] Ibrahim, "Saudis Seeking," *New York Times*, 16 October 1987.

[30] In *Riyadh AL-RIYAD*, FBIS, NES, 11 September 1990, 21.

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than to oppose the threatening state if they are weak and lack effective allies.[31] Thus, we have some reason to believe that had the Iran-Iraq war not taken place, Riyadh would have been more likely to appease Iraq than it turned out to be. The Saudis would have been more likely to agree to some compromise solution in which Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait either in exchange for movement on the Palestinian issue or for political-territorial compromise with Kuwait.

Of course, the Saudis would have been reluctant to accommodate Saddam given the threatening posture of Iraqi military forces on their border. Few states purposefully flirt with suicide when they have some hope of preserving their autonomy. But regardless of its initial position, Riyadh would have been more likely to choose an accommodating policy after U.S. forces arrived in Operation Desert Shield than proved to be the reality. Indeed, at this point, the Saudis would have had to recalculate. And assuming the absence of the Iran-Iraq war, what they would have lacked as a point of reference is their own enhanced regional role, increasing assertiveness, and a substantially improved political-security relationship with Washington. They also would not have been able to count on as strong an Egyptian and European role and on an America as militarily capable for Gulf contingencies.

If we add to this picture the fact that accommodation was a cornerstone of Saudi foreign policy prior to and even throughout most of the Iran-Iraq war until the Mecca crisis, and that some influential Saudi princes were strongly anti-American and preferred Arab solutions to Arab-world problems, we can see that a policy of appeasement might very well have been adopted by the Saudis under less favorable conditions. Indeed, even with the benefit of strong allies and increased self-confidence, the Saudis considered appeasing Iraq in 1990. For their part, Egypt and Iran strongly opposed the implication by Saudi defense minister Prince Sultan that Iraq be given some territory in Kuwait in exchange for withdrawal from Kuwait.[32] And, at the outset of the conflict, Riyadh showed some hesitation in enlisting the United States against Saddam.

Less than two days after the Iraqi invasion, the pro-American Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, paid a visit to American national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. Bandar reminded Scowcroft of the pre-Iran-Iraq war Saudi doubts about American determination and expressed Saudi concern that America would lend a temporary hand against Saddam and then "pull it back," thus leaving Saddam on the Saudi border "twice as mad as he is now."[33] Had the Iran-Iraq war not strengthened U.S.-Saudi political-security relations, it is probable that such Saudi doubts would have been much greater.

But what would increased pressures for appeasement have meant for the American-led operation against Iraq? First, they probably would have decreased

[31] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. 29–31.

[32] *Belgrade TANJUG*, FBIS, NES, 24 October 1990, 7.

[33] Bob Woodward, "President Gave Saudis Word of Honor," *Washington Post*, 3 May 1991.

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America's ability to deal with the crisis as it wanted to and resulted in an outcome less favorable than the one that occurred in reality. Second, and less likely, it might have put America from day one of the crisis on a path toward agreeing to some veiled form of back-door compromise with Saddam. In the first scenario, U.S.-led operations would have suffered. In the second scenario, Operation Desert Storm might have been either delayed or suspended. While this would have saved many lives, it would have also allowed Saddam's nuclear program, which was farther along than U.S. intelligence ever suspected, a greater chance to succeed. It also would have left his army intact with the attendant negative implications for long-term peace in the Gulf and broader Middle East.

U.S.-Gulf State Military and Political Preparation

The increase in Saudi influence and capability caused by the Iran-Iraq war was related to another effect of the war, which would later benefit U.S.-led operations. The war significantly improved U.S. relations with Gulf states. Overall, the GCC states preferred accommodating Iran as a security alternative to cooperating significantly with the United States. But as the Iranian threat and their confidence in America increased, so did their propensity to oppose instead of appease Iran.

In a secret oral undertaking between the United States and Saudi Arabia in February 1981, Washington agreed to sell the latter AWACs aircraft, and Riyadh agreed to build networks of command, naval, and defense facilities large enough for a massive deployment of U.S. forces.[34] While America's foreign policy during this period, as implied by several U.S. officials,[35] was motivated by the Soviet threat, the Saudis were most concerned with the regional threat from Iran. What is ironic is that the facilities Riyadh was planning to build would benefit it against Iraq, which had appointed itself the protector of the Arab Gulf against Iran, not against Iran.

As the Iran-Iraq war progressed, the Saudis agreed more publicly to American access to these military facilities against the Soviets or in a major flare-up in the Persian Gulf.[36] When Iraq invaded Kuwait, U.S.-led coalition forces used these facilities to support rapid deployment and other logistics for Operation Desert Shield and to conduct military attacks on Iraqi territory in Operation Desert Storm.

Iran's successful military offensive at the Faw peninsula in February 1986 represented the most significant militarily-related instability in the Gulf during

[34] Scott Armstrong, "Saudis' AWACS Just a Beginning of New Strategy," *Washington Post*, 1 November 1981.

[35] For example, see former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, "Saudi Security, Middle East Peace, and U.S. Interests," *Current Policy* No. 323 (Washington, DC: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, October 1981), 1-3.

[36] See Bernard Gwertzman, "Saudis To Let U.S. Use Bases in Crisis," *New York Times*, 5 September 1985.

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the Iran-Iraq war. Together with escalated attacks on Gulf shipping, it put in motion effects relevant to the outcome of Operations Desert Shield and Storm.

In the post-1985 period, GCC states provided assistance for U.S. transit operations and forces. Bahrain provided support for port visits by the U.S. Navy and a logistics base facility for U.S. forces; the Saudis allowed the RDF enhanced access to their airfields and ports; Oman accepted a "quantum" increase in the use of its airspace for U.S. forces; UAE and Qatar allowed port visits, ship repairs, and refueling.[37] For their part, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain quietly gave U.S. forces prepositioning rights.[38] Moreover, joint U.S. military maneuvers with GCC states increased in intensity and frequency. Such maneuvers as the Bright Star exercises in 1987 and 1990 provided the means to project U.S. forces in conjunction with host nations.[39] They improved U.S.–GCC security cooperation and gave American forces valuable experience. Finally, as indicated by Kuwait's request that America reflag its oil tankers, the war reversed GCC opposition to American naval intervention in the region.[40]

Had the war not taken place, it is highly unlikely that the Gulf states would have cooperated with the United States to the extent that they did, because they would have lacked a strong enough incentive to so. Thus, this part of the political-security groundwork for Operations Desert Shield and Storm would not have existed.

Improvements in U.S. Military Capability

Just as the Iran-Iraq war motivated improved U.S.–GCC relations, it also accelerated U.S. defense efforts for Gulf contingencies, which had been put in motion by the Iranian revolution and, more importantly, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[41] Thus, the Iran-Iraq war played some role in preparing America militarily for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

The regional threat to American interests created by the Iran-Iraq war compounded the perceived threat Moscow presented from Afghanistan at the global level. This had two major implications. First, the Iran-Iraq war helped motivate the Saudis to develop major facilities for U.S. rapid deployment forces and Arab states to engage in joint military exercises with Washington. Second, the war was

[37] See Witness Statement by George B. Crist, U.S. Congress, House, Hearing Before A Subcommittee Of The Committee On Appropriations, *Department Of Defense Appropriations For 1989*, 100th Congress, 2nd. sess., table 2, 178.

[38] Cordesman, *The Gulf And The West*, 135.

[39] On these exercises, see Witness Statement Before The Senate Armed Services Committee (hereafter referred to as Schwarzkopf statement), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of U.S. Central Command, 8 February 1990, 55.

[40] See *MECS*, vol. xi, 1987, 33, and 29–35 for a good summary of the reflagging mission.

[41] See S. A. Yetiv, "How the Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan Improved the U.S. Strategic Position in the Persian Gulf," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 18 (Summer 1990): 62–81.

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added incentive for Washington to develop rapid deployment capability, which was crucial for Operation Desert Shield.[42]

Concerned with global and regional threats to Gulf security, Washington was determined not only to improve its capability to deter "outside" pressure on the Gulf,[43] but also to deal with pressures arising within the Gulf. In that spirit, President Ronald Reagan stated in October 1981 that there was "no way" the United States could "stand by" and see Saudi Arabia threatened to the point that the flow of oil could be shut down.[44] This and other statements of the same kind later became known as the Reagan Doctrine, which was widely perceived as a U.S. commitment to protect Saudi Arabia against both external and internal threats. In this sense, it was a departure from the Carter Doctrine, which aimed more toward the deterrence of outside as opposed to internal threats to Gulf security.

In 1980, U.S. projection to the Gulf of minimal forces would have taken many weeks,[45] but by 1983, America could have had the first ground force to the Gulf in a few days. U.S. airlift, sealift, and prepositioning capabilities continued to improve substantially throughout the 1980s.[46]

The American military build-up for gulf contingencies came at great cost[47] and was not without its inadequacies. However, if Iraq had invaded Kuwait instead of Iran in 1980, Washington would not have had an effective conventional response. That President Jimmy Carter considered the nuclear option against a possible Soviet invasion of the Gulf from Afghanistan in 1980 underscores this point.[48]

Egypt Reintegrated into Persian Gulf Security System

The improvement in U.S.–GCC relations and the development of Gulf-related U.S. military capabilities benefited U.S.-led operations against Iraq as did Egypt's reintegration into the Arab world. The GCC states alienated Egypt for

[42] See George C. Wilson, "Effort Is Launched to Beef Up U.S. Rapid Deployment Force," *Washington Post*, 28 September 1980.

[43] Statement by Nicholas Veliotes, assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, U.S. Congress, House, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs and the Joint Economic Committee, *U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf*, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 May 1982, 9.

[44] In Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* [hereafter referred to as Reagan Papers] (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1981), 873, 952.

[45] President Reagan referred to this lack of military readiness for Gulf contingencies as a "shame" in *Middle East Economic Digest*, 7 November 1980. He later aptly described the RDF as "neither rapid nor deployable and not much of a force." See Reagan Papers, 1982, vol. i, 228, 254, 296.

[46] For excellent details, see Schwarzkopf statement, 173–302. Also, see U.S. Department of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY1988/1989 Budget and FY1988-92 Defense Programs*, 12 June 1987 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), 36.

[47] For details on part of these costs, see *Rapid Deployment Forces: Policy and Budgetary Implications* (Congressional Budget Office, 1983).

[48] See Richard Halloran, "Soviet Buildup Near Iran Tested Carter," *New York Times*, 27 August 1986.

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its decision to make peace with Israel. They refused to cooperate with it politically or militarily and even severed diplomatic relations. Their approach to Egypt, however, changed as a direct result of the Iran-Iraq war. Indeed, they restored diplomatic ties to Egypt primarily because of its potential anti-Iranian role.[49] Saudi King Fahd's visit to Cairo in March 1989, the first trip by a Saudi monarch since the Camp David agreement of 1978, symbolized Egypt's reintegration into the Arab world.

The Iran-Iraq war slowly reintegrated Egypt into the political-security system of the Persian Gulf. Egypt was even viewed as prepared to provide military advisers and instructors to GCC states. And although it was reluctant to involve itself in the Iran-Iraq war, Egypt probably was added insurance for GCC states against the threat from Iran.[50] Had the Iran-Iraq war not taken place, it is much less likely that Egypt would have assumed a role in Gulf security and bridged its differences with Arab-Gulf states. These states would have lacked the incentive provided by the war to restore security and diplomatic ties to Egypt, and Egypt would have been deprived of an important catalyst for improving its relations with Gulf states. Thus, Egypt probably would not have been in a position to play a role as the most influential Arab member in the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq.

Transatlantic Security and Political Framework

The Iran-Iraq war not only reintegrated Egypt into the Gulf security system, but also increased Europe's role. The allied naval intervention during the Iran-Iraq war, while economically inefficient and politically shaky,[51] laid part of the political and military groundwork for transatlantic cooperation during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. In political terms, it accomplished four basic things. First, it showed the states of the Western European Union (WEU), the nine-member group of European states that deals with problems that occur outside the purview of the NATO charter,[52] that their military participation alongside American naval forces could serve to contain Iran and protect Gulf shipping rather than exacerbate the political-security situation in the Gulf. These states initially rejected Washington's request for mine sweeping support because they wished to avoid the escalatory potential and the costs of naval deployment to the

[49] For a brief analysis, see Warren Richey, "Gulf Visit Marks Key Egyptian Role," *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 January 1988.

[50] On Egypt's possible role, see Philip H. Stoddard, "Egypt and the Iran-Iraq War" in Thomas Naff, ed., *Gulf Security and the Iran-Iraq War* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 37–39.

[51] For a case-study analysis of allied naval intervention in the Gulf and for a consideration of a strategic option for future transatlantic policy toward this region, see Steve A. Yetiv, "The Transatlantic Dimension of Persian Gulf Security," *Naval War College Review* 44 (Autumn 1991): 45–58.

[52] The WEU is composed of Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Spain and Portugal joined the WEU in March 1990.

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Gulf,[53] were quite reluctant to confront Iran, and were averse to out-of-area military deployments.[54]

Second, it allayed European fears that America would be a trigger-happy superpower dragging them unnecessarily into a regional conflict. Indeed, the American effort during the Iran-Iraq war seemed measured and effective. While Iran was less than daunted at times by U.S. force, at other times the opposite seemed to hold true. By the end of 1987, American forces escorted twenty-three convoys without attack from either Iran or Iraq.[55] The U.S. helicopter attack that crippled an Iranian mine laying ship in September 1987 also seemed to deter Iran for several months.[56] Third, the allied intervention during the Iran-Iraq war undoubtedly provided experience in ironing out transatlantic political differences regarding Gulf security and helped in the difficult task of developing patterns of political cooperation for out-of-area operations.

It stands to reason that these factors made it more probable that the Europeans would support U.S.-led operations against Iraq in lieu of espousing a negotiated settlement with Iraq at one point or another in the crisis. Indeed, even as things stood, France and Germany were disposed to accommodate Iraq, despite the fact that America's credibility was tied to reversing Iraq's aggression. Cooperation between the allies showed some real signs of strain.[57] Such differences probably would have been more significant had the allies not profited from their positive interaction in the previous Gulf crisis.

In military terms, the European allies clearly built on their experience during the Iran-Iraq war. American and European navies did not coordinate their naval presence during the Iran-Iraq war. Among themselves, European forces did engage in some bilateral and multilateral naval cooperation.[58] Efforts were also made to coordinate a joint European naval force for the Gulf within the framework of the WEU. However, other than an agreement in early 1988 among Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium for some mutual cooperation, European forces were generally uncoordinated.[59] European naval participation during the second Gulf crisis was considerably more coordinated. Indeed, unlike during the

[53] Although the British were already active in the Gulf since 1980 with the two frigate Armilla Patrol and France also had an Indian Ocean naval presence.

[54] See James M. Markham, "European Policy in the Gulf: A Striking Reversal," *New York Times*, 16 September 1987. Also, see "Naval Co-operation in the Gulf War," *Jane's NATO Handbook* (1988–1989): 200.

[55] Ibid., *Jane's NATO Handbook*, 198.

[56] "Six mercifully dull months," *The Economist*, 30 January 1988.

[57] See Craig R. Whitney, "Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity," *New York Times*, 25 January 1991. Also, see editorial, *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 January 1991. In addition, see Jim Hoagland, "Germany's Timidity in a Time of Crisis," *Washington Post*, 29 January 1991.

[58] For instance, Dutch and Belgian mine sweepers received tactical support from British warships on a bilateral basis. "Iraq's Round," *Economist*, 12 September 1987.

[59] Michael Chicester, "Allied Navies and the Gulf War: Strategic Implications," *Navy International* 93 (June 1988): 320.

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Iran-Iraq war crisis, the WEU ministers agreed formally to coordinate their respective areas of operation in the Persian Gulf and to exchange intelligence and engage in mutual protection of forces. They also provided mutual logistical and operational support.[60] This level of cooperation proved important in enforcing the economic embargo against Iraq and in conducting extensive mine sweeping operations.

Conclusions

At the broadest level, this article has sought to explain aspects of the policy choices, behavior, and performance of some of the key actors in the recent crisis in the Gulf. It has shown that their actions and the outcome of their actions were linked to the previous crisis of the Iran-Iraq war. Thus, it suggests that we cannot understand the recent Gulf crisis without understanding the Iran-Iraq war.

Beyond this, two major issues should be distinguished in this article. The first deals with the link between the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait. On this point, this article argues that while the Iran-Iraq war produced consequences (such as an imbalance of regional power) that made an Iraqi attack on Kuwait more likely in 1990, the Iran-Iraq war was not a necessary cause for Iraq's invasion. Given Iraq's historical claims to Kuwait, its invasion of Iran in 1980, and Saddam's demonstrated ambition, it is plausible to believe that Iraq might have invaded Kuwait even if the Iran-Iraq war had never taken place.

The second issue and the central thesis of this article is that the Iran-Iraq war is linked to the outcome of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait or, in other words, to the successful U.S.-led containment and eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The first and second arguments of this article should be considered in tandem. Together they suggest that had the Iran-Iraq war not taken place, Iraq still might have invaded Kuwait, but that the outcome of the invasion would have been different.

The Iran-Iraq war contributed to the GCC's development and to an increase in Saudi influence. It was added incentive for Riyadh to develop military facilities to handle the type of massive threat posed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It helped reverse Egypt's isolation from Gulf security, enhance political and strategic coordination and trust between Arab-Gulf states and Washington, and push America to accelerate the development of Gulf-related military capabilities. In addition, it helped develop transatlantic security and political ties for Gulf contingencies. Together, these factors laid part of the foundation for Operations Desert Shield and Storm. The absence of the Iran-Iraq war and of all these interrelated and reinforcing consequences would have made the containment and reversal of Iraq's aggression in Kuwait more difficult.

[60] For an authoritative account of the WEU's role in European and Persian Gulf security, see Willem Van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security Order: WEU's Contribution," *NATO*

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While the present case-study is of some value in and of itself, we still should ask what it implies for policy and theory. First, this study does not show that Operations Desert Shield and Storm would have failed had the Iran-Iraq war not laid part of their political-security foundation. The successful containment and reversal of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was probably tied more to America's general military superiority over Iraq, to its will to use its capability, and to Saddam's gross miscalculations than to remote factors. This article shows how remote causes, while perhaps not crucial in explaining the outcome of Desert Shield and Storm, were linked to it.

Second, we can say that both the initiation of actions and the outcomes of these actions have proximate and remote causes. The causes of the initiation of actions and the causes of their outcomes can be similar. Thus, we might say that one reason for Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait was that the regional balance of power favored it, and one reason why its invasion was contained and reversed successfully was that the balance of power turned against it. However, while the causes of the initiation of actions and the causes of their outcomes can be similar, they are often quite different.

Some scholars have debated the relative importance of remote and proximate causes in their explanations of the outbreak of conflicts. However, little work has been done on evaluating the relative importance of remote and proximate causes in explaining the outcomes of conflicts, be these military, economic, or political in nature. It stands to reason, however, that knowing why X occurred is no more important than knowing why X resulted in a particular outcome. Because remote causes are important in our broader attempts at explaining the outcomes or results we observe and because they are largely neglected, it follows that more attention should be devoted to them. In the present case, for instance, I call attention not only to the importance of analyzing why Iraq invaded Kuwait but also to the remote causes that help explain why its invasion was contained and reversed successfully. Assessing how observed outcomes are related to remote causes improves our ability to determine how things hang together causally, which in turn enhances our ability to evaluate and make policy and to build theory. This is because such efforts depend fundamentally on ascertaining what produces observed outcomes, or in the present case, where the causes of our policy successes and failures might lie.

Third, Iraq's use of force against Iran, which triggered the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq war, created some obvious costs for Iraq. The war, for instance, took a brutal human and economic toll on Iraq. But one major cost to Iraq of its attack on Iran has not been recognized: its attack and the ensuing war produced consequences that contributed not only to Iraq's interest in invading Kuwait, but also to its demise at the hands of the American-led coalition. Iraq's debacle in

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Review 38 (August 1990): 18–23. On the WEU's contribution during the Kuwait crisis, see Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival* 32 (November/December 1990): 529–530.

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1990–1991 against U.S.-led forces should be viewed as perhaps the greatest cost for Iraq of its invasion of Iran in 1980. Indeed, Iraq's invasion of Iran and the war it produced are linked here to the serious diminution of Iraqi power in 1990–1991.

Fourth, had Iraq never invaded Kuwait, some observers might have argued—perhaps plausibly—that Iraq's attack on Iran in 1980 produced some benefits for Iraq and should not be viewed as a failure. These observers might have pointed to the fact that Iraq's attack on Iran impeded Iran's efforts to spread its revolution throughout the Gulf, enhanced Iraq's image in the Arab world, helped Saddam build a major military capability, and thus offered him the means for subtle forms of influence building. This argument, however, is undermined if one links Iraq's attack on Iran and the ensuing Iran-Iraq war first to Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait and then to its demise.

Fifth, based on the above points, this article demonstrates something that is not often shown: how the costs of the use of military force can manifest themselves in the long term. Indeed, Saddam sowed some of the seeds of Iraq's demise in 1990–1991 long before he ever invaded Kuwait. It just took some time for the effects he helped put in motion to play themselves out in the historical process.

The analysis here suggests that there are some benefits in exploring the long-term implications of the use of force (or of other foreign policy instruments). This type of analysis could provide two possible benefits. It could offer a more accurate picture of the consequences of the use of these instruments. Such knowledge is currently lacking. Indeed, in an inventory of research on the subject, Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro found that "the effect of the foreign policy tool used has been a neglected area of research." They expressed both surprise and concern about this finding and asked an interesting question: "Since the purpose of foreign policy is to bring about some consequence . . . why study foreign policy if you are going to ignore the outcomes which decision-makers hope to bring about with that policy?"[61]

The second benefit of such analyses would be to increase our understanding of the utility of the use of one foreign policy instrument relative to that of another. Should actors use the stick or the carrot, force or economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure or the withdrawal of foreign aid? Answers to these questions are to some extent related to what we know about the relative consequences of the use of each of these instruments. Presumably, the more we know about these consequences, the more prudent will be our policy choices.

Sixth, this study suggests that it is unwise to assume that the apparent success of American intervention in the Persian Gulf could be easily repeated elsewhere. Indeed, the American-led success was clearly related to remote causes particular to the regional and international politics of the Persian Gulf region. Washington

[61] Cited in David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 11–12.

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benefited from the political-security foundation laid prior to the actual Gulf crisis and from Saddam's questionable statecraft.

Finally, since this article uses counterfactual analysis as a vehicle of argumentation, it seems appropriate to conclude by addressing one issue neglected so far. Some observers might argue that had the Iran-Iraq war never taken place, Iraq would have been much less capable militarily, because it would not have gained battlefield experience and would not have had the incentive or opportunity to obtain as high a level of arms from the West. Thus, it would not have posed as great a military threat as it did in 1990–1991.

While there is of course some truth in this view, statistics show that the arms race between Iran and Iraq was fast paced long before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war.[62] While Iraq would not have received massive loans from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with which to buy arms had the Iran-Iraq war not taken place, it also would not have squandered its human resources and its own domestic means to buy arms. It is therefore reasonable to believe that while Iraq would not have had as many trained men under arms had the Iran-Iraq war not taken place, it still would have had developed a substantial military force with which to invade Kuwait.

[62] See Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971–85* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1987), 16–17.

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Gorbachev's Difficult Time in the Gulf

GALIA GOLAN

Mikhail Gorbachev's "new political thinking" for foreign policy was tested and stretched to its limits in the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf crisis; it may have been stretched beyond its limits. New thinking posited a world of interdependent states and, therefore, international relations devoid of ideology, East-West competition, and the zero-sum game approach characteristic of the cold war. These ideas dictated Soviet behavior in the early stages of the Gulf crisis, which began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. A second period could be discerned, however, as a result of the singular increase in the influence of conservatives from the Soviet military, KGB, and Communist party in Moscow. The power of these groups was felt primarily in domestic affairs, most blatantly with regard to the nationalities issue; but it was gathering in the area of foreign policy, as demonstrated by the difficult juggling act undertaken by Gorbachev as the Gulf war progressed.

Moscow's initial behavior following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was entirely in keeping with the new thinking. Intent upon demonstrating that the Soviet Union was serious about belonging to the world community of responsible, law-abiding, and cooperative nations, the Soviet leadership left the old ideological and zero-sum game considerations well behind and joined the American-led

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coalition against a "progressive" Third World state allied to Moscow by treaty. This alliance had long since been reduced to a basically commercial (and military) relationship, and the Soviets also had much to gain economically from siding with the West and such conservative Gulf states as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Yet Soviet officials anticipated a loss for 1990 of approximately $800 million in trade and payments, primarily for tripartite oil deals the Soviets had with Iraq for deliveries to countries such as Bulgaria, Rumania, and India, as well as additional losses from nonpayment of an Iraqi debt to the USSR unofficially estimated at anywhere from $5 to $20 billion.[1] Nor was the failing Soviet oil industry in a position significantly to take advantage of the price rises caused by the crisis.

Early behavior dictated by new thinking and apparently charted by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze included the unprecedented joint condemnation of Iraq issued with visiting U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on 3 August 1990. Subsequently the Soviet Union participated in the UN Security Council sanctions and suspension of virtually all official relations with Iraq except for those connected with the crisis itself. An interdepartmental committee created for the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Kuwait and Iraq maintained contacts with Baghdad, sometimes combining its efforts with the high-level political attempts by Moscow to resolve the crisis. But even in their meetings with Iraqi leaders prior to the outbreak of war, the Soviets loyally represented the coalition position. This included explicit rejection of Saddam Hussein's proposed linkage of withdrawal from Kuwait to the resolution of the Palestinian and Lebanese problems. The most Moscow would concede to this point was sequential linkage—that is, agreement that the Arab-Israeli conflict be tackled following resolution of the Gulf crisis. Sequential linkage, however, was also advocated by the United States, as expressed by President George Bush in his speech to the United Nations in October 1990 and the joint communique issued after the September Soviet-American summit in Helsinki. The Soviets also expressly welcomed the decisions of the Arab heads of state to join the coalition force in the Gulf, which meant that their own ally, Syria, entered into cooperation with the United States.

From the outset, however, the policy chosen by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze was fraught with difficulties, some stemming from new thinking itself, if not from opposition to new thinking. A major problem was the possibility of the use of force if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait. New thinking expressly opposed any but political solutions to crises; the thrust of Gorbachev's foreign policy eschewed the risks of military conflicts and the use of the military in overseas ventures. Combined with the post-Afghanistan syndrome in Soviet society, these constraints made it hard for Moscow to support decisions calling for the use of force much less join in any military action in the Gulf. Gorbachev, therefore, delayed and sought to soften, if not prevent, the relevant Security Council deci-

[1] *Sovetskaia Rossiya*, 26 August 1990; TASS, 30 August 1990.

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sions (Resolutions 665 and 678) permitting the use of force. However, in each case, following high-level attempts to persuade Iraq to retreat (in talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Azziz or Prime Minister Sa'dun Hammadi), the Soviets cooperated with Washington. They even agreed in principle to join a UN force should one be created—a move for which Shevardnadze was later to be severely criticized.[2] Such cooperation initially came after American assurances at the Helsinki summit in September 1990 that U.S. forces would not remain in the Gulf on a permanent basis; but it was also possible to view Soviet cooperation as a quid pro quo for American promises of such things as the inclusion of Moscow in Middle East affairs (specifically the Arab-Israeli peace process), and later, one might speculate, American tolerance of the attempted Soviet crackdown in the Baltics.

Domestically the Gulf crisis unleashed a flood of criticism and demands focused mainly on the fact that the Soviet Union had been the primary arms supplier to Baghdad. A Soviet poll conducted in September 1990 by the relatively new Soviet Institute for Public Opinion revealed that 38 percent of the population held Moscow at least partially responsible for the Iraqi invasion because of the arms supplies. An earlier debate by experts erupted into demands for the cessation of the use of arms-sales as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Countering arguments by the military that the arms trade accounted for 15 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings, critics claimed that most client states (including Libya, Syria, and Iraq) had not met their payments, turning arms deliveries into one big Soviet aid program.[3]

Criticism expressed in the media broadened to include all of Moscow's past policies in the Middle East (in which, it was claimed, any dictator or local leader was supported who merely learned to pronounce the word "socialism"). The decision-making process and continued influence of persons responsible for the past policies came under attack, along with the lack of information as to who had authority to make decisions—for example, over arms deliveries to the Third World and just what quantities actually were involved. The criticism reached the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet during testimony by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov, who later admitted that Mos-

[2] Eduard Shevardnadze, speech to the United Nations, *International Herald Tribune*, 26 September 1990.

[3] For this discussion, see *Izvestiia*, 1 March 1990; Andrei Kolosov, "Reappraisal of USSR Third World Policy," *International Affairs*, 4 (April 1990): 40; Yurii Kornilov, *Literaturnaia gazeta* 31 (January 1990); Andrei Kolosovskii (assistant deputy foreign minister and possibly the same person as the above Andrei Kolosov), "Risk Zones in the Third World," *International Affairs* 8 (August 1989): 44–45; and his even earlier "Regional Conflicts and Global Security," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniia* 6 (June 1988): 32–41; A.V. Kozyrev in *Izvestiia*, 21 February 1990; Petr Litavrin, "The Issue of Arms Trade Limitation," *SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIIA* 1 (January 1989): 13–20. Even Libya was said to still owe $2 billion to Moscow for arms supplies.

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cow's "entire concept of military cooperation with the countries of the Middle East has to be revised and conclusions drawn" in light of the Gulf crisis.[4]

From the same amorphous pro-*perestroika* camp came demands for the removal of all Soviet military experts from Iraq. Parliamentarians of the Russian Republic took this even further with a demand for abrogation of the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship and Cooperation Treaty and cessation of training of all Iraqis in the Soviet Union. Many commentators explicitly championed American moves in the Gulf in response to Saddam Hussein; and some from academia, the press, and the general public urged direct Soviet participation in the form of volunteers or the dispatch of at least a symbolic naval or medical contingent.[5]

Yet the vast majority of persons supporting Gorbachev's policy on the crisis opposed the dispatch of Soviet troops in any form. A public opinion poll indicated that only 8 percent would have approved such an action, and this fact was duly exploited by the opponents of Moscow's position on the Gulf. Gradually these opponents became more vociferous, expressing in some cases deeper and broader concerns related to the new thinking altogether and the future of Soviet power.

The most powerful opponents were from the military (mainly army officers) and presumably those involved in the military industries. They could argue a contradiction within new thinking itself between rejection of the military as distinct from political resolution of conflict, on the one hand, and the domestic economic need for arms sales abroad. The opponents were mainly concerned, however, over the loss of Soviet power, especially with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact; they saw in Gorbachev's Gulf policy a blow to Soviet power in still another region. In the eyes of many in the military, not only were Moscow's positions in the Middle East and its potential for future power projection endangered, but the United States stood to benefit. They did not condone Iraq's moves, but they perceived the United States as using the crisis to establish a military presence in the Gulf, even as a replacement for the no longer tenable American military presence in Western Europe and a plan to shift NATO power against the Soviet Union to areas to the south of the USSR. Gorbachev's vision of the end of bipolarity had, in their eyes, turned into American unipolarity, and with Soviet assistance.

The military conservatives' concern over the blow to Soviet power was shared by conservatives of the Communist party. Before his appointment as vice-president, Gennadi Yanaiev, who was the politburo official responsible for international affairs, complained in the Soviet parliament over the "flabbiness" of government responses in the crisis.[6] He objected to Moscow's eclipse as a world power, demonstrated by what was perceived as a rubber stamp of Washington's decisions regarding the Gulf. Russian nationalists joined in their dissatisfaction

[4] Belonogov, interview to *New Times* 33 (September 1990): 6.

[5] Igor Belaiev, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 10 October 1990; Alexei Arbatov, *Moskovskie novosti*, 14 October 1990; Galina Sidorova, "World Closes In," *New Times* 36 (September 1990): 4–5.

[6] *Pravda*, 31 August 1990.

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and opposed a policy that appeared to slight the Arab cause to the benefit of Israel. So too did many Soviet Arabists from academia and the press, although not apparently those in the Foreign Ministry. Many of these Middle East specialists were not necessarily opposed to new thinking, as were the military and party conservatives; but they did object to what was viewed as disloyalty to Moscow's long-time allies in the Arab world. As experts, they maintained that the American presence in the Gulf would eventually produce an indigenous Arab and Muslim (including Soviet Muslim[7]) backlash. So they argued that it would be to the Soviets' interest to dissociate themselves from the Americans in the region. In this there was agreement with the military, who also worried over the future of Soviet positions in the region.

This was not merely an academic debate; it was a genuine policy disagreement. For many involved, the issue was one mainly of degree—that is, how to pursue new thinking without becoming a second rate power or mere appendage of the United States. For others, however, it was a question of priorities emanating from principles. On the one side was Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's vision of the Soviet need and interest in a strong relationship with the West, primarily the United States, in an interdependent world in which regional influence or positions would no longer be sought because of the end of zero-sum game competition and the advent of international cooperation. On the other side was the conservative view of continued competition in the world and need for regional positions and influence, which took priority over—indeed, could be allowed to jeopardize—cooperation with the West.

Over the months of the Gulf crisis, the conservatives of the military and party gained in strength. This was due primarily to the sharp deterioration in the Soviet domestic situation: the nascent collapse of the economy, the impending disintegration of the Union, the breakdown of law and order—in short, the failure of *perestroika*. By late fall 1990, Gorbachev was already making concessions to the conservatives, assuming greater central powers, and permitting a freer hand to the security forces, presumably with the hope of creating a situation in which he could eventually enforce *perestroika*. Soviet policy regarding the Gulf crisis contributed, however, to the strengthening of the conservatives. Compounding, for the military, the humiliation and weakening of Soviet military power caused by the loss of Eastern Europe and the arms agreements with the West, Gorbachev's newest ostensible "sell out" to the West could and was used to rally party and nationalist forces. Popular sentiment could even be aroused through accusations that this policy of disregard for Soviet prestige and status in the world also included plans to send troops to fight in the Middle East.

As major architects of *perestroika*, such as Aleksandr Yakovlev and Leonid Abalkin, became the victims of concessions to the military and party on matters

[7] While the problems and demands of Soviet Muslims only marginally touched on foreign policy issues, there was sympathy for Saddam Hussein in Muslim circles as indicated by the numerous letters received by the press from persons proclaiming their willingness to volunteer for Iraq.

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such as Baltic independence, economic reform, even elements of *glasnost*, Shevardnadze became the first victim in the realm of foreign policy.Under constant demagogic attack from the conservatives with regard to the Gulf policy and actually undermined by independent and secret deeds by the military in the area of arms control and possibly also the Gulf, Shevardnadze expressed his despair over the specter of dictatorship and resigned on 20 December 1990.[8] With his exit, the way was open for subtle but significant changes in policy that gradually became apparent in Soviet behavior once the war in the Gulf was under way.

Shevardnadze's replacement by career diplomat Aleksandr Bessmertnykh was in fact a positive sign promising the continuation of his Middle East policies, which had been supported by Bessmertnykh. But the new foreign minister lacked the authority and power of Shevardnadze, especially against the rising power of party conservatives such as Yanaiev, who was named vice president; and Aleksandr Dzasochov, party secretary for ideology and chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Supreme Soviet. While these two gained a greater say in foreign policy, conduct of the Gulf policy fell increasingly into the hands of Middle Eastern expert Evgenii Primakov. While a supporter of new thinking, Primakov had come into conflict with Shevardnadze as early as November regarding, apparently, what he saw as the need to pursue a more independent policy in the Middle East (vis-à-vis the United States) for the protection of future Soviet interests in the Gulf. Primakov undertook a number of initiatives to prevent and later to end the war against Saddam Hussein, culminating in the last minute Gorbachev proposals for a cease-fire negotiated with Tariq Azziz in Moscow.

Signs of the change came during Bessmertnykh's talks with Baker in Washington at the end of January 1991, when the new Soviet foreign minister cautioned the Americans against destroying Iraq rather than concentrating on the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.[9] This was followed by what appeared to be a bid for a cease-fire launched by Gorbachev. Gorbachev issued a statement that called for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and condemned Iraq's effort to provoke Israel into the battle. Gorbachev also spoke of what he said appeared to be moves by the coalition forces that went beyond the mandate accorded by Security Council.[10] This statement followed just a few days after a decision by the Communist Party Central Committee calling on Gorbachev to "take the necessary steps" to bring about an end to the bloodshed.[11] It was accompanied by the dispatch of Primakov to Baghdad on 12 February 1991 with what turned out to be a Soviet plan for a cease-fire and Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Primakov's plan was subsequently refined in talks with Tariq Azziz in Moscow on 21-22 February to call for a

[8] Such acts included the shifting of weapons beyond the Urals and classifying others as naval weapons so as to exclude them from recent arms accords. Many in Washington believe that Shevardnadze actually had no knowledge of at least some of these steps.

[9] *International Herald-Tribune*, 28 January 1991.

[10] TASS, 4 February 1991.

[11] *Pravda*, 4 February 1991.

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cease-fire to be followed forty-eight hours later by an end of the sanctions against Iraq and an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait over a period of three weeks.

At the same time, there were increasing rumors of the continued presence of Soviet military advisers in Iraq (despite official Soviet denials), of continued Soviet military aid to the country, and even a report that Iraqi planes shifted to Iran had been transferred to Soviet air bases in Afghanistan for maintenance.[12] While these were for the most part only rumors, they may also have been signs of the increased influence of military circles in Moscow either conducting their own foreign policy or forcing Gorbachev's hand in the interests of preserving Soviet positions in the Middle East.

The cease-fire initiative was obviously a last-ditch attempt to head off the planned ground offensive, which Gorbachev had urged the Americans to postpone. It represented, however, the supreme effort by the besieged Soviet leader to placate the demands of the conservative forces in Moscow, primarily the military, without seriously damaging relations with Washington. While Gorbachev's interest in preserving the relationship with the United States was clearly not shared by the military, he may have believed that the arrangements for Iraqi withdrawal would be open to further negotiation by the coalition and that support from some West European countries such as France would minimize damage to Soviet–U.S. relations. That Gorbachev was engaged in a juggling act to please domestic opponents in hopes of ultimately resuming his own policies was demonstrated by the full cooperation accorded by the Soviets in the events which followed. The United States virtually ignored the Soviet plan, the ground war was commenced, and the Soviets joined with the coalition at the Security Council in dictating terms to Baghdad for a cease-fire and compliance with all the Security Council resolutions.

Ramifications of Soviet Behavior on Middle East Policy

Some positive results of Soviet policy became apparent early in the crisis. There was a significant warming of Soviet-Egyptian relations, which had been improving steadily prior to the crisis in any case. More significantly, diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia opened. This had been sought for some time by Moscow, expected after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and finally accorded by Riyadh as a token of appreciation for Soviet cooperation in the crisis. The Saudi move boosted the Soviets' standing in the Gulf region itself, including opening of relations with Bahrain. By the end of December this included a $4 billion credit from the Kuwaiti government, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab

[12] Reuters, 25 January 1991; *Liberation* (Paris), 12 February 1991; *Nouvel Observateur*, 14 February 1991. In response, Bessmertnykh told French Foreign Minister François Dumas that only a few dozen Soviet nationals remained in Iraq. See *International Herald-Tribune*, 13 February 1991. All of the 7,830 nationals including 193 military experts had been evacuated, the Soviets claimed, by 9 January 1991.

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Emirates.[13] Political gains were also registered in Soviet-Iranian relations, as Primakov engaged Teheran in his peace-making trips back and forth to the region, especially in connection with his cease-fire initiative. The dissociation from the Americans urged by opponents of Shevardnadze's policy was of particular importance for the benefits that were to accrue to the Soviets in their dealings with Iran during the Gulf war.

Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov's comments about a reevaluation of Soviet military relations with the Middle East may have portended cut backs in Soviet arms deliveries to the region. Certainly the Gulf crisis itself raised the question internationally of the regional arms race, which might inhibit Soviet arms deals in the future. The Syrians, already concerned over Moscow's refusal to provide arms beyond what the Soviets considered reasonable defensive sufficiency, were apparently worried about such a possibility. The visit by Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas to Moscow in early February 1991 was connected with this, as the Syrians—armed with $2.5 billion assistance received from Saudi Arabia in exchange for participation in the anti-Saddam coalition—sought new arms promises. Just what the Soviets offered is still not clear; there were reports that Moscow preferred repayment of Syria's arms bill rather than increased supplies, while other reports claimed that the rising influence of the Soviet military led to previously withheld promises of increased deliveries and new weapons systems. Moscow was not willing, however, to offer credits.[14]

The division within the Arab world during the crisis, with some of Moscow's major clients supporting Iraq, prompted not only domestic Soviet demands for a review of the criteria for Soviet-Middle East relations but also a counterresponse on the part of the Arabs themselves. Many in the Arab world had already been concerned over what they perceived as a weakening of the Soviets' world position and willingness to act as a major supporter. It was not surprising, therefore, that PLO executive member Abdallah Hourani responded to Soviet policy in the crisis by characterizing Moscow's behavior as "an attempt to please the Zionist movement and obtain American money." Indicating what was probably the response of others as well, Hourani concluded: "It is no longer possible to regard

[13] *Izvestiia*, 24 December 1990.

[14] The arms deal was reported to be worth $2 billion. If this is the figure for one year, it would be a return to pre-Gorbachev high levels of deliveries, which averaged $2 billion a year in the 1980–1984 arms accord. If, however, this is the figure for the full 1990–1994 accord, which has been under negotiations since the fall of 1989, it would be a drastic reduction from the $1 billion yearly average of the 1985–1989 agreement. Moreover, Syria is making large purchases from North Korea and Czechoslovakia, presumably from the $2.5 billion given by Saudi Arabia, which would not leave much for a new arms deal with Moscow, especially in view of the Soviet demand for cash rather than credit, and for payment of back bills totalling approximately $16 billion (possibly less as Moscow reportedly has cancelled $5 billion of the debt). As to types of weapons, the Soviets have already provided MIG-29s and SU-24s, but the Syrians are requesting the longer-range SCUD C. They have reportedly sought the equivalent missile from China or North Korea in the case that Moscow is not forthcoming.

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Moscow as a friend and ally of world forces of liberation, including the Arab world and the Palestinian people and cause."[15] Unwilling to go quite that far, the Palestinian embassy in Moscow issued a statement that limited its criticism to the Soviet press; but visits by PLO officials Abu Mayzin, Yasir abd Rabbo, Nayif Hawatmeh, and later George Habash during the crisis were probably designed to stem the deterioration occurring in relations.[16]

Gorbachev himself admitted to an Arab journalist that "it may already seem to some that there has been a decline in our common prestige or in that of somebody's country." Without by implication minimizing the harm that might accrue to Soviet-Arab relations, he said that the problems would be resolved favorably if Moscow's policy in the crisis proved successful.[17] Yet the policy did not prove successful in the eyes of many Arabs. Primakov's efforts notwithstanding, the Soviets did not emerge from the crisis with increased credibility or prestige in the region. At best these efforts may have been viewed in some Arab circles as an attempt at compensation for the Soviet failure to support Saddam; at worst the Soviet moves were seen as irrelevant and impotent, indicating an even greater weakness of Soviet power than previously assumed. If Primakov's intention was, as seems likely, to try to preserve some Soviet prestige and entree with regard to Iraq and its supporters in the Arab world, the effort failed. While it ran the risk of alienating the anti-Iraqi forces in the region, the ultimately futile effort fell far short of satisfying the pro-Iraqi elements. When added to the apparent military-technological inferiority of Soviet-equipped Iraqi fighting power in comparison with western counterparts—"a technological gap" subsequently noted by some Soviet commentators—Primakov's attempt may have contributed to a further weakening of the Soviet position in the region.[18]

That Gorbachev himself was not too concerned about the Arab reaction was evident by the upgrading of Soviet-Israeli relations that he initiated during the crisis. Gorbachev took the unprecedented step of receiving two ministers of the Israeli government in September 1990 and then raised official relations between the two countries to consular level following a meeting between Shevardnadze and Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir in Washington.[19] In addition, the long-

[15] Reuters, 27 September 1990.

[16] Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic, 26 September 1990, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report SOV*, 27 September 1990, 28. D. Zgerskiy, interview with Palestinian ambassador, *New Times*, 38 (October 1990): 6–7; Radio Moscow in Arabic, 28 September 1990, FBIS-SOV, 1 October 1990, 25–26 (Abu Mazin and Abd Rabbu visits); TASS, 4 January 1991 (a second visit by Abu Mazin); and TASS, 13 December 1990 (Habash visit). There was another visit to Moscow by PLO officials during the war, during which the Soviets reportedly cautioned the PLO against any action that might exacerbate the situation, presumably meaning terrorist acts. (Israeli television, 31 January 1991.)

[17] Moscow domestic radio, 31 August 1990, FBIS, *Daily Report SOV*, 4 September 1990, 51.

[18] Soviet defense systems were found to be no match for American weapons such as the Tomahawk or HARM missiles, as noted by Gennadii Gerasimov in *Sovetskaia kultura* 10 (8 March 1991): 12.

[19] The meeting, the first since the 1967 break between a member of the Soviet government and

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delayed direct flights between Israel and the Soviet Union were finally initiated, albeit as charters so as to avoid their use by emigrants en route to Israel.

There did not appear to be any change in the Soviet attitude toward either Israel or the Palestinians at the time of Primakov's cease-fire initiative or as an immediate result of the crisis. Even though Soviet-PLO relations had cooled under Gorbachev, the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute sought by the Soviet leadership called for resolution of the Palestinian issue in any case. There was the possibility of a warming of relations under the increased influence of party conservatives, the KGB, and Soviet Arabists, but in fact there were no signs of such a change nor of any effort to help Yasir Arafat restore his own tarnished image in the world. There were reports that Moscow was even unwilling to invite Habash and Hawatmeh to Moscow after the war, but in fact Hawatmeh did make a visit at the end of June. Nonetheless, there were numerous references to the need for Soviet contacts with local Palestinians, by implication, as an alternative to the PLO in Tunis.[20] The Soviet newspaper *Izvestiia* caused a minor altercation with the PLO by suggesting that the PLO was not the *sole* legitimate representative of the Palestinian people inasmuch as it had not received a mandate from the Palestinians to represent them.[21]

Similarly, one might have expected a cooling of Soviet-Israeli relations with the rise of the Arabists, nationalist elements noted for their anti-Semitism, and military forces indifferent to the good will generated with the United States by a positive Soviet attitude toward Israel and Jewish emigration. Yet there were no signs of a Soviet retreat on either the matter of emigration or the improvement of relations with Israel. On the contrary, following the war the improving Soviet-Israeli relationship climaxed in an unprecedented visit by the Soviet foreign minister (at this time, Alexandr Bessmertnykh) to Israel during his May 1991 tour of the region.

Actually, the Soviet position on resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict appeared to remain much the same, even without Shevardnadze at the helm. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union accepted Saddam's proposed linkage of withdrawal from Kuwait with resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the logical response of both superpowers to the dangers raised by Iraq's power play was to seek removal of the sources of instability in the region as a whole. In this respect, one result of the crisis promised to be greater priority and pressure on the part of both superpowers, possibly in concert, for the achievement of a settlement in

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an Israeli prime minister, took place on 12 December. The Israeli consul in Moscow presented his credentials on 24 December 1990.

[20] The Soviet consul-general in Israel announced that Moscow had begun cooperation with Palestinians in the occupied territories. (*Kol Israel*, [Voice of Israel] 11 June 1991.)

[21] Vladimir Skozyrev, *Izvestiia*, 27 May 1991. PLO representative in Moscow, Nabil Amr, answered that PLO-Soviet relations had deepened as a result of the Bessmertnykh meeting with Arafat in Geneva. (Amr claimed that Arafat had authorized the Soviets to speak for the Palestinians.) A foreign ministry source subsequently denied the according of such significance to the meeting.

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the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, Moscow clearly benefited on this issue from the Gulf crisis. At the September 1990 Helsinki summit and again in the January 1991 joint communique issued by Baker and Bessmertnykh in Washington, the United States agreed to Soviet participation in the postwar Arab-Israeli peace process. While Moscow may have had to provide a regional quid pro quo—possibly that was the impetus for renewal of consular relations with Israel—this was clearly one of the rewards for cooperating with the United States in the Gulf crisis.

The inclusion of Moscow in Baker's postwar initiation of an Arab-Israeli peace process, including the meeting between the two foreign ministers in Cairo in May, indicated that Washington continued to see a role for the Soviet Union, despite Gorbachev's brief retreat from *perestroika* and new thinking in the last stage of the crisis. Indeed, even the nature of this role remained much the same as it had been under Shevardnadze—a cooperative, relatively even-handed role in which the Soviets were active partners with the United States in the pursuit of compromises from all parties to the conflict. The watchword remained flexibility. Moscow was amenable to any kind of negotiations even if short of an international conference; it approved of the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation if the PLO were deemed unacceptable; it supported an interim agreement with Soviet-U.S. assurances that a permanent settlement would eventually be negotiated; and it continued to express its willingness to accept any procedures and solutions agreeable to the parties concerned.

Undoubtedly some officials preferred a return to the pre-Gorbachev approach of championing the demands of the Arabs in a competitive mode vis à vis the Americans, or at least what many called an independent line.[22] Yet this idea was juxtaposed with what critics of the pre-Gorbachev support for the Arab world advocated as a policy determined by Soviet, not Arab, national interests. Moscow's postwar policy, presumably still guided by Primakov, may actually have sought something of a middle path whereby the Soviets would refrain from alienating the Arabs while nonetheless genuinely seeking resolution of the conflict and preferring stability over the more limited Brezhnevian goal of merely preventing a Pax Americana. Primakov's approach was based more on the Arab states (including Jordan) than necessarily emphasizing the PLO; while it included cooperation with the United States, it leaned toward the idea of an independent Soviet position. Yet whatever the intention, postwar Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict did not reflect any significant impact of the Gulf war or even of the monumental domestic crisis which occurred simultaneously with the war.

The character of the Gulf war may have had an effect on the approach to a settlement. In particular, Saddam Hussein's use of altered (intermediate range)

[22] There were those in Washington too, who preferred the previous competitive model of super power relations, viewing Primakov's efforts to achieve a premature cease-fire as signs of Soviet competitiveness.

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surface-to-surface missiles and threats to use chemical warfare, as well as the Israeli nuclear deterrent evoked by Washington, emphasized the need to bring about some controls on arms development and transfers, if not to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, which propelled the regional arms race. During the crisis, the Soviets made several references to proposals for regional security arrangements originally raised by Shevardnadze in 1989 and repeated to the Israelis, Syrians, and Americans in the months prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

These proposals, intended originally to meet Israeli security demands in the event of a settlement, called for the creation of a military risk-reduction center to introduce and monitor a number of security measures for the whole region. These were to include limitations on arms deliveries to the countries of the region; control on the transfer of technology, particularly in the realm of nonconventional weaponry, nuclear and chemical warfare; troop reductions and demilitarized zones; prior notification of military exercises; international inspection and verification procedures; commitments against terrorism; and other similar measures.[23] As the major arms suppliers, the Soviet Union and the United States would be the principal initiators and presumably supervisors of such arrangements, but the United Nations was to provide the overall framework and necessary mechanisms.[24] Shevardnadze also proposed to the UN during the crisis that restrictions be applied by a multilateral regime governing nonproliferation of certain types of missiles and missile technology and certain types of weapons, in addition to the creation of an international registry of arms sales and supplies.[25]

The increased influence of the military promised to jeopardize the pursuit of such proposals in view of the interest in arms sales and strategic positions abroad. Yet the military and their conservative allies may have maintained their own past interest in regional stability, notably for a region so close to Soviet borders, as well as a desire to avoid the kind of military build-up that might prevent the withdrawal of American forces from the area. There were actually no signs of a retreat from the Soviet interest in regional security, as demonstrated by renewed references to the idea during the visit of Secretary Baker to Moscow in March 1991 and the Soviet proposals conveyed to the Arab states immediately after the war. Nonetheless, the question of arms deliveries to Syria and Iran (which could pay) might limit the type of restraints Moscow would be willing to advocate. Indeed, a concentration on nonconventional weapons, as distinct from conventional weapons, in the postwar period may have reflected this dilemma; the Soviet military industry (not unlike its western counterparts) preferred to discuss only weapons of mass destruction so as to continue sales of conventional equipment.

The repercussions of the Gulf crisis at the global level were somewhat unclear. Initially, the Soviet-American cooperation in a crisis situation appeared to clear

[23] TASS, 23 February 1989; *Izvestiia*, 29 April 1990. (Shevardnadze speeches.)

[24] The proposal was not fully formed, particularly with regard to the role of the superpowers as distinct from the UN.

[25] *Pravda*, 26 August 1990.

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the way for future collaboration, building trust, and sensitizing both domestic and international elites and populations to the phenomenon of superpower cooperation. Potential impediments to such cooperation were created in the course of the crisis, however, as conservative skeptics in both countries pointed to the pursuit of self-interest on the part of the other power. The strengthened position of those forces interested more in restoring Soviet position and power in the world than in cooperation with the West forced Gorbachev to pursue policies contradictory to *perestroika*'s inherent need for close relations with the United States. This contradiction led the Soviet leader to deliver a warning for domestic consumption about the "fragility" of Soviet-American relations.[26]

Moreover, the apparent reversal of *perestroika*, as well as the appearance of problems regarding Soviet-American strategic disarmament accords and European conventional forces agreements, combined with Soviet behavior at the end of the Gulf crisis were bound to raise doubts in some circles in Washington. Many of the digressions from Gorbachev's new thinking could be attributed to independent actions by the Soviet military or to such temporary and reversible aberrations as concessions to conservative forces. These were of no consequence provided Gorbachev were able to reassert his control and policies. Washington appeared to adopt this general interpretation, persisting in its willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

It could be argued that as in the case of the region itself, so too in the view of the United States and the world's great powers, Soviet weakness became particularly apparent during the crisis. Moscow could have made the pursuit of the anti-Iraq offensive most difficult, possibly forcing Washington to act without UN approval or international support. Yet the USSR's status as a superpower was very much in question. Both the priority and the nature of Gorbachev's domestic problems, as well as some interpretations of new thinking, placed serious limits on the besieged leader's potential for action. It has been argued that by not taking a more active role in the form of dispatching even a symbolic force against Iraq, Moscow lost or passed up an opportunity to demonstrate just how much it had changed its foreign policy and become a respectable member of the enlightened community of nations.[27] Whether unable or unwilling to take a more active part, the Soviet Union maintained its ostensible position as a superpower more as a status bestowed upon it by Washington than one actually deserved in substance. Moscow's weakness was apparent both at home and abroad.

Decision Making in the Crisis

Gorbachev did eventually reassert himself and his policies domestically and gained significantly in strength following his agreement with Boris Yeltsin in

[26] Gorbachev speech in Minsk, 26 February 1991.

[27] Views espoused by such analysts as Andrei Shumikhin of the USA-Canada Institute and Alexei Arbatov of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

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spring 1991, in the subsequent accord with nine republics to remain in the USSR, and in Yeltsin's impressive popular election to the presidency of the Russian Republic in June. This domestic element had in fact dictated much of Soviet policy during the Gulf crisis, at times in contradiction of new thinking. Yet the Gulf crisis was neither a central domestic topic in the preoccupied and troubled USSR nor one which significantly altered Soviet decision making beyond the indirect connection with Shevardnadze's resignation. While *glasnost* was very much in evidence during the crisis, providing a very good sample of the new generally free media even in time of crisis, democratization of decision making was far less evident. Decision making in time of crisis is generally contracted and concentrated in the hands of the few, but in this case the lines of authority, the roles of the various bureaucracies, institutions and decision-making bodies as well as of public opinion and elected organs were far from clear.

Within the Soviet parliament, Soyuz, the conservative group of Communist and nationalist deputies was most active in the onslaught on Shevardnadze, exploiting his statements regarding the possible Soviet contribution to a UN force in the Gulf. The parliament and the Soviet Supreme Soviet were not that active, however, with regard to the crisis, not even the International Affairs Committee, which might have been expected to monitor the decisions of the government. This committee did debate the crisis following a presentation by deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov, who was the ministry's chief person dealing with the Gulf conflict. And it did hear samples of both sides of the public debate. Yet its resolutions dutifully supported the government's policy, with only the slightest hint of criticism from different points of view expressed in the committees deliberations.[28]

The committee also heard criticism of the Foreign Ministry for its failure to provide information and analyses of events with regard to Soviet state interests. This criticism was reported only by the newspaper *Izvestiia*, which itself was critical of the fact that Belonogov's presentation to parliament had contained nothing not already available in the press.[29] The paper repeated this complaint later, not only with regard to information provided the parliament and the public, but also the failure of the Supreme Soviet to conduct a thorough debate of policy in the crisis. Criticizing the committee's perfunctory discussion and approval of the government's policy, *Izvestiia* correspondent Vladimir Skosyrev bemoaned the fact that foreign policy remained in the hands of "the top people in the state,

[28] See for example the resolution of the deliberations at the end of August, TASS, 30 August 1990. It cited both the importance of restraining the United States from the use of force (calling for a solution through the UN) and the need to review the advisability of recalling the specialists once their dependents were evacuated from Iraq. It expressed support for the government's position demanding the "complete and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the complete restoration of its sovereignty [sic], national independence, and territorial integrity"; it also condemned Iraq's taking of foreign hostages.

[29] *Izvestiia*, 1 September 1990.

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the Foreign Ministry and other powerful departments," despite the numerous demands for parliamentary control over the formation of state policy.[30]

Voicing similar criticism, Aleksandr Bovin argued that many "doubts and questions" would disappear if "our super-departments—Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry—were to behave less coyly, if they were clearly to explain and describe the motivation behind their decisions and their positions."[31] Also in *Izvestiia*, Stanislav Kondrashov presented a more nuanced picture of infighting between the two ministries. On the question of the military specialists, he said that in private discussions with "senior staff members" of the Foreign Ministry opposition to the specialists remaining in Iraq was expressed on moral grounds. Defense Ministry people reportedly said that the decision must be made by the political leadership, but the Foreign Ministry people argued that the recommendation for withdrawal must come from the military inasmuch as the personnel belonged to them.[32]

From these comments it could be seen that it was not clear just who or what organs were critical in the foreign policy crisis decision-making process under *perestroika*. It was explained that the party had transferred most of its foreign policy duties to the Foreign Ministry, but as the "ruling party" it aspired to maintain its "responsibility for the elaboration of the Soviet Union's foreign policy strategy.[33] According to one military spokesman, neither the military nor the party was responsible for decisions regarding, for example, arms sales. Lt. General V. Nikutich told *Izvestiia* that such decisions, once taken by the Politburo and the Council of Ministers, were now taken by the president and the Council of Ministers.[34] While the latter did set up an interdepartmental committee to organize the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Kuwait and Iraq, there was no information released on the jurisdiction, authority, level of participants, or *modus operandi* of this committee.

An apparently separate crisis group was established, possibly only with the beginning of the war. Its members consisted of the defense, interior, and foreign affairs ministers as well as the head of the KGB, presidential foreign policy aide Anatolii Chernaiev, and presidential adviser Primakov, with the participation also of presidential press aide Vitalii Ignatenko and deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov.[35] According to one account, Gorbachev consulted with Vice-President Yanaiev, Bessmertnykh, Vladimir Kriuchkov, Dmitrii Yazov, Primakov,

[30] *Izvestiia*, 16 September 1990.

[31] *Izvestiia*, 5 September 1990.

[32] *Izvestiia*, 4 September 1990.

[33] *Pravda*, 13 August 1990 (interview with Yanaiev).

[34] *Izvestiia*, 16 August 1990. Ivan Belousov, chairman of the State Commission for Military-Industrial Affairs in the Council of Ministers (of which he was deputy chairman) told an interviewer that arms sales were handled by the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations with heavy involvement of the Foreign Ministry. See *Pravitelstvenii vestnik* 2 (January 1991): 12 in FBIS-SOV, 8 July 1991, 1–2.

[35] Primakov, *Pravda*, 2 March 1991.

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CPSU Central Committee International Department Chief Valentin Fallin, and others when he was informed of the imminent commencement of the war on 17 January. But only Primakov, Belonogov, Chernaiev, and Ignatenko were reported to have participated in the critical February talks with Azziz in Moscow.[36] Primakov created his own informal committee of consultants, composed of virtually all the major Middle Eastern and some other experts to advise him during the crisis.[37]

Virtually no mention was made of the Presidential Council's role in the crisis. One report (gleaned, it was commented, only from "a great many phone calls"), explained that the council was still in the formation stage, implying that it would be "another few months" until the council assumed its function as a "national security council" modeled after Washington.[38] In any case, according to an interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev (probably written before the Gulf crisis), he and the council were to have only advisory capacity, interpreting events and advising the president, with no decision-making powers.[39] An interview with Valentin Fallin was a tiny bit more explicit. He explained that operational matters were in the hands of the Foreign Ministry (as distinct from the past when the Party Politburo "had to approve virtually every verbal note"), while problems of "a broad state level" were the domain of the Presidential Council. He implied that the party's role was to express the public mood on those matters "protruding beyond the framework of interstate relations." While this was not entirely comprehensible, Fallin did explain that each of the three bodies would provide its own presumably different analyses and proposals to the president.[40] In November 1990, however, the surprising announcement came that the Presidential Council was to be disbanded. It was eventually replaced by a new National Security Council to which Primakov was elected as the only nonminister dealing with foreign policy matters, specifically economic ones. The functions, authority, and jurisdiction of this council, however, were no clearer than those of its predecessor.

Equally confusing and potentially even more significant was the distinction that appeared between the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and that of the Russian Republic (RSFSR). A few weeks after the debate in the International Affairs Committee of the Soviet parliament, the analogous committee of the Russian Republic under the chair of V. Lukin (a very forward looking and

[36] *Sovetskaia Rossiya*, 18 January 1991; *Izvestiia*, 22 February 1991.

[37] This group was by no means homogeneous and most likely offered quite contradictory advice. The existence of this group, however, contradicted claims in *Komsomolskaia Pravda* (14 February 1991) that Soviet Arabists were not consulted during the crisis. The informal committee consisted of Aleksandr Kislev, Nodarii Simoniia, Vladimir Nosenko of IMEMO; Vitalii Naumkhin and Irina Zviagelskaia of the Oriental Institute; Andrei Shumikhin and Victor Kremeniuk of the USA Institute; and V. V. Zhurkin, head of the European Institute.

[38] *Izvestiia*, 1 September 1991, following the visit by White House Chief of Staff John Sununu.

[39] *Soyuz* 34 (September 1990): 4.

[40] *Pravda*, 20 August 1990. Although this interview took place at the height of the Gulf crisis, no reference was made to the crisis or decision making at the time.

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long-standing new thinker) also debated Soviet policy in the Gulf. Unlike the Soviet parliament, the Committee of the RSFSR parliament did not fully approve the government's policy but called for the recall of all Soviet specialists in Iraq including the military experts, abrogation of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, and cessation of the training of Iraqi military personnel in the Soviet Union.[41] The central Soviet media avoided all mention of these decisions or even the fact of the committee's debate, undoubtedly hoping to avoid the potentially explosive implications of serious, oppositional involvement of a republic in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.[42] Yeltsin refrained from any public disagreement with the central government's Gulf policy, but the appointments of such professional and decisively new thinkers as Lukin to chair the committee and Andrei Kozyrev as RSFSR foreign minister suggested that a new problem of jurisdiction and decision making for foreign policy might be added to the increasingly untenable Soviet federal system.

The domestic debate over the Gulf crisis continued well into the postwar period; the proponents of each point of view drew appropriately different conclusions regarding the outcome of the war. This too was evidence of the preeminence of the domestic scene influencing attitudes toward the crisis. Those who favored a return to pre-Gorbachev policies, that is a cold war rather than new thinking approach, saw in the crisis the victory of American military hawks advocating a unipolar, American-dominated world in which Washington determined who and what constituted aggression, and military might ruled. For the military among these old thinkers the Iraqi defeat was either the result of backward (Iraqi) forces using good (Soviet) arms or not fighting at all, on the one hand; on the other hand, it demonstrated a technology gap that necessitated increased investment and development of the Soviet arms industry. Further, it demonstrated, some claimed, what would be the inadequacy of a military doctrine based on defensive sufficiency. Thus, for conservative forces, the results of the war fortified their arguments against domestic military reform and for a strong Soviet military to combat the growing dominance of the United States, along with the need for greater arms production not only for Soviet uses but also for sales and assistance to Third World nations. Thus the Soviet Union would regain its status as a superpower.

Pro-*perestroika* forces, however, presented another interpretation, concluding that the crisis produced an unprecedented sample of international cooperation on the basis of universal principles of law, reason, and democracy in opposition

[41] *International Herald-Tribune*, 13 September 1990; *Post facktum* (Moscow), September 1990. A few weeks later it was revealed that on 4 September a group of forty-eight Soviet oil specialists in Iraq had sent a letter to the RSFSR parliament calling for assistance in helping some 300 Soviet specialists seeking to return to Russia. See *Argumenty i fakty* 39 (29 September–5 October 1990): 5 in FBIS, 2 October 1990, 12. A similar letter was handed to the Soviet ambassador in Baghdad on 1 October by a different group, representing 400 specialists. *Izvestiia*, 5 October 1990.

[42] Only very indirect references were made in the central press, for example, *Izvestiia*, 16 September 1990.

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to aggression and tyranny. Their emphasis was on America's willingness to subordinate itself to the decisions of the United Nations, even with regard to cessation of the hostilities. For the nationalists among these forces, or at least to counter the disappointment over the decline in Soviet status, they could argue that it was Soviet pressure for peaceful resolution of the conflict that stopped the Americans from pushing on to Baghdad. Deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU, Andrei Grachev, maintained that "it was the political impetus from the Soviet side that stopped the Americans short of Baghdad, for it reminded them that other members of the coalition would not follow them."[43] His was a middle position, which belittled the risks to Soviet-American relations and welcomed the existence of differences, rather than total identity, between the national interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in the crisis.

The determination of the Soviet national interest, however, remained elusive. Each component of the domestic debate provided its own definition and then judged Soviet policy in the Gulf accordingly. Having steered his usual zigzag course in this international crisis much the way he conducted domestic policy (and for most of the same reasons), Gorbachev may have failed to satisfy any one group and alienated most. While he was able subsequently to forge an alliance with the democratic forces, thus bolstering *perestroika*, the anti-*perestroika* forces were also fortified by this crisis. In this sense the Gulf crisis, by no means a cause of the subsequent conservative effort to overthrow Gorbachev in the coup attempt of August 1991, may have been a contributing factor. Insofar as new thinking, with all its foreign policy and military ramifications, aggravated the conservatives' more central concerns over the eclipse of the party, the weakening of the military, the collapse of the economy, and, most important, the disintegration of the Union, the Gulf crisis played a role. The defeat of the conservatives, however, may have opened the way to a more wholehearted cooperative Soviet policy vis à vis the West in future international crises—provided that there is an all-Union body strong enough to pursue a unified foreign policy for the varied and independent republics.

[43] Andrei Grachev, *New Times* 17 (May 1991): 20–22.

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Clarence Thomas, Black Pluralism, and Civil Rights Policy

LEE SIGELMAN
JAMES S. TODD

Senator [Howard M.] METZENBAUM. . . . To me it is rather significant . . . that . . . to the best of my knowledge, nobody—nobody—in the American civil rights community will be here urging the confirmation of the nominee.

That gives a message loud and clear to the entire Nation. And I would think it would have a strong message to the nominee himself. I think it would say to him: What is there about me that causes the civil rights community not to be here, supporting my nomination? Does the whole army march to a different drumbeat than that which I play?[1]

Senator [Charles E.] GRASSLEY. . . . What do the liberal interest groups fear from this man? That he dares to think for himself? That he challenges the establishment? That he offers some new solutions to some old festering problems? He represents a new kind of role model, one that will not walk in lockstep with the established orthodoxy and one that challenges the prominence and the domination that the groups have maintained over the last 25 to 30 years. Clarence Thomas is a challenge to the status quo, and these special interest groups are threatened.[2]

President George Bush's 1 July 1991 nomination of Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall as an associate justice of the Supreme Court set in motion

[1] U.S. Congress, Hearing Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, U.S. Senate, on Clarence Thomas, of Missouri, To Be Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 23 July 1986, 8.

[2] U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st sess., 15 October 1991, S14629.

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a sequence of events that now seem destined to be stored in the nation's collective memory under the heading of "sexual harassment" rather than "civil rights." But long before it was stunningly detoured by Anita Hill's sexual harassment allegations, the debate over the Thomas nomination raised the issue of pluralism among black Americans: to what extent there is genuine diversity among blacks in views of civil rights policy.[3] By Thomas's own reckoning, the sexual harassment charges themselves culminated a long line of attempts to deter him from and to punish him for his forceful advocacy of viewpoints at odds with "mainstream" black leaders. These attempts reached new depths, Thomas furiously maintained, in the Senate Judiciary Committee's unprecedented special hearing on the sexual harassment allegations—a proceeding Thomas denounced as "a high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think for themselves, to do for themselves, to have different ideas, and . . . a message that unless you kowtow to the old order, this is what will happen to you."[4]

The Thomas nomination provides a compelling vantage point from which to explore black opinion on civil rights policy. His views number few supporters among civil rights leaders, but where do average blacks stand on broad issues such as why poverty continues to be widespread among them and what the role of government should be in alleviating this problem? More specifically, how do blacks feel about issues such as racial preferences, quotas, and school busing—which the Court will be called on to adjudicate in coming terms? To what extent is there a black consensus on such issues? Is the civil rights establishment really out of touch with the black public, or is this merely wishful thinking on the part of conservatives? How many blacks really share Thomas's positions on these issues?

The Nomination and the Opposition

The Thomas nomination confronted civil rights leaders with the Hobson's choice of either supporting a nominee with whom they strenuously disagreed on major policy issues or opposing him, knowing that if his nomination were blocked, the next nominee would certainly not be a black with views similar to Justice Marshall's and would probably not even be a black. Benjamin Hooks succinctly stated the dilemma by asking, "If we decide to oppose him, what is the alternative?" As if in answer to his own question, Hooks was reported to have predicted that if Thomas were defeated, the next nominee would be "a white Genghis Khan."[5]

[3] See, for example, Arch Puddington, "Clarence Thomas and the Blacks," *Commentary*, February 1992, 28.

[4] "Judge Thomas's Evening Statement to the Committee," *Washington Post*, 12 October 1991.

[5] Quoted in "On the Record," *National Review*, 12 August 1991, 10; and Walter V. Robinson, "White House Readying Campaign for Thomas," *Boston Globe*, 28 July 1991.

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Columnist William Raspberry approvingly quoted a friend who had told him, "Given a choice between two conservatives, I'll take the one who's been called 'nigger.'"[6] After some initial hesitation, the NAACP came out against Thomas, as did the Congressional Black Caucus, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the predominantly black National Bar Association, and the National Baptist Convention USA (the nation's largest black organization, with almost nine million members).

President Bush predictably denounced intimations that the nomination had been guided by strategic considerations. He described Thomas as "a fiercely independent thinker with an excellent legal mind" who "has excelled in everything that he has attempted." Thomas, he proclaimed, would "be a great Justice. He is the best person for this position," and "the fact that he is black and a minority has nothing to do with this in the sense that he is the best qualified at this time. . . . I kept my word to the American people and to the Senate by picking the best man for the job on the merits."[7]

This glowing assessment of Thomas's qualifications was not unanimously shared. Commentaries on the nomination teemed with language denoting less than distinguished credentials. The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary rated Thomas only "qualified," and Senator Bill Bradley, playing on Bush's words, described Thomas as "the best person for Bush's political agenda."[8] Bush's denial that race had been the determining factor in Thomas's selection was derided as "farcical," and the nomination itself was denounced as hypocritical, since Bush, a staunch opponent of racial quotas, had selected "the ultimate quota candidate."[9]

Bush delighted in reciting the Horatio Alger-like saga of Thomas's rise from the strict segregation and grinding poverty of rural Pin Point, Georgia, declaring that "the kind of life he's had" should serve as "a model for all Americans" and had earned Thomas "the right to sit on this nation's highest court."[10] Immediately, however, dissenting opinions were voiced. Lewis Lapham characterized as "an inspired non sequitur" Bush's conclusion that Thomas's status as a role model qualified him for membership on the Supreme Court.[11] Jesse Jackson, contrasting Thomas's rise with his own, denied that Thomas had pulled himself up:

> The difference between Clarence Thomas and me is not that he has been victimized more but that he has been sponsored more—by the president, by conservative and

[6] William Raspberry, "Thomas and the Black Mainstream," *Washington Post*, 10 July 1991.

[7] "Excerpts from News Conference Announcing Court Nominee," *New York Times*, 2 July 1991.

[8] Saundra Torry, "ABA Panel Judges Thomas 'Qualified' for High Court," *Washington Post*, 28 August 1991; U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 102d Congress, 1st sess., 4 October 1991.

[9] Michael Kinsley, "Class, Not Race," *The New Republic*, 19 and 26 August 1991, 4; Christopher Edley, Jr., "Doubting Thomas: Law, Politics and Hypocrisy," *Washington Post*, 7 July 1991.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Lewis H. Lapham, "Justice Horatio Alger," *Harper's*, September 1991, 8; see also Richard Sennett, "A Role Model Unto Himself," *New York Times*, 12 August 1991.

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moderate Republicans, by the whole Republican Party. Clarence Thomas is the most sponsored black man in American history.

If my party sponsored me as much as his party sponsors him, we wouldn't even need a primary. I could just go straight to the general election.[12]

In recent years, Thomas and other prominent blacks who oppose policies favored by the major civil rights groups have often been condemned in the strongest possible terms—as "little more than turncoats, gravitating toward white power and money in a conservative era," as "Oreos" or "nut cases" who do not speak in an "authentically black voice," and even as "colored quislings," "snake-oil salesmen pitching their right-wing spiel in Orwellian doublespeak," or "subverters of the core values of Afro-American culture."[13] When Justice Marshall was asked at a press conference whether he would like to be succeeded by another black, he replied that getting the "right" judge was more important than the judge's race, noting his father's admonition to beware of "a black snake as well as a white snake—they both bite."[14]

This advice seemed much on the minds of civil rights leaders in the days following Thomas's nomination. Representative Craig Washington described Thomas as "not fit to shine the shoes of Thurgood Marshall," and Jesse Jackson declared that "It would be a betrayal of the heritage of our struggle to support anyone who threatens to undermine it."[15] Building on this theme, Representative Major Owens, after comparing Thomas to Benedict Arnold and French collaborator Henri Petain, concluded that elevating Thomas to the Supreme Court would be "a gross insult, a cruel slap in the face of all African Americans."[16]

Throughout his career, Thomas has seldom hesitated to reciprocate the civil rights establishment's dim view of him, calling the leaders of civil rights organizations "out of touch with reality" and asserting that all they do is "bitch, bitch,

[12] Quoted by William Raspberry, "Thomas's Credential: Deprivation," *Washington Post*, 20 September 1991; on a similar theme, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., "An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* (January 1992): 1015–1020.

[13] These descriptions are from Peter Applebome, "Black Conservatives: Minority Within a Minority," *New York Times*, 13 July 1991; Stephen L. Carter, *Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby* (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 6; and Playthell Benjamin, "Black Neocon Artists: Living Large, Thinking Small," *Emerge*, November 1991, 47–48.

[14] Quoted by Haywood Burns, "Clarence Thomas: A Counterfeit Hero," *New York Times*, 9 July 1991.

[15] Quoted by Richard L. Berke, "Court Nominee Gives Credit to Civil Rights Movement," *New York Times*, 10 July 1991; and Robert Suro, "Jackson Spurns Thomas But Warns of Creating Martyr," *New York Times*, 11 July 1991.

[16] Quoted by Ruth Marcus, "Rights Groups, Black Caucus Urge Senate Panel Not to Confirm Thomas," *Washington Post*, 20 September 1991. On the recurrence of the betrayal motif in black political thinking, see John White, *Black Leadership in America: From Booker T. Washington to Jesse Jackson*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1990); and Matthew Holden, Jr., *The Politics of the Black "Nation"* (New York: Chandler, 1973).

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bitch, moan and moan, whine and whine."[17] Indeed, in a 1987 interview with *Reason* magazine, he claimed that he could find nothing of value in the mainstream civil rights agenda: "*Reason*: Are there any areas where you think today that the civil rights establishment is doing really good work? By that I mean NAACP and—*Thomas:* No. *Reason*: None? *Thomas:* I can't think of any."[18]

Looking back, Thomas perceives the ill repute in which the Republican party and conservatism have long been held within the black public as directed at labels, not ideas:

> [O]ur ideas themselves received very positive reactions, especially among the average working-class black American who had no vested or proprietary interest in the social policies that had dominated the political scene for the past 20 years. In fact, I was often amazed with the degree of acceptance. But as soon as "Republican" or "conservative" was injected into the conversation, there was complete about-face. The ideas were okay. The Republicans and conservatives, especially the black ones, were not.[19]

But Thomas's frustration over this rejection pales by comparison to his resentment of his "pariah" treatment at the hands of civil rights leaders, who, he and other critics charge, are primarily concerned with protecting their own privileged positions and the hegemony of their "Hammurabi Code of Correct Negro Thought in America."[20] Accordingly, disagreements over the views he has expressed and the policies he has administered have produced an unceasing series of attempts to destroy him politically:

> . . . [T]he real issue is why, unlike other individuals in this country, black individuals are not entitled to have and express points of view that differ from the collective hodgepodge of ideas that we supposedly share because we are members of the same race. There seems to be an obsession with painting blacks as an unthinking group of automatons, with a common set of views, opinions and ideas. Anyone who dares suggest that this may not be the case or has a viewpoint that disagrees with the "black viewpoint" is immediately cast as . . . some kind of anti-black renegade. . . . The dissenter from the common view becomes a pariah, and cannon fodder for cute phrases by silver-tongued orators. . . . Dissenters are pilloried and used for target practice in the media. . . .[21]

For virtually as long as he has been in the public eye, Thomas has complained of being persecuted for his political views and has decried the unfairness of being "treated with disdain, regularly castigated, and mocked [and] . . . accused of

[17] "*Reason* Interview: Clarence Thomas," *Reason*, November 1987, 31; Juan Williams, "Thomas and the Isolation of the Liberal Establishment," *Washington Post*, 15 September 1991.

[18] "*Reason* Interview," 32.

[19] Clarence Thomas, "No Room at the Inn: The Loneliness of the Black Conservative," *Policy Review* (Fall 1991): 76.

[20] This term is employed by Tang Nivri, "New Massas for the Old Negro Thought Police," *Emerge*, November 1991, 49.

[21] "*Reason* Interview," 32–33. See also Carter, *Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby*; and William Raspberry, "Now for the Rough Stuff," *Washington Post*, 16 September 1991.

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anything without recourse and with impunity."[22] But in his testimony at the Senate Judiciary Committee's special hearing on sexual harassment, he went considerably further, charging that his good name had been indelibly smeared and his family irreparably harmed in retribution for his views. From the very start of the confirmation process, he testified, he had considered himself a "sitting duck for the interest groups," which he expected to "attempt to kill me." Lest anyone wrongly conclude that he was speaking metaphorically, he added, "And yes, I even expected personally [sic] attempts on my life."[23]

Thomas believes that the civil rights establishment has been permitted to pose as the voice of all blacks, when the truth is that "a lot of black Americans have a lot of different opinions on a lot of different things." "Blacks," he has said, "are no less pluralistic than the rest of society. Just as no one really speaks for white America, no one really speaks for black America. . . . [B]lack Americans clearly reject the demeaning and racially derogatory notion that we must all think alike."[24]

As soon as Thomas was nominated, white supporters seized on this theme, portraying the nomination as striking a blow for black pluralism and against the civil rights establishment. "Clarence Thomas," Representative Newt Gingrich asserted, "is going to validate the idea that there's more than one opinion in the black community"; William F. Buckley congratulated President Bush for "remind[ing] the nation, and above all . . . black Americans, that it is incorrect to think of the black population as a monolith"; and Charles Krauthammer portrayed Thomas as living proof "that black conservatism is a respected and respectable current" of black opinion.[25] However, others perceived the issue quite differently, arguing that blacks were being asked to accept a maverick whose philosophy no more than a handful of them embraced and the great majority found anathema.[26] Despite the respectful attention that Thomas, Stephen Carter, Thomas Sowell, Shelby Steele, Walter Williams, and other critics of the civil rights establishment had been accorded in the nation's press, the black public was said to have remained solidly in support of the policy agenda of the established civil rights groups. Thus, political scientist Lucius Barker detected "a remarkable degree of consensus and unity" in blacks' positions on policy issues.[27] Another

[22] Thomas, "No Room at the Inn," 76.

[23] "Thomas: 'This Is Worse Than Any Obstacle . . . That I Have Ever Faced,'" *Washington Post*, 12 October 1991; "Thomas: 'This Plays Into the Most Bigoted, Racist Stereotypes,'" *Washington Post*, 13 October 1991.

[24] Thomas, "*Reason* Interview," 32; and Thomas, "Pluralism Lives: Blacks *Don't* All Think Alike," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 November 1985.

[25] Quoted by Robin Toner, "Symbolic Justice: Capturing an Era's Racial Conflicts and Ironies," *New York Times*, 7 July 1991; William F. Buckley, "Bush Bares Liberal Myth," *Atlanta Journal-Atlanta Constitution*, 7 July 1991; and Charles Krauthammer, "Clarence Thomas and the Liberal Orthodoxy," *Washington Post*, 12 July 1991.

[26] See, for example, Tom Teepen, "An Unholy White Glee at Black Discomfort," *Atlanta Constitution*, 11 July 1991.

[27] Lucius J. Barker, "Jesse Jackson's Candidacy in Political-Social Perspective: A Contextual

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political scientist, Ronald Walters, argued that it was bogus to depict the Thomas nomination as striking a blow for black pluralism:

> Since the Reagan years, a succession of black conservatives have emerged, and their ideas have been given extraordinary public credibility. And even though they have no measurable following in mainstream black public opinion, they are nevertheless pitted against legitimate black spokesmen as though their views were equally representative, with the paean that "blacks are not monolithic."
>
> Seldom is it suggested that it is one thing to point out the obvious—that black opinion is indeed not monolithic—but quite another to imply that there is no predominant opinion, or that a sliver of conservative opinion should equal in weight the dominant liberal values of the majority. The deliberate process of legitimizing minority views within the black community is an oppressive impediment to the true expression of black mainstream opinion.[28]

Thomas and the Black Mainstream

Underlying the heated debate generated by the Thomas nomination, then, was the empirical question of whether Thomas's policy views were shared by a significant number of blacks. Supreme Court justices, unlike members of Congress, are not supposed to represent a constituency. Still, defenders portrayed Thomas as a champion of views that, though far removed from the establishment line, held sway among many blacks, while opponents attacked him for having embraced positions antithetical to the interests of blacks.

Virtually absent from these often acrimonious exchanges about whether Thomas was out of step with the views of most blacks was any dispassionate effort to compare his positions to those of the black public. Such a comparison is the task of the present analysis, which is based on a coordinated search of two separate bodies of data. First, we combed the documentary record of Thomas's speeches, articles, letters to the editor, interviews, congressional testimony, and of others' characterizations and descriptions of him and his views. There were many issues on which Thomas had never taken a public position and others on which his conflicting statements made it impossible to determine what he believed. However, on issues of special interest to blacks, his record was extremely consistent, and his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee provided no real indication that he had undergone a confirmation conversion from the controversial opinions he had often expressed on these issues.

Second, we scanned national opinion polls for data on black opinion on the issues that concern us here. We found three recent national surveys that reached a large number of black respondents: the ABC News/*Washington Post* "Black

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Analysis" in Lucius J. Barker and Ronald W. Walters, eds., *Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign: Challenge and Change in American Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 25.

[28] Ronald Walters, "Thomas: Estranged from His 'Blackness,'" *Washington Post*, 15 July 1991.

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Poll" of January 1986 for which 1,022 blacks were interviewed; a September-October 1989 ABC News/*Washington Post* survey for which 376 blacks were asked some of the same questions as in the 1986 survey; and, most importantly, the April 1991 Gallup/*Newsweek* "Race Relations" poll for which 305 blacks were interviewed.[29] The issue, then, is whether on key policy issues blacks are as pluralistic as Thomas and other dissidents claim, and whether Thomas's views, as reflected in the documentary materials we examined, are congruent with the views of a substantial segment of blacks, as reflected in the opinion surveys.

Basic Political Orientations

Thomas is a Republican. There was a time when most blacks warmly embraced the party of Lincoln, but that time is long since past. Black allegiance to the Democratic coalition forged by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932 has outlived the New Deal, and in election after election blacks have been the most reliable Democratic voters in the nation.[30] According to the ABC News/*Washington Post* and Gallup/*Newsweek* surveys, only about 5 percent of blacks currently identify with the GOP. So while there may be substantial diversity among blacks along certain philosophical and political lines, party identification is clearly not one of these lines. The reason may well be, as Thomas himself has said, that the Republicans "have shown very little interest in black Americans and have actually done things to leave the impression among blacks that they are antagonistic to their interests."[31] But for present purposes the point is simply that as a Republican and a black, Thomas is part of a tiny minority within a minority.

Ideologically, Thomas is generally regarded as a conservative, a label he has accepted "for the sake of discussion, so I don't have to spend a whole lot of time on definitions, etc."[32] But if he is a conservative, he is an unorthodox one. He has described himself as having "some very strong libertarian leanings" and as being particularly partial to Ayn Rand's libertarian tracts *The Fountainhead* and *Atlas Shrugged*. The extreme individualism and antistatism that have suffused his public statements lie at the very core of libertarianism:

[29] These data were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan; and the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. Neither the original collectors nor the distributors of the data bear any responsibility for our analyses or interpretations.

[30] See Robert S. Erikson, Thomas D. Lancaster, and David W. Romero, "Group Components of the Presidential Vote, 1952–1984," *Journal of Politics* 51 (May 1989): 337–46; Patricia Gurin, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson, *Hope & Independence: Blacks' Response to Electoral and Party Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989); and Ronald W. Walters, *Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988).

[31] "*Reason* Interview," 32–33; see also Thomas, "No Room at the Inn"; and Carter, *Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby*, chap. 7.

[32] "*Reason* Interview," 33.

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> Thomas: If the things that are being done to the individual in this city [Washington, D.C.] were being done by one person, we'd all think that we were living under a dictatorship. We'd all be thinking in a rebellious way about how we were going to get out from under this dictatorship. The erosion of freedom is incredible.
>
> *Reason*: Should we be thinking about rebellion?
>
> Thomas: Well, I'm not an anarchist. But I tell you what—we should all be thinking about going to Sears and getting ourselves a tent and survival kit! [Laughter]
>
> I do think that our freedoms are at risk. There are very few people in the private sector who are talking about freedoms. We're talking about interest groups, we're talking about issues, we're talking about your piece of the action, my project, this building, that building. What about freedom? What about the system or the environment that allows us to mind our own business? To live our lives, raise our families? There isn't a whole lot of talk about that.[33]

These are professions of libertarianism, not traditional conservatism.[34] To be sure, Thomas once declined to classify himself as a libertarian, but his objection seemed less philosophical than situational: "At this point," he said while serving as chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, "I'm caught in the position where if I were a true libertarian I wouldn't be here in government."[35] Although frequently allied, libertarians and traditional conservatives part company on many issues that pit the power of the state against the rights of the individual. Accordingly, even though his nomination was well received in conservative circles, he struck many commentators as something of a "mystery man" or "wild card" whose views sometimes strayed significantly from predictable conservatism.[36]

Only about 20 percent of blacks are willing to classify themselves as conservatives, let alone libertarians; so Thomas's libertarian leanings raise the suspicion that his political philosophy may be even further outside the black mainstream than the prevailing image of him as a conservative would suggest. However, the self-reliance he ardently champions does strike a responsive chord among blacks, as it has done at least since the time of Booker T. Washington. Like many other blacks of his generation, Thomas grew up in "an environment that put a premium on self-help, an environment that did not preach any kind of reliance on government."[37] He learned to regard government more as a problem than as the solution, a view that seemed natural to one "raised to survive under the totalitarianism of segregation, not only without the active assistance of government but with its

[33] Ibid.

[34] See, for example, E.J. Dionne, Jr., *Why Americans Hate Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

[35] "*Reason* Interview," 31.

[36] See Paul M. Barrett and Stephen Wermiel, "Mystery Man: Judge Thomas, Billed as Conservative, May Prove Unpredictable," *Wall Street Journal*, 19 July 1991; Linda Greenhouse, "A Wild-Card Nominee," *New York Times*, 2 July 1991; and Nat Hentoff, "Clarence Thomas's Stubborn Independence," *Washington Post*, 17 August 1991.

[37] "*Reason* Interview," 29.

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active opposition."[38] The upshot was his belief that "government simply cannot make amends, and therefore should not try. The best it can do is to deal a clean deck and let the game resume enforcing the rules as they have now come to be understood."[39] It is, he once declared, as "insane" for blacks to expect help from the federal government for years of discrimination as it is to expect a mugger to nurse his victim back to health[40]—a metaphor that casts government in the role of the cause, not the solution, of blacks' problems. "There is no governmental solution," he has said:

> It hasn't been used on any group. And I will ask those who proffer a governmental solution to show me which group in the history of this country was pulled up and put into the mainstream of the economy with governmental programs. The Irish weren't. The Jews weren't. Use what was used to get others into the economy. Show us the precedent for all this experimentation on our race.[41]

As Thomas sees it, the solution lies in broad acceptance of the norm of individual responsibility—and therefore within the realm of individual rather than group remedies. Government cannot develop individual responsibility. The most it can do is "refrain from preventing or hindering the development of this responsibility."[42]

Thomas harbors no illusion that racism is a thing of the past. He perceives "a mean, callous world out there" that is "still very much filled with discrimination" and "still holds out a different life for those who do not happen to be the right race or the right sex."[43] However, he believes that the solution to these problems lies not in government action but in individual effort, and he has often implored blacks to accept the responsibility for improving their lot rather than succumb to the temptation of always blaming others.[44] He warned his son that he would "personally hunt you down and kick your behind from one end of America to the other" if he ever heard any "whining about how you can't make it because you are black."[45] "I'll put the bottom line on you," he once told an interviewer. "I don't think we caused our problem, but we're damn sure going to have to solve it."[46]

[38] Clarence Thomas, "Why Black Americans Should Look to Conservative Policies," speech quoted by Neil A. Lewis, "From Poverty to the Bench," *New York Times*, 2 July 1991.

[39] This is Juan Williams's characterization of Thomas's views; Williams, "A Question of Fairness," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1987, 79.

[40] Quoted in Steven A. Holmes, "N.A.A.C.P. Report Faults Thomas View on Equality Issues," *New York Times*, 31 July 1991.

[41] Williams, "A Question of Fairness," 79.

[42] Thomas, "No Room at the Inn," 72.

[43] Clarence Thomas, "Climb the Jagged Mountain," commencement address at Savannah State College, Savannah, Georgia, 9 June 1985, excerpted in the *New York Times*, 19 July 1991.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Quoted by William McGurn, "The Trials of Clarence Thomas," *National Review*, 12 August 1991, 36.

[46] Quoted by Joseph J. Kane and Staci D. Kramer, "Marching to a Different Drummer," *Time*, 15 July 1991, 19.

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TABLE 1

Blacks' Views of Responsibility and Government Programs

Discrimination has unfairly held down blacks, but many of the problems which blacks in this country have today are brought on by blacks themselves.

	1986	*1989*
Agree	51.5%	52.0%
Disagree	48.5%	48.0%

In your opinion, is the federal government doing too much, too little, or about the right amount to help blacks in this country?

	1991
Too little	77.9%
About right	16.7%
Too much	5.4%

Some people say we already have enough legislation on the books to improve conditions for blacks in this country and that further progress will come mainly through private efforts. Others say private efforts are important but that more legislation is still needed to improve conditions for blacks. Which comes closer to your view?

	1991
Already have enough	24.9%
More legislation needed	75.1%

Sources: 1986 and 1989 ABC News/*Washington Post* surveys and 1991 Gallup/*Newsweek* survey.

According to the 1986 and 1989 ABC News/*Washington Post* surveys, black opinion is split down the middle between those who accept and those who reject the proposition that blacks have helped to cause many of the problems they face. Clearly, there is nothing even remotely approaching a black consensus about the extent to which blacks' problems are of their own making.

Notwithstanding his consistent emphasis on individual responsibility for overcoming problems, Thomas (presumably along with most civil rights leaders) would side with the half of blacks who do not believe that blacks' problems are self-inflicted ("The problem is that we had state-imposed racism in our society"; "I don't think we caused our problem . . . "). He and most civil rights leaders would probably also agree that the real issue is not where the responsibility for *causing* blacks' problems lies, but where the responsibility for *solving* these problems lies. On this issue he and the civil rights establishment part company, for while he places the greatest emphasis on black self-help, albeit with some limited continuing role for government, they grant the importance of self-help but see it as insufficient and call on government to do more. This difference is undoubtedly less extreme than the heated rhetoric employed by both sides would suggest, but it is nonetheless a real difference of relative emphasis and priority.

According to the 1991 Gallup/*Newsweek* survey, almost 80 percent of blacks accept the civil rights leadership's view that the federal government is doing too little to help blacks. Even more telling are responses to a pair of statements that delineate Thomas's disagreement with civil rights leaders about where the

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responsibility for solving blacks' problems should lie. Only one black in four endorses a self-help approach by agreeing that "We already have enough legislation on the books to improve conditions for blacks in this country and . . . further progress will come mainly through private efforts." The great majority—three blacks in four—sees an expanded governmental role as necessary, subscribing to the idea that "Private efforts are important but . . . more legislation is still needed to improve conditions for blacks." These findings bear out indications from a 1984 survey that few blacks embrace an individualistic, antigovernment ideology; the great majority favor an activist governmental role.[47] In light of the prominent role the federal government has played in their lives since the time of Reconstruction, it seems only natural that blacks turn reflexively to government—especially the federal government—for help.

Racial Preferences

In Thomas's view, it is legitimate, even necessary, for government to strike down *de jure* racial segregation, but government goes too far when it tries to foster racial integration. The principle, he holds, must always be that people are to be treated as individuals, not as members of a certain race:

> I firmly insist that the Constitution be interpreted in a colorblind fashion. It is futile to talk of a colorblind society unless this constitutional principle is first established. Hence, I emphasize black self-help, as opposed to racial quotas and other race-conscious legal devices that only further and deepen the original problem.[48]

This insistence on colorblindness forms the cornerstone of Thomas's thinking on civil rights issues. He believes government must move against racial discrimination, and it cannot do so by itself acting discriminatorially; those who think otherwise, he contends, have "relinquished their roles as moral and ethical leaders."[49] Preferential treatment simply does not work, for it benefits "the most-advantaged members of the preferred groups . . . while causing the least-advantaged members of those groups to fall farther behind."[50] Racial preferences also create "a narcotic of dependency, not an ethic of responsibility and independence," and stigmatize their supposed beneficiaries: "I think that preferential hiring on the basis of race or gender will increase racial divisiveness, disempower women and minorities by fostering the notion that they are permanently disabled and in need of handouts, and delay the day when skin color and gender are truly the least important things about a person in the employment context."[51]

[47] Gurin et al., *Hope & Independence*, 244, 247; on this theme, see Charles V. Hamilton, *The Black Experience in American Politics* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 245–246.

[48] Clarence Thomas, Letter to the Editor, *Wall Street Journal*, 20 February 1987.

[49] Clarence Thomas, "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Reflections on a New Philosophy," *Stetson Law Review* 15 (1985): 35.

[50] Clarence Thomas, "Abandon the Rules; They Cause Injustice," *USA Today*, 5 September 1985.

[51] Clarence Thomas, 5 May 1987, letter to Professor Herbert Hill, reprinted in U.S. Congress,

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TABLE 2

Blacks' Views of Racial Preferences

Because of past discrimination, blacks who need it should get some help from the government that white people in similar economic circumstances don't get.

	1986	*1989*
Agree	55.7%	51.8%
Disagree	44.3%	48.2%

Do you believe that, because of past discrimination against black people, qualified blacks should receive preference over equally qualified whites in such matters as getting into college or getting jobs, or not?

	1989
Yes	50.0%
No	50.0%

Sources: 1986 and 1989 ABC News/*Washington Post* surveys and 1991 Gallup/*Newsweek* survey.

While Thomas does not hesitate to attack preferential treatment as both futile and racist, his ultimate objection is that racial preferences threaten vital constitutional guarantees of individual rights:

> I would be lying to you if I said that I didn't want sometimes to be able to cheat in favor of those of us who were cheated. But you have to ask yourself whether, in doing that, you do violence to the safe harbor, and that is the Constitution, which says you are to protect an individual's rights no matter what. Once you say that we can violate somebody else's rights in order to make up for what happened to blacks or other groups in history, then you are setting a precedent for having certain circumstances in which you can overlook another person's rights.[52]

Many blacks share Thomas's reservations about racial preferences. More agree than disagree that "[b]ecause of past discrimination, blacks who need it should get some help from the government that white people in similar economic circumstances don't get," but the margin is extremely narrow. On the closely related question of whether "[b]ecause of past discrimination against black people, qualified blacks should receive preference over equally qualified whites in such matters as getting into college or getting jobs," 50 percent of blacks who expressed an opinion one way or the other agreed, while the other 50 percent disagreed.

In short, opinion polls indicate a lack of consensus among blacks on the issue of preferential treatment. Therefore, while it is accurate to say that in rejecting racial preferences Thomas distances himself from a substantial portion of the black public, it is equally accurate to say that in espousing racial preferences the civil rights establishment distances itself from a substantial portion of the black

Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, on Confirmation Hearings on Appointments to the Federal Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2nd sess. (6, 21, and 27 February 1991), 62–63; Clarence Thomas, "Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!" *Yale Law & Policy Review* 5 (Spring/Summer 1987): 403.

[52] Williams, "A Question of Fairness," 79.

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public. In any event, Thomas's position on preferential treatment cannot fairly be characterized as out of step with prevailing black opinion, for on this issue there is no prevailing black opinion. In this respect, those who herald the pluralism and diversity of blacks have a legitimate point.

Quotas and School Busing

Thomas's stances on the two most controversial policy measures favored by most black civil rights leaders—racial quotas and busing to achieve racial balance in the schools—follow naturally from his "constitutional, legal, moral, [and] ethical opposition" to policies that involve differential treatment on the basis of race.[53] He believes that racial quotas, like any other race-conscious policy, do not produce the desired results, stigmatize blacks, and—most importantly—flout the constitutional principle of equality before the law.[54] For all these reasons, he is "unalterably opposed to programs that force or even cajole people to hire a certain percentage of minorities."[55]

Thomas's opposition to school busing springs from the same roots. The Supreme Court erred in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al.*, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) and subsequent decisions, he believes, when it struck down segregation not "as a matter of simple justice" but rather on the basis of "psychological evidence, compassion, and a failure to connect segregation with the evil of slavery."[56] This reasoning led the Court not only to outlaw school segregation, a step he considered long overdue, but to require school integration, a step he considers "disastrous" because it ushered in "busing and other policies that were irrelevant to parents' concern for a decent education. The Court appeared . . . to be more concerned with meeting the demands of groups than with protecting the rights of individuals. . . . In a good cause, the Court was attempting to argue *against* what was best in the American political tradition."[57]

Thomas considers this shift in focus from desegregation to integration an egregious misstep, because integration per se is neither a legitimate policy goal nor a solution to the problems blacks face. As he sees it, if certain people are being denied equal treatment, then government must step in to rebalance the scales; but the point is to assure equal treatment, not to insist on integration. After a series of interviews with Thomas, Juan Williams concluded: "Despite his anger at segregation, he does not automatically grant that integration is good for

[53] Thomas, quoted by Greenhouse, "A Wild-Card Nominee."

[54] See esp. Clarence Thomas, "Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest" in David Boaz, ed., *Assessing the Reagan Years* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1988), 397; and U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, U.S. Senate, 23 July 1986, 46.

[55] Thomas, quoted by Kane and Kramer, "Marching to a Different Drummer," 19.

[56] Thomas, "Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest," 392–393.

[57] Ibid.

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TABLE 3

Blacks' Views of Quotas and Busing

Do you think fairness in education, hiring, and promotion can be accomplished without quotas, or are quotas necessary?	*1991*
Don't need quotas	32.0%
Quotas are necessary	67.9%
Would you say you favor or oppose the busing of black and white students as a last resort for school integration?	*1986*
Favor	60.8%
Oppose	39.2%

Sources: 1991 Gallup/*Newsweek* survey and 1986 ABC News/*Washington Post* survey.

black people. Thomas wants to know in every instance what integration means for blacks. If it means losing the alternative of going to their own schools, running their own businesses, then he doesn't like it." "The whole push to assimilate," Thomas told Williams, "simply does not make sense to me."[58] A busing program designed to enhance educational quality might well appeal to him, but a busing program designed to achieve racial balance does not.

Most blacks do not share Thomas's views on these matters. According to the 1991 Gallup/*Newsweek* survey, almost seven out of every ten blacks consider quotas necessary to achieve fairness in education, hiring, and promotion; only about three in ten think fairness can be achieved without quotas. Moreover, in contrast to Thomas's doubts about school integration as a policy goal, surveys have long indicated that support for school integration is "virtually universal" among blacks.[59] To be sure, there is nothing approaching universal agreement among blacks about how school integration should be achieved, but a clear majority—six in ten—endorse busing as a "last resort" measure. Thus, in contrast to the issue of preferential treatment, on which Thomas's views are shared by as many as half of all blacks, on the issues of racial quotas and school busing his views place him in the company of considerably fewer blacks.

Conclusion

In the wake of the bruising battle over Thomas's confirmation, the air was full of recriminations. Livid about what they saw as an eleventh-hour campaign of character assassination waged by special interest groups, Thomas's supporters pledged revenge. So did women's groups, infuriated by what they regarded as the

[58] Williams, "A Question of Fairness," 74; see also "*Reason* Interview," 32.

[59] Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch, *Black Americans' Views of Racial Inequality: The Dream Deferred* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 121.

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all-male Judiciary Committee's indifference to sexual harassment, its blaming-the-victim treatment of Anita Hill, and the unfortunate message this episode sent to victims of sexual harassment. A nation transfixed by the melodrama that had unfolded on its television screens professed disgust at the whole tawdry spectacle, which seemed above all else to reaffirm its low estimate of politics in general and Congress in particular.

Some, however, could not disguise their pleasure over the ways things had turned out. Republican strategists sensed a new opportunity to blame the Democrat-controlled Congress for the nation's ills. In the gleeful estimate of one Bush administration official, "This debacle did more for our domestic agenda than any 200 education and crime events."[60] Conservatives were openly delighted after years of being berated as racists to have been given an opportunity to turn the tables on liberals for the attempted "lynching" of Thomas. Seizing the initiative, the chairman of the Citizens Committee to Confirm Clarence Thomas brandished polls that showed widespread black support for Thomas's confirmation, claiming that these constituted proof positive that the "Washington-based civil rights community" was "dangerously out of step with their constituents."[61]

For present purposes, the short-term partisan fallout of the confirmation battle is less pertinent than the potential long-term impact of the Thomas appointment on civil rights policy. Ironically, the initial point of contention in the furor over the Thomas nomination, the question of whether the nominee's policy positions lay outside the black mainstream or were more in tune with the beliefs of blacks than civil leaders cared to admit, was virtually ignored during Thomas's confirmation hearing. Commentators characterized civil rights issues as "the dog that hardly barked" during the hearing, muzzled by the reluctance of "terror-stricken" Democratic senators to risk antagonizing white constituents by attacking Thomas on such divisive issues as affirmative action and busing.[62]

Though shunted aside during the confirmation hearing and overshadowed thereafter by the sensational sexual harassment allegations, civil rights issues continue to be a matter of obvious concern to blacks. Our comparisons of Thomas's positions and the opinions expressed by national samples of blacks have revealed some subjects on which Thomas's views cannot be said to fall outside of the black mainstream, for on these issues there is no black mainstream. Blacks are divided almost evenly about whether "many of the problems which blacks in this country have today are brought on by blacks themselves" and whether "blacks who need it should get some help from the government that

[60] Quoted by Ann Devroy, "Gleeful GOP Poised to Exploit Thomas Issue," *Washington Post*, 18 October 1991.

[61] Gary Bauer, quoted by Thomas B. Edsall and E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Core Democratic Constituencies Split," *Washington Post*, 16 October 1991.

[62] Williams, "Thomas and the Isolation of the Liberal Establishment"; Puddington, "Clarence Thomas and the Blacks," 31; see also Edith Efron, "Native Son," *Reason*, February 1992, 26; and Suzanne Garment, "Why Anita Hill Lost," *Commentary*, January 1992, 27.

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white people in similar economic circumstances don't get." Thus, no matter where one stands on these issues, one will find many blacks who agree and just as many who disagree. On these issues, pluralism prevails, much as Thomas and other critics of the civil rights establishment have often claimed.

On the other hand, on most of the issues examined here there is widespread agreement among blacks, and on these issues Thomas's positions are invariably opposed not only by most civil rights leaders but also by clear-cut majorities of the black public. Thomas has dismissed government action as the solution to blacks' problems, arguing that the key to progress lies in individual effort and initiative; very often, he has argued, well intentioned social programs actually exacerbate the problems they were supposed to alleviate. But three out of four blacks believe the federal government is doing too little to help blacks in this country, and only one in twenty accepts the idea that it is doing too much. Thomas has urged that blacks be weaned away from what he considers their destructive dependence on government. But most blacks disagree: when asked whether the problems blacks face are more likely to be solved through private efforts or more legislation, three out of four call for more legislation. Thomas has declared himself unalterably opposed to race-conscious remedies like quotas. But two out of three blacks believe that fairness in education, hiring, and promotion cannot be achieved without such quotas. Thomas has stated his opposition to school busing on the grounds that it is a misguided step toward imposed integration rather than a positive step toward quality education. But blacks' support for racial integration as a policy goal is virtually unanimous, and six in ten endorse busing as a last-resort means of achieving this goal.

In sum, on most key civil rights issues, blacks strongly back positions that Thomas has resolutely opposed. To be sure, if Thomas in his role of associate justice of the Supreme Court adheres to his long-standing positions on these issues, he will not stand alone among blacks. But almost always the majority—and often the overwhelming majority—will stand against him.

Why, then, did so many blacks support Thomas's confirmation? Opinion polls conducted both before and after the airing of the sexual harassment allegations indicated that many blacks—a plurality or even a majority—favored confirmation. For those inclined to see the Thomas nomination as a triumph of black pluralism, this seemed to be proof that they were correct.[63] In our view, though, black support for confirmation had more to do, first, with the hope that Thomas's roots and his race would win out over his conservative views—a hope the nominee did much to encourage during the confirmation hearings by disavowing some of the extreme positions that had been attributed to him, acknowledging his personal debt to Justice Marshall and the civil rights movement, and using language that hinted that he would "do the right thing" if appointed to the Court—and, second, with the conviction that it was vital to have a black on the Court.[64] For many

[63] See, for example, Puddington, "Clarence Thomas and the Blacks."

[64] On these points, see especially Katherine Tate, "Invisible Woman," *The American Prospect*, 8 (Winter 1992): 75.

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blacks, the paramount consideration was undoubtedly race: above all else, they wanted Justice Marshall's successor to be a black. Given carte blanche, it seems unlikely that they would have chosen Clarence Thomas. But they were given Thomas, not carte blanche. Most, as we have seen, did not share Thomas's views about the role of government or about specific policies such as busing and racial quotas, but most supported Thomas nonetheless. What counted most of all were the color of his skin and the prospect of a continuing black presence on the nation's highest court. In early September 1991, before the sexual harrassment allegations entered the picture, only one black in six of those polled in a nationwide survey said that Thomas's opposition to most forms of affirmative action made them feel more favorable toward him. For that matter, only one black in six said that Thomas's views on affirmative action made them feel less favorable toward him. So positions on civil rights policy issues were not the force driving black support for Thomas. Race was. Indeed, 75 percent of the black respondents in the same survey said "yes" when asked whether it is important "that there always be at least one black person on the Supreme Court."[65] Race surely mattered even more after Thomas played the race card at the sexual harassment hearing by depicting himself as a victim of the cruelest form of racial stereotyping and making himself the embodiment of black martyrdom. In sum, there is strong reason to believe that blacks accorded Thomas widespread support in spite of, not because of, his positions on the issues.

[65] CBS News/*New York Times* Poll, press release, 9 September 1991.

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Innovation and Boundaries in American Employment Policy

MARGARET WEIR

For the thirty years that followed World War II, American presidents, in words, if not always in their actions, supported the goal of full employment. For Democrats the objective was especially salient, but, wary of the electoral repercussions, Republican politicians also highlighted employment concerns. During the later 1970s, in an economic context of sharply rising inflation, full employment receded as a political issue. And as full employment lost its place as a pivot of partisan competition, ideas arguing that government could only play a limited role in affecting employment began to set the terms for public policy.

What accounts for this change in the position of employment as a political issue, and how did ideas about limiting the government role become influential? Two major explanations, each linked to broader arguments about American exceptionalism, have been offered to account for shifts in economic policy in the late 1970s. One traces the shift to business influence, pointing to the striking political mobilization of American business and financial interests during the 1970s.[1] A second explanation highlights the role of public opinion: strong and

[1] The most thoroughgoing of these arguments is presented in Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986).

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widespread opposition to inflation joined with antipathy to federal power to overwhelm negative sentiments about unemployment.[2]

Although substantial evidence exists to back up each claim, this article argues that the role of business and public opinion cannot be properly understood unless the debates about employment policy in the late 1970s are seen as the final stage of a policy sequence that began in the 1940s. To understand why full employment lost its force as a political issue, we need to understand why alternative policies that revise and enhance government's role attracted so little support.

I examine two episodes central to the development of employment policy—the transformation of Keynesian policy ideas after the 1940s and the War on Poverty. I show how three characteristics became deeply embedded in employment policy. First, American employment policy settled on a narrow definition of the problem to be solved: policy focused on "unemployment" as defined by a single aggregate number. Second, policy makers concerned with employment policy rarely conceived of their task as one of institution building. Finally, employment issues became partitioned into an economic component and a social component, each cast into a distinct orbit of politics and administration. Over time, this institutional and political segmentation limited employment policy and narrowed the possibilities for adapting policy to new political and economic conditions.

I show how the interaction of ideas and politics since the 1940s created this pattern of "bounded innovation" in which some ideas about employment policy became increasingly unlikely to influence policy. Central to this narrowing process was the creation of institutions, whose existence channeled the flow of ideas, shaped incentives for political actors, and helped to determine the political meaning of policy choices.

The Politics of Bounded Innovation

The approach I take aims to make sense of innovation as well as boundaries in American policy making. This objective directs attention to the diverse links between ideas, political institutions, political actors, networks of experts, and social interests that are often overlooked in culture- or interest-based accounts of policy making.[3] But in contrast to general theories of policy making that are not historically grounded, it also entails understanding how some avenues of

[2] For a sophisticated analysis of unemployment and inflation that points in this direction see Douglas Hibbs, Jr., "The Mass Public and Macroeconomic Performance: The Dynamics of Public Opinion Toward Unemployment and Inflation," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (November 1979): 705–31. Both public opinion and business mobilization are considered as determinants of economic policy in Thomas Byrne Edsall, *The New Politics of Inequality* (New York: Norton, 1984).

[3] On culture, see Anthony King, "Ideas, Institutions and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis: Part III," *British Journal of Political Science* 3 (October 1973): 409–423. On interest explanations, see, for example, Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy To New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the New Deal," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984): 41–93.

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policy become increasingly blocked if not entirely cut off.[4] Central among the questions I ask are how do social phenomena become policy problems and how do particular understandings of problems emerge to guide policy making? How do such understandings affect the way groups identify their policy interests and in the process facilitate some alliances and discourage others?

Answering such questions requires an approach that is fundamentally historical, which looks for connections among policies over time. Such perspective is essential for understanding how opportunities for innovation arise and for assessing the range of policy possibilities open at any particular moment. Inherent in this approach is the notion that individual innovations are part of a policy sequence in which institutional development renders some interpretations of problems more persuasive and makes some prospective policies more politically viable than others.[5] In such policy sequences, decisions at one point in time can restrict subsequent possibilities by sending policy off onto particular tracks, along which ideas and interests develop and institutions and strategies adapt.[6]

To understand how a sequence develops requires examining not only the direct antecedents of innovation but also policies formally classified in other arenas, which may nonetheless shape the problem itself, thinking about the problem, or the politics of the issue. This calls for casting a broad eye over politics to understand how developments in different domains of politics and policy collide with one another to create outcomes that cannot be readily anticipated or easily controlled by individual actors. Such collisions can become turning points in a sequence by creating opportunities for political actors seeking to promote new ideas and different visions of politics.[7]

The mode of bureaucratic recruitment, the procedures that govern advancement within the federal government, and the permeability of the federal government to social groups all facilitate consideration of innovative ideas in national policy making. The American practice of recruiting government officials whose primary identification and prospects for career advancement lie in their professional expertise provides a hospitable setting for introducing new ways of looking

[4] For an influential general theory of policy making see John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).

[5] On the notion of sequences, see Sidney Verba, "Sequences and Development" in Leonard Binder et al., eds., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 283–316.

[6] See the discussion in Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984): 223–246; Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutionalist Perspective" in James Caporaso, ed., *The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), 223–246; Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[7] These collisions are similar to the sharp changes that are envisioned by the theory of punctuated equilibrium. See Carmines and Stimson, *Issue Evolution*; and Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutionalist Perspective."

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at problems. In contrast to systems where recruitment into government is governed by strict guidelines and conformity to established civil service norms, the American federal bureaucracy is routinely refreshed with ideas from outside government.[8] These features of American political institutions mean that a wide range of ideas have a chance of influencing American policy. Ideas that are formulated and advocated by preexisting interests as well as those devised by professional groups may find their way onto the policy agenda.

But because politicians in the United States have considerable freedom to consider and solicit a range of ideas, we must also examine the distinctive incentives that guide their choices. Two features of American politics offer clues to the conditions under which parties and presidents have evaluated policy choices. The first is the fragmented structure of national political institutions, which creates a wealth of opportunities for mobilizing opposition. The ease of mobilizing opposition encourages politicians to adopt a shortened time horizon and makes short-term coalitions the bread and butter of American policy making. Such arrangements do not encourage attention to the long-term repercussions of policy. The second feature of American politics that affects politicians' evaluations of policy is the federal system, which can create formidable political and procedural barriers. The need to negotiate the various levels of the federal system affects the way political actors decide how policy goals should be achieved or, indeed, whether they are possible at all.

The need to achieve results in the short term pushes parties and presidents to put together ad hoc coalitions around specific issues and to assemble broad public support sustained by rhetoric with wide but shallow and often vague appeal.[9] Although the support engendered by such appeals may be diffuse or ephemeral, it serves immediate political needs. Policies that depend on reforming existing institutions or building new institutional capacity are less attractive than policies that funnel distributive benefits through existing institutions, those that bypass existing institutions altogether, or those that rely on private activity that may be more easily launched. Reliance on new channels or private actors to implement policy also helps to remove obstacles posed by the federal system. Because there is little incentive to consider the long-range repercussions of policy, tactics useful in passing a policy can actually undermine the emergence of long-term political coalitions and enduring institutions needed to sustain policy direction.

Policy ideas may reach the national agenda and be selected by politicians, but unless they build supportive alliances they will be vulnerable to political attacks. Such support is often critical in allowing policy administrators to learn from their

[8] See the essays in G. Calvin MacKenzie, ed., *The In-&-Outers: Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

[9] Fred I. Greenstein, "Change and Continuity in the Modern Presidency" in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 65. On the use of rhetoric, see Jeffrey K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

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mistakes and modify policy accordingly. It also permits policy makers to redesign policy to respond to new circumstances.

I argue that such alliances are the product of political processes, not preexisting preferences.[10] This view presumes that policy interests can be defined in different ways so that several distinct policies may be compatible with a group's interest. Potential group members do not always know their interests in a specific policy area. Moreover, existing groups may be divided or ambivalent about their policy interests. Accordingly, the process by which a group forms around support for a specific set of policy preferences cannot be taken for granted; instead, questions must be asked about why one policy is favored over another.[11]

One of the most powerful factors determining how groups define their policy interests and which alliances they enter is the organization of political institutions. The aspects of the political system that aggregate interests—in particular the party system and Congress—are central in this regard. By channeling the way groups interact in politics and policy making, these institutions greatly affect the possibilities for diverse groups to recognize common interests and construct political alliances and often determine whether such alliances are necessary.

Another factor affecting the way groups define their interests is the way a policy is packaged. Conceptualizing policy as part of a package helps to locate it within the broader framework of political conflict by identifying its relation to past policies and to other items currently on the national agenda. Such identifications can help sway definitions of interest: for example, the identification of the War on Poverty as a black program cut into white support by the late 1960s, when urban riots replaced peaceful marches. Thinking about policy in such relational terms helps make sense of patterns of support and opposition, since a single policy is unlikely to be judged simply on its own terms. Rather, it will be considered as part of a constellation of policies that seem to be related. The way a policy is packaged plays an important role in maintaining the diffuse support or acceptance necessary to protect a policy from challenge.

Politicians seek to affect these processes of group interest identification and alliance formation, but a variety of strong inertial forces limit what they can do. Interests attached to established policies can obstruct later efforts to reorganize policy along new lines.[12] The political terms on which policies are first introduced may also block later efforts to mobilize support. For example, if social support has been initially won on the basis of the effectiveness of the policy, efforts to

[10] On the need to investigate the sources of preferences, see Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation," *American Political Science Review* 81 (March 1987): 3–21; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *The American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984): 734–49.

[11] For an argument stressing the role of culture in interest construction, see Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions."

[12] For a discussion of this process see Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Politics Against Markets* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

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sustain support on different grounds, such as citizen's rights, will prove difficult. Likewise, initial decisions about implementation may affect later possibilities for sustaining a supportive alliance. Implementation problems can erode support for policy by giving force to arguments that unwanted side effects outweigh benefits, even if the policy is inherently desirable.

Efforts of politicians to create support for policies are also limited by events they cannot control, such as social movements, economic changes, or international political developments. Such events, often only indirectly connected to a particular policy, can nonetheless have important ramifications for the positioning of that policy. By creating a new context, such events can change the meaning of a policy, linking it with a different set of issues and tying its fate to new forces.

Innovating within Boundaries

During the New Deal, the United States became an international leader in experimenting with new forms of government action to combat unemployment. The version of social Keynesianism articulated by Alvin Hansen, the leading American Keynesian in the 1930s and 1940s, sought to resolve the "apparent conflict between the humanitarian and social aims of the New Deal and the dictates of 'sound economics'" by tying economic stimulation to social spending and enhancing the planning capability of the federal executive.[13]

After a string of political setbacks, however, advocates of Keynesian ideas began to rethink the form their innovation should take. The defeat of the Full Employment bill in 1946, which had embodied many of the ideas of the social Keynesians (especially endorsement of spending to stimulate the economy) and its replacement with the Employment Act of 1946 (which charged the president with monitoring the economy) marked an end to the New Deal experiments with employment policy. In the years after 1946, Keynesian ideas were reworked and disseminated in a prolonged process of social learning. But the Employment Act of 1946 constrained the directions in which the ideas, institutions, and interests relevant to employment policy developed. Networks of expertise emphasizing macroeconomic approaches to employment limited the scope of employment policy. Political actors shunned the task of institution building in a domain that promised little immediate pay-off. And the key groups interested in employment policy—labor and business—elaborated alternative mechanisms rooted in the seniority system to govern employment issues.

As a consequence, employment policy began to exhibit several distinctive features: social and economic policy were sharply divided, policy focused narrowly on the rate of unemployment, and little in the way of institution building oc-

[13] Quoted in Ester Fano, "A 'Wastage of Men': Technological Progress and Unemployment in the United States," *Technology and Culture* 32 (1991): 288.

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curred. These characteristics became lasting boundaries in American employment policy during the following decades despite considerable innovation as new initiatives reinforced, rather than altered, these features of policy.

Reworking Keynesian Ideas

To understand why subsequent innovations in employment policy remained within the boundaries set in the late 1940s despite innovation, we must examine how institutions relevant to employment policy helped to shape later possibilities. One of the most important ways they did this was by influencing the development and flow of ideas by encouraging research and thinking about problems along specific lines.

Much of the process by which Keynesian ideas were reworked can be understood by examining the institutional framework created by the Employment Act of 1946. The act did not write Keynesian principles into government activity the way the Full Employment bill had. Instead, systematic attention to economic matters would be assured by an annual presidential report to the Congress on the state of the economy. Presidential capacities to analyze the economy were enhanced by the establishment of a Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), a small body of advisers appointed by the president and mandated to serve him in an advisory capacity only. A companion body in Congress, the Joint Committee on the Economic Report of the President (later the Joint Economic Committee) would ensure congressional consideration of economic conditions.[14]

This set of institutions and mechanisms gave Keynesian ideas a tenuous foothold in the federal government. The most receptive entry point for such ideas was the Council of Economic Advisers, because it had a mandate to monitor the whole economy and because it recruited academic economists, among whom Keynesian ideas were spreading quickly, into short-term government service. But the CEA could only act as an advocate for these ideas if the president appointed Keynesians to the council. Even then, the council would need substantial internal strength to win battles against opposing agencies within the executive branch if discretionary action such as tax cuts were to be accepted. The experience of the CEA under Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower demonstrated that it would take time to build such influence.

Truman's appointees to the CEA were sympathetic to Keynesian ideas and made significant contributions to their development.[15] Nevertheless, their impact on policy was small. As a new agency that had to compete with large, well-established departments including the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the

[14] For a description of the Employment Act, see Stephen Kemp Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law* (New York: Vintage, 1950), chap. 11.

[15] On intellectual contributions see Walter Salant, "Some Intellectual Contributions of the Truman Council of Economic Advisers to Policy-Making." *History of Political Economy* 5 (Spring 1973): 36–49.

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Budget Bureau, the CEA had neither the authoritative position nor the institutional strength to control policy. The CEA's early years were spent trying to sort out its status: the relationship among the three members of the council had to be thrashed out, as did the council's relationship to the president.[16]

The other major innovation of the 1946 Employment Act, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), was more successful in building support for Keynesian ideas. In the latter half of the 1950s, it played a key role in bringing Democrats, organized labor, and economists together around a Keynesian economic agenda.[17] Because the committee's Democratic majority was dominated by liberals, it could function with a set of shared understandings about economic goals and government action that were absent from the Democratic party as a whole. Yet, the JEC was a limited tool for disseminating and organizing broad support for Keynesian ideas. It could and did schedule hearings to publicize particular perspectives, but its lack of legislative function and staffing limitations restricted its reach.

The weakness of public vehicles for advancing and adapting Keynesian ideas allowed private groups to play an important role in reshaping and winning acceptance for Keynesian principles of economic management. The model for this type of activity and a key actor in the development of Keynesian ideas was the Committee for Economic Development (CED). Launched in 1942 by forward-looking businessmen concerned that business be prepared to help shape postwar policy, the CED was a small research organization that brought together social scientists and businessmen.

Even before the war was over, the CED began to rework Keynesianism so that its most objectionable features—the potential for capricious action by the federal government and out-of-control spending policies—were removed. Instead of spending, the CED advocated reliance on automatic stabilizers—variations in government revenues and expenditures that occurred in response to economic conditions without any deliberate government action. If discretionary action were undertaken, tax cuts, not spending, were the method the CED approved.[18]

The committee's organizational form—a small, well-funded group of econo-

[16] See William J. Barber, "The United States: Economists in a Pluralistic Polity," *History of Political Economy* 13 (Fall 1981): 513–24.

[17] On the congressional role in economic decision making, see Victor Jones, "The Political Framework of Stabilization Policy" in Max F. Millikan, ed., *Income Stabilization for a Developing Democracy*, 604–10; Alvin Hansen, "The Reports Prepared Under the Employment Act"; and Edwin Nourse, "Taking Root (First Decade of the Employment Act)" in Gerhard Colm, ed., *The Employment Act Past and Future: A Tenth Anniversary Symposium*, National Planning Association Special Report no. 41 (Washington, DC: National Planning Association, 1956), 92–97 and 62–65.

[18] It was work by the CED's Beardsley Ruml that made possible the tax cut route. In the early 1940s, Ruml devised the withholding plan that became the basis for the American tax system, allowing tax policy to be used for stabilization purposes. On Ruml and the CED's policies see Herbert Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 220–40; Robert M. Collins, *The Business Response to Keynes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), chaps. 5–6.

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mists working with liberal business leaders—was an ideal setting for advocacy and development of innovative economic ideas. This type of forum was far more insulated from outside pressure and from shifts in the political winds than the public institutions responsible for economic policy making. Because it was not immediately answerable to a broad business constituency, the committee could advocate policies that the majority of the business community opposed. Yet, the committee's undisputed expertise in economic matters and its ties to important business interests allowed it to launch a vigorous educational campaign that helped businesses reinterpret their economic policy interests to embrace demand management; at the same time, the CED made Keynesianism more palatable to business.[19]

If in private organizations, Keynesian ideas were being tailored to make them more acceptable to business, within the academic discipline of economics, they were being transformed into technical and theoretical problems. In the academy, economics sought to model itself on the natural sciences with a considerably narrowed agenda that excluded concerns not readily handled by prevailing models of economic behavior.[20] Increasingly, economic questions were severed from the institutional considerations that had been present in the era of institutional economics before the New Deal and in the 1930s and 1940s, when economists worked with government administrators on administrative and political innovations relevant to policy. The dominant economic ideas about employment issues thus contracted and became more technical.

The Kennedy administration's decision in 1962 to support tax cuts as a means to stimulate the economy indicated both the power that ideas could still exercise and the way those ideas had been transformed since the 1940s. Although John Kennedy did not endorse Keynesian ideas in his presidential campaign and opposed cutting taxes, his appointees to the CEA were drawn from the leading liberal Keynesian economists in the country. His choice reflected the available pool of expertise: in 1960 economists who aligned with liberal Democrats were likely to be thoroughly steeped in Keynesian ideas.[21] The selection of CEA members also reflected the emergence of a consensus among liberal economists about the relationship between economic policy, social welfare goals, and expansion of the public sector. While more generous social policies and enhanced public capacities might be attractive, economic policies should not be held captive to such goals.

Led by the energetic and persuasive Walter Heller, the CEA played the role of economic educator and advocate within and outside the Kennedy administration.

[19] Collins, *The Business Response to Keynes*, chap. 6 presents an excellent account of the CED's extensive campaigns to educate business and government officials about its views on economic policy.

[20] Ibid., 6–7; on the economics profession in the United States and the acceptance of Keynesianism, see Marc Trachtenberg, "Keynes Triumphant: A Study in the Social History of Ideas," *Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present* 4 (1983): 17–86.

[21] See the discussion in Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America*, 372–84.

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The council enjoyed unprecedented influence under Kennedy, because of the substantial access that the president granted it and the encouragement he gave it to publicize its analysis through congressional testimony and public speeches.[22] It was also helped by the strength of the Keynesian consensus within the economics profession at the time. Heller could—and did—call upon a range of prominent economists from prestigious universities to reinforce his message.[23] His efforts ultimately paid off in 1962, when the president accepted the need for fiscal stimulus in the midst of an economic recession.

Tax cuts were the route selected. This choice reflected the doubts about the administration's ability to secure congressional approval for spending increases as well as the council's belief that tax cuts were the more efficient route.[24] The president received further encouragement to go with the tax cut strategy from the business community. The long educational project of the CED had paid off by the early 1960s in widespread business acceptance of federal deficits as a means of economic stimulus, although not all major business organizations supported cutting taxes to create those deficits. But for a president who worried about being branded antibusiness, this broad approval likely helped to tip the balance in favor of the decision to act.[25]

Even so, there was considerable congressional resistance to enacting a tax cut in a period of rising deficits. The intensive educational activities of the CED and later of Kennedy's CEA had swayed opinion at the elite level but had not conquered the realm of popular economic discourse to which Congress was more closely attuned.[26] Not just southern conservatives, but many moderate Democrats, too, worried that cutting taxes would be economically irresponsible. In fact, congressional approval of the tax cut was not assured until after President Lyndon Johnson had agreed to trim his 1965 budget request.[27] During the Ken-

[22] Erwin C. Hargrove and Samuel A. Morley, *The President and the Council of Economic Advisers* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 174, 181–82; Walter Heller, *New Dimensions of Political Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 26–27.

[23] Hargrove and Morley, *The President and the Council of Economic Advisers*, 202.

[24] Walter Heller, "Memorandum for the President Re: The Economics of the Second Stage Recovery Program," 17 March 1961, President's Office Files, File: Council of Economic Advisers, 1/61–3/61, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; "Minute on the President's Request for a Review of the Clark Community Facilities Bill and Allied Projects," 15 June 1961, File 6/1/61–6/15/61, Walter Heller Papers, John F. Kennedy Library. "Recap of Issues on Tax Cuts and the Expenditure Alternative," 16 December 1962, File: "Council of Economic Advisers," Record Group 174, National Archives, 3; see also Hargrove and Morley, *The President and the Council of Economic Advisers*, 196, 200–01.

[25] On Kennedy's relationship with business, see Hobart Rowen, *The Free Enterprisers: Kennedy, Johnson and the Business Establishment* (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1964), chap. 1; and Jim F. Heath, *John F. Kennedy and the Business Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

[26] A 1962 public opinion poll showed that 72 percent of the general public opposed a tax cut if it meant an increase in the national debt. See Heath, *John F. Kennedy and the Business Community*, 115.

[27] Hargrove and Morley, *The President and the Council of Economic Advisers*, 205–210.

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nedy administration, Democratic economists had created a new language with which to justify deficits; by promoting such concepts as the full employment budget they succeeded in blunting the influence of the balanced budget ideology.[28] But continued congressional wariness raised questions about the depth of the nation's conversion.

Working with the institutional framework and the configuration of interests left by the Employment Act of 1946, Democratic politicians and their economic advisers had finally launched an activist fiscal policy twenty-six years after Franklin D. Roosevelt first proposed spending to stimulate the economy. In Andrew Shonfield's words, Americans had been the "intellectual leaders" and the "institutional laggards" in actively deploying Keynesian principles.[29] Only after a reworking of the ideas, the emergence of a strong consensus in the economics profession, and a long process of education did an administration dare to increase the deficit in order to stimulate the economy.

Limits to Innovation and the War on Poverty

During the 1960s, Democratic politicians introduced a range of innovations relevant to employment policy under the umbrella of the War on Poverty. Although these policies extended federal activity in the domain of labor market policy, they did not challenge the framework established two decades earlier. As it developed, the War on Poverty revealed the limits of that framework: efforts to expand the definition of the problem to include underemployment were stymied, the divisions between social and economic policies intensified, and little lasting institutional framework for expanding federal capacities to administer employment programs emerged. The labor market policies of the War on Poverty became remedial programs targeted at the bottom of the labor force—especially at African Americans—and remained largely unconnected to the private labor market.

Officially launched in 1964, the War on Poverty had its origins in a rather vague request several years earlier by President Kennedy to have his CEA look into the problem of poverty. The program his advisers devised over the next two years encompassed a variety of remedial service and job readiness programs that targeted the lowest end of the labor market.[30] Underpinning this strategy was the belief that macroeconomic measures would produce ample opportunities for all who were prepared to take advantage of them. The CEA devoted little attention to the relationship between poverty and underemployment, and directed thinking

[28] See the discussion in James Savage, *Balanced Budgets and American Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 175–79.

[29] Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 333.

[30] For general accounts of the initiation of the War on Poverty see Allen J. Matusow, *The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), chap. 4; James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1968), chap. 4.

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away from the relationship between poverty and the structure and operation of labor markets, and toward the problems of individuals. As Henry Aaron has noted, "perhaps the most striking characteristic of this view of the poverty cycle is the absence of any mention of the economic system within which it operates."[31]

The most innovative feature of the poverty program was the decentralized and participatory implementation framework. The federal government funneled monies directly to local communities, bypassing state and, initially at least, city authorities. The call for "maximum feasible participation" sparked the mobilization of communities to participate in administering the new programs.[32] Localities set up community action programs that created new participatory structures and oversaw the delivery of the varied services launched under the auspices of the War on Poverty.

The vagueness of the presidential directive and the dearth of academic material about poverty gave the Council of Economic Advisers considerable latitude in setting the terms for the new poverty program. The CEA's conception of the problem that policy should address—unemployment due to insufficient macroeconomic stimulation and lack of job readiness among the poor—dominated thinking about poverty and unemployment throughout the 1960s.

The influence of macroeconomists in setting the terms of the War on Poverty highlights the importance of established networks of expertise. The council's skepticism about manpower policy undermined efforts to enhance significantly the public role in job training during the 1960s. As the War on Poverty developed, efforts from within the Labor Department to expand the definition of the problem to include underemployment faced severe obstacles. Proponents of expanding policy had to fight against established theoretical perspectives as well as elaborate new criteria and categories for collecting and interpreting data. With few allies and mired in institutional rivalries, the advocates of a broader scope for employment policy did not succeed in changing established definitions.[33] Thus, although the organization of American national political institutions generally encourages consideration of a range of ideas in national policy making, the creation of institutionally-linked networks of expertise over time gives advantages to some ideas over others.

By creating a separate realm of poverty policy, the architects of the War on Poverty in the CEA reinforced the divisions between social and economic policy. Guided by a disciplinary perspective that devoted scant attention to institutions, they did little to address problems of institution building or reform. It would have been difficult for the economists on the CEA to influence institutions in any case, since the CEA was a small agency without the capacity to implement policy.

[31] Henry J. Aaron, *Politics and the Professors* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), 20.

[32] Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty* (New York: Free Press, 1970).

[33] On the efforts to establish a measure for underemployment, see the discussion in *The Manpower Report of the President* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967, 1968), 73–78 and 34–36 respectively.

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The short-term perspective of politicians and particularly the president's need to push policy through quickly also helped account for the problems of institution building in employment policy and for the strengthened divisions between social and economic policy. The decision to create a separate set of agencies to implement the War on Poverty—in the process bypassing such unresponsive federal-state bureaucracies as the United States Employment Service—allowed rapid implementation of new policies, but at the same time it created obstacles for institutionalizing them. The institutional rivalries and political conflict that this route provoked placed poverty policies in constant political jeopardy. The approach embedded in the War on Poverty was far more suited to challenging existing institutions than to creating or reforming enduring institutions needed to administer employment policy.

The incentives of politicians also help account for a distinguishing feature of the War on Poverty—its racial focus. Although the poverty program was officially nonracial, the civil rights movement and later the urban riots created pressures to focus resources on African Americans. Community action agencies were pressed from below to increase the representation of blacks, and the Office of Economic Opportunity overseeing the program in Washington took on black empowerment as central to its mission.[34] And as riots began to shake northern cities, President Lyndon Johnson looked to the poverty program as a way to funnel resources into the affected black communities. The collision of the civil rights revolution with employment policy gave the poverty program a racial identification that shaped its political meaning.

The positions relevant social groups took on employment policy ratified the direction laid out by intellectual networks and political choices. Most striking was the relative lack of interest expressed by business or organized labor in extending employment policy. Although organized labor supported proposals for job training, it never viewed these programs as essential to its own well-being. And, indeed, expansions and redirections of employment policy had little to offer labor or business. Alternative arrangements secured during the New Deal and immediately after the war governed promotion and pay. Most central were the seniority system and collective bargaining; such training as existed was an internal function of the firm.[35] So long as these arrangements worked satisfactorily, neither unions nor business had much incentive to support alternative conceptions of employment policy, especially if they threatened existing arrangements. In

[34] Paul E. Peterson and J. David Greenstone, "Racial Change and Citizen Participation: The Mobilization of Low-Income Communities Through Community Action" in Robert H. Haveman, ed., *A Decade of Federal Anti-Poverty Programs: Achievements, Failures and Lessons* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), 248, 251-56.

[35] See Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, *Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985).

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this way established institutions in the domain of labor relations affected later possibilities for employment policy.

The perspectives of black Americans on employment policy developed in response to a different set of considerations. The limited focus of the War on Poverty and the failure of efforts to extend the reach of employment policy encouraged black leaders to make legal regulation—the affirmative action approach—the centerpiece of a black employment strategy. This approach, together with efforts to preserve the new jobs available to blacks in expanded federal bureaucracies, defined the most promising avenues of employment policy for African Americans.[36] Although black organizations vigorously supported broader approaches to employment when they reached the agenda, after the War on Poverty, they focused on the legal realm, where black employment problems cast as questions of rights stood a better chance of being addressed.[37]

The War on Poverty was an extraordinary episode in American politics and policy, providing a hothouse environment for experimentation. But prominent features of the poverty program as it developed had troubling consequences: the focus on the individual problems of the poor served to direct attention away from the broader economic sources of poverty; suspicion of established agencies, however well-founded, undermined possibilities for reforming existing institutions; and the racial focus of the War on Poverty limited political possibilities for enhancing existing programs or even shifting their focus.

These features of policy in the 1960s were the product of different actors who were pressing against the perceived bounds of politics and established frameworks of policy understanding. The directions in which they pushed, however, were limited by their starting points. Thus, the CEA's approach to employment policy and poverty rested on its assumptions about macroeconomic policy making; the president's enthusiasm for the poverty program stemmed from his efforts to overcome the institutional constraints on presidential policy making.

Once in place, the political meaning and policy possibilities embodied in the War on Poverty were transformed by unexpected intersections with other events. The collision of the War on Poverty with the movement for black political empowerment was central to its political fate. The sequence of policy innovation and the interaction of policy with unpredicted events deeply affected the politics of employment policy. After the War on Poverty, efforts to link poverty to employment problems faced new barriers. Policy had been carved up into two

[36] On the War on Poverty and public employment of African Americans, see Michael K. Brown and Steven P. Erie, "Blacks and the Legacy of the Great Society: The Economic and Political Impact of Federal Social Policy," *Public Policy* 29 (Summer 1981): 299–330.

[37] On the development of the affirmative action approach, see Hugh Davis Graham, *The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), chap. 9.

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realms: a politics of economic policy and a politics of poverty; no broader politics of employment united them.

Ideas, Politics, and Administration in American Policy Making

During the 1970s, the United States suffered the highest rates of unemployment since the Great Depression; at the same time, the puzzling performance of the economy suggested that traditional Keynesian remedies no longer worked as they once had. In this uncertain setting, three very different perspectives contended to shape American employment policy. The first called for a larger and qualitatively different government role that would involve planning or new forms of business-labor cooperation. A second, adopted by the Carter administration, offered a blend of macroeconomic policy, jobs programs, and wage-price guidelines.

The third perspective, increasingly influential among economists and the new crop of think tanks that emerged in the 1970s, broke with the fundamental premises underlying policy for the past thirty years.[38] It argued that government action hampered the operation of the economy and asserted that the best employment policy was less government activity. Public spending and regulation, the major routes of policy development in the 1970s, were singled out as barriers to creating the economic prosperity that was the best remedy for employment problems.

The election of Ronald Reagan and the policy changes implemented during his first years in office signaled the victory of the pro-market approach. Although policy consistently fell short of the vigorous rhetoric of the Reagan administration—most notably on the subject of deficits—the character of the debate about employment qualitatively shifted during the 1980s. Debates were no longer centered around the question of *how* the government should intervene but *whether* the government should act.

To understand why the pro-market approach prevailed in the 1980s, we must consider the nature of the links that had been forged between ideas, politics, and administration in employment policy since the 1940s. The growing disjuncture among these components essential for innovation presented problems for those who wanted to extend the government role. It meant not only disrupting patterns of political-administrative interaction that had been developing for decades but also finding new ways to reorganize these elements without replicating the political and administrative problems of the past. Proponents of staying the course, on the other hand, had been weakened by a decade of puzzling economic performance. Those arguing for less government faced fewer administrative and political barriers than either alternative perspective.

[38] On the political appeal of supply-side economics see Herbert Stein, *Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), chap. 7.

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Public Philosophies and Technical Ideas

There are two distinct ways in which the word "ideas" is used in accounts of policy making: the first meaning is captured by the concept of public philosophy.[39] It expresses broad concepts that are tied to values and moral principles and that can be represented in political debate in symbols and rhetoric. A second usage of ideas refers to a more programmatic set of statements about cause-and-effect relationships attached to a method for influencing those relationships. The language expressing programmatic ideas is the technical or professionally-rooted terminology of the expert.[40]

Although the two meanings of ideas shade over into one another and on occasion interlock, it is useful to differentiate between them, because their influence on policy and politics is distinct. Public philosophies play a central role in organizing politics, but their capacity to direct policy is limited; without ties to programmatic ideas their influence is difficult to sustain. Likewise, programmatic ideas are most influential when they are bound to a public philosophy; but these ideas must also forge links with administration. Programmatic ideas developed without reference to administration may be technically strong but are likely to be politically impotent. The influence of ideas on politics is strongest when programmatic ideas, tied to administrative means, are joined with a public philosophy; unhinged, the influence of each becomes difficult to sustain.

In American employment policy, much of the period from the 1940s to 1980 was characterized by a dissociation of programmatic ideas and public philosophy. The social Keynesianism championed by Alvin Hansen had joined a set of programmatic, administratively-rooted ideas with a broader vision about politics, most fully articulated by Roosevelt's 1944 Economic Bill of Rights. After its failure, ideas as public philosophy became increasingly disjointed from the technical policy ideas, and these ideas became increasingly divorced from administration. The growing distance of these two types of ideas and their separation from administration impoverished both.

Because programmatic ideas increasingly developed without political or administrative moorings, it became difficult for them to influence policy in any regular way. Although the expression of these ideas grew ever more sophisticated, their ability to chart new policy directions involving government action was narrowing. Research relevant to employment policy emphasized the movement of aggregate measures and microeconomic models, leaving untouched a middle ground concerned with sectors and institutions that the government was grappling to ad-

[39] See the discussion of public philosophy in Samuel H. Beer, "In Search of a New Public Philosophy" in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 5-44.

[40] Ideas of this sort are often the product of social research. See Carol H. Weiss, "Improving the Linkage Between Social Research and Public Policy" in Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., ed., *Knowledge and Policy: The Uncertain Connection* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), 23-81.

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dress.[41] In the absence of sufficient applicable research, purely political criteria held sway. This was particularly evident in the 1970s in the federal responses to growing unemployment and inflation, ranging from wage-price guidelines to pork barrel-style public service employment.

The dissociation of the two kinds of ideas made public philosophy increasingly hollow. During the 1960s and 1970s, rhetorical appeals grew in importance, but they were unanchored in programmatic content. The War on Poverty, for example, was declared with little effort to assemble support based on a rationale for the specific policies to be undertaken.[42] The difficulty in matching politics and programmatic ideas lay behind the exhaustion of New Deal liberalism and the crisis in public philosophy that characterized the 1970s.[43] Yet, as party ties attenuated, rhetoric and symbols bore a greater burden for organizing electoral politics.

Much of Ronald Reagan's early political success can be attributed to the way he fused a bold and appealing rhetoric to a set of programmatic ideas about how the economy worked. Although widely rejected by economists, supply-side economics resonated with mainstream economists' growing disillusion with government action. Most importantly, however, supply-side economics appeared plausible, in part because it was clearly "doable" within the context of American politics and institutions. But the merging of programmatic ideas and public philosophy was more apparent than real for most policy areas during the Reagan administration. As the decade progressed, the disjuncture between rhetoric and government action on the economy grew. While the rhetoric remained firmly pro-market, policy was actually a disjointed blend of initiatives.[44] In this sense, the Reagan administration did not so much resolve as elide the problems of uniting philosophy with programmatic ideas about the economy.

The Political Problem of Positive Government

The experience of employment policy suggests that the development, access, and plausibility of ideas calling for new kinds of government capacities are handicapped by the difficulty of uniting politics, ideas, and administration in the United States.

Immediately after World War II, some supporters of a broad, more encompassing employment policy worried about precisely this problem. The political scientist E.E. Schattschneider argued that a national employment policy would

[41] See the strongly worded critique of John T. Dunlop, "Policy Decisions and Research in Economics and Industrial Relations," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 30 (April 1977): 275–82.

[42] See Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, 165.

[43] See Beer, "In Search of a New Public Philosophy."

[44] See Emma Rothschild, "The Real Reagan Economy," *The New York Review of Books*, 30 June 1988, 46–54; See also Benjamin M. Friedman, *Day of Reckoning: The Consequences of American Economic Policy Under Reagan and After* (New York: Random House, 1988).

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be impossible without "responsible" programmatic parties. He urged that parties establish permanent research organizations that could fuse policy and politics in what he called "political planning." Stressing the inherently political nature of devising and mobilizing policy ideas, he warned that "parties simply cannot afford to rely on non-party research and publicity to do the job."[45]

Yet that is just what presidents and parties had to do in the United States. It meant that connections between politics, administration, and policy were forged in piecemeal and sporadic ways when cooperation among technical experts, interests, and government agencies could be effected or when the president threw the weight of his office behind policy innovation. In some policy areas, including social security, this union was unproblematic; in others such as medical care, it experienced partial success.

In employment policy, by contrast, the most important private interests—business and labor—had little interest in extending policy; the dominant experts paid little attention to administrative issues; and the relevant government agencies were either hostile or weak. Moreover, the president had little political interest in backing employment policy innovation so long as America remained economically strong and Keynesian policy appeared sufficient to manage unemployment. In this context, the scope of employment policy remained limited and proposals for extending it contested. Nothing in the political, intellectual, or administrative history of employment policy provided a foothold for reorienting the government's role during the 1970s, when it became clear that the older approach had broken down.

Where the difficulties of uniting politics, administration, and ideas are less severe, policies may be enacted more easily. The successes of deregulation and tax reform in the 1980s provide a telling counterexample of employment policy: in neither of these cases did ideas about reform have to contend with arguments about administrative feasibility or with opposition to building new government capacities.[46] In this context, technical ideas were able to influence policy more easily and were able to benefit from their attachment to an appealing rhetoric.

A number of analysts have portrayed the recent successes of tax reform and deregulation as evidence of the importance of ideas in policy making.[47] In each case, a strong consensus among experts allowed them to shape the terms of the policy debate and exert influence on the outcome. But what each of these instances of reform also has in common—and shares with the pro-market reforms in

[45] E. E. Schattschneider, "Party Government and Employment Policy," *American Political Science Review* 39 (December 1945): 1154.

[46] On tax policy see David R. Beam, Timothy J. Conlan, and Margaret T. Wrightson, "Solving the Riddle of Tax Reform: Party Competition and the Politics of Ideas," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Summer 1990): 193–217; on deregulation see Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, *The Politics of Deregulation* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985).

[47] See Beam, Conlan, and Wrightson, "Solving the Riddle of Tax Reform"; and Derthick and Quirk, *Politics of Deregulation*, esp. chap. 7.

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employment policy as well—is administrative simplicity. Ideas that create new forms of government activity face a more difficult task. Although they might also fashion an appealing rhetoric and find political support for such concepts as fairness or opportunity, their rhetorical claims remain unconvincing; support is ephemeral if government's capacity to act is widely doubted. When there is a history of administrative failure, as in the case of employment policy, the rhetoric becomes even less likely to influence policy.

Political Possibilities and Future Employment Policy

What are the possibilities that American policy makers and politicians can construct an alternative approach to employment issues in the 1990s, when transformations in the international economic system and American competitiveness have become overriding concerns in public debate? I conclude by considering how new policy sequences may be launched and by sketching the features of an employment policy that combines ideas, politics, and administration in politically sustainable forms.

The start of a new policy sequence is most visible when there is a "big bang" of innovation. Yet the big bang analogy is somewhat misleading. It underestimates changes that have already prepared the way for such shifts in policy, and it overstates the degree to which policy is transformed afterwards. In fact, small changes transform policy, even in a political system in which policy shifts seem to occur all at once. Small changes not only prepare the ground for major shifts, they may also chart the direction of those transformations by providing working examples of new policy and creating new conceptions about what is possible and desirable.

During the 1980s, alterations to the economic and social environment created the potential for making small changes in employment policy that could point the way toward a fundamental reorientation in scope and mission. Support for such revitalized employment policies could be won by linking these policies with problems that have attracted broad public attention, including concern about American competitiveness, dissatisfaction with public education, and the worries about a growing underclass.[48]

The growing concern among business leaders about the quality of the American labor force and its impact on American competitiveness creates possibilities for building support for a broader, more encompassing labor market policy.[49] But

[48] See the argument of Albert O. Hirschman that "neglected" policy problems can be more easily addressed if they are attached to "privileged" policy problems that are the focus of broad public concern. Albert O. Hirschman, "Policymaking and Policy Analysis in Latin America—A Return Journey," *Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 150–52.

[49] See Ray Marshall, *Unheard Voices: Labor and Economic Policy in a Competitive World* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

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to attract employer interest, employment policy would have to build much stronger ties to the private sector, attending more closely to the needs of the private economy. This does not mean, however, that policy need blindly follow the dictates of business; government could influence business goals relevant to employment policy by creating incentives to adopt some strategies rather than others. The availability of highly skilled workers, for example, may prompt movement away from a competitive strategy based on low-wage labor.

Widespread dissatisfaction with American public education provides another potential opening for expanding employment policy. The problem of school dropouts, the growth of youth unemployment, and the difficulty of making the transition from school to work all suggest the need for rethinking the institutional links between school and the labor market. Apprenticeship programs, which have attracted increasing attention, are only one of the ways in which public schools could contribute to an enhanced labor market policy. As preeminent community institutions, schools could also serve as centers of information about the labor market and programs of adult education.[50]

Finally, concern about the emergence of an American underclass has drawn attention to the links between economic change and community stability. The economic dislocations of the 1980s have highlighted the importance of local institutions in cushioning the effects of economic transitions.[51] This experience suggests the need for bottom-up community organizing strategies as an essential component of employment policy. Local organizations including community development corporations, churches, and schools can all be enlisted to increase the effectiveness and extend the reach of labor market policies.

In the context of a set of broader employment policies, such mobilization could avoid being limited by the institutional isolation that characterized organizing during the War on Poverty. A community organizing strategy builds on distinctive strengths and weaknesses of American federalism, which lacks a strong central bureaucracy but features a strong tradition of local activism. The growth of state-level administrative capacities during the 1980s together with the community-based organizations created during the 1960s may prove helpful in sustaining such local activism.[52]

These potential impulses for revitalizing employment policy suggest an approach different from the one that dominated policy in the past. They indicate the need for building stronger ties between public and private action, creating a

[50] For an argument in favor of creating a broad apprenticeship program in the United States, see Robert I. Lerman and Hillard Pouncy, "The Compelling Case for Youth Apprenticeships," *The Public Interest* 1001 (Fall 1990): 62-77.

[51] See William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[52] On the growth of state-level capacities during the 1980s, see David Osborne, *Laboratories of Democracy* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988); and R. Scott Fosler, *The New Economic Role of American States: Strategies in a Competitive World Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

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broader scope for policy, and devoting greater attention to the institutional links that join policy areas. The resulting policy would contribute to reconciling the social and economic objectives of employment policy and would begin to address the employment needs of minorities without explicit targeting.

Reliance on macropolicy would be replaced by greater attention to the specific relationships and institutions that undergird the economy. Learning how and where the government might affect those relationships in order to influence the quantity and quality of employment is thus central to redesigning policy. Labor market policy would be expanded to serve different levels of the labor market, thereby losing its remedial character. The task of labor market policy would be more than simply addressing unemployment, its primary charge in the past. Problems of relieving bottlenecks, upgrading skills, and enhancing geographic mobility would all fall into the domain of labor market policy.[53]

This conception of employment policy calls on government to play a different role than it has in the past. It emphasizes the need of government to act as a catalyst for private activity rather than simply as a regulator or director of a separate public realm.[54] This approach channels market trends toward public goals rather than compensating for the market as in the 1960s and 1970s, or capitulating to it as in the 1980s. Increasing this type of intervention would actually strengthen the political appeal of regulatory and public-sector approaches, such as affirmative action and public employment programs; a more balanced blend of approaches would both reduce the pressure on such policies to carry the burden alone and help mitigate their status as political flashpoints. In this way, employment policy that incorporated a variety of approaches could enhance the political acceptability of policies contested during the 1960s and 1970s by changing the context within which they are evaluated.

These are some of the most promising possibilities for assembling new packages of policy: by remaking institutional links and bringing interests together in different ways, they provide the raw material for launching a new employment policy sequence.

[53] For an argument in favor of an employment policy organized along these lines, see Paul Osterman, *Employment Futures: Reorganization, Dislocation, and Public Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); another argument for a broader approach to employment policy is made by Isabel Sawhill, "Rethinking Employment Policy" in D. Lee Bawden and Felicity Skidmore, eds., *Rethinking Employment Policy* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1989), 9–36.

[54] This formulation is John T. Dunlop's. See his essay "Involving Government as a Catalyst, Not as Regulator" in William Kilberg, ed., *The Dislocated Worker, Preparing America's Workforce* (Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press, 1983), 14–17.

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Perpetuating the Cold War: Domestic Sources of International Patterns of Behavior

JAMES G. RICHTER

The postwar international order has changed. As John Lewis Gaddis has emphasized, this order provided a long and relatively stable peace between the great powers.[1] But if the peace was long, one might also argue it was unnecessarily confrontational and costly. Through most of the period, both the United States and the Soviet governments regarded each other as essentially aggressive entities that understood only the language of strength. As a result, each power feared that any action—or failure to act—that allowed the other to improve its position would be regarded as an expression of weakness and encourage further aggression. This fear inclined both governments to view their rivalry as a zero-sum game and to blur the distinction between vital and peripheral interests. These images led both governments persistently to pursue policies that were counterproductive to their domestic and international interests. The belief that accommodation would encourage the other side to make greater demands hampered negotiations. Both sides heavily burdened their national budgets with defense spending, contributing to the current collapse of the Soviet economy and to the United States's debilitating budget deficit. Finally, both governments engaged in long, costly wars in areas of questionable strategic importance, severely straining social tensions at home in the process.

[1] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

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In this period of transition, it is important to understand how this self-destructive behavior started and why it lasted so long in order to avoid a repetition of equally counterproductive behavior in the future. Structural theories only go so far. They explain why in a bipolar system the two powers must concentrate on each other in their competition for security and influence. But Kenneth Waltz, in particular, argues that the increased certainty of a bipolar world and the wide disparity in capabilities between the superpowers and the rest of the world lead the two powers to manage their competition better.[2] Thus, though he recognizes that the two major powers may overreact in a global competition where "there are no peripheries," he also suggests that their reliance on internal balancing rather than alliance politics allows them to avoid foreign adventures more easily than great powers in a multipolar world.[3] In short, his analysis explains the stability of the "long peace" rather than the virulence or persistence of the confrontational aspects of the cold war.[4]

The superpowers' behavior is more puzzling when one considers the consequences of the nuclear revolution. When each side has an invulnerable, nuclear retaliatory capability, as Robert Jervis cogently argues, a state does not need military superiority—or even equivalence—to defend its vital interests.[5] Mutual vulnerability should also induce greater restraint by highlighting the difference between peripheral and vital interests, and increasing the risks incurred through overreaction. Indeed, the condition of strategic interdependence contradicts the very notion that one can impose a solution on a reluctant adversary, which is the essence of the politics of strength implicit in an image of an aggressive enemy.

Psychological approaches to the study of international relations help fill in some of the gaps left by structural explanations. The image of an aggressive enemy who understands only strength, after all, has persisted since the time of Pericles. The insecurity of an anarchic, self-help system inclines a rational actor to prepare for the worst. This rational tendency is then reinforced by the inherent egocentrism of human perception, which, as Jervis again argues, tends to make leaders interpret their own actions as a response to objective conditions, and another's actions, particularly when they conflict with their own interests, as the expression of a hostile disposition.[6]

[2] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979), chap. 8.

[3] Ibid., 171–2.

[4] Waltz does not contest these limits to structural explanations. He notes in reference to the magnitude of the arms race: "That both continue to pile weapon upon unneeded weapon is a puzzle whose solution can be found only within the United States and the Soviet Union"; see his "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory" in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 51.

[5] See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167–214. Also, see Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

[6] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 66–76, 343–355.

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After World War II, the emergence of virulent enemy images was particularly likely.[7] Nuclear weapons had not yet supplanted industry and territory as the most important strategic assets, and the power vacuum in the industrial center of Europe excited fears on each side that the other would gain control of that territory first. Moreover, the two powers' mutually antagonistic ideologies exacerbated the tendency of each of them to ascribe the most hostile motives to the actions of the other. Finally, leaders on both sides remembered the lessons of Munich that concessions to inherently hostile countries—whether totalitarian or imperialist—only embolden aggression.

Even so, psychological explanations cannot fully account for the virulence of these images, their tenacity through the postwar period, or the persistence of the behavior that accompanied them. One can find several occasions in which leaders of the United States or the Soviet Union tried and failed to alter their governments' respective cold war mythology: Georgii Malenkov in 1953–1954; Nikita Khrushchev in 1959–1960 and in 1963–1964; John Kennedy in 1963; and arguably Dwight Eisenhower in 1959–1960 and Jimmy Carter in 1977–1978. Even in 1963, when leaders of both countries sought to overcome the prevailing public image of the enemy simultaneously, the cold war myths prevailed. Only Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded, but under special circumstances to be considered at the end of this article.

These leaders' inability to change the course of their country's foreign policy suggests that domestic politics contributed to the confrontational character of the cold war. This should not be surprising. To the extent that international pressures force states to undertake certain tasks for their security and well-being, these states must define new institutional missions—and, if necessary, create new institutions—to perform these tasks. They also must formulate legitimating myths about their country's world role to justify these tasks and to mobilize and extract the resources from within their territories necessary to accomplish them.[8]

Once established, these myths become embedded in countries' domestic politics and are difficult to dislodge.[9] Institutions defining their mission in terms of these myths, for example, are sure to resist any attempt to change them. Meanwhile, these myths are used not only by ruling bodies in the service of the state, but also are coopted by persons, parties, or other political actors in order to mobilize support for partisan interests. Leaders who seek to modify these prevailing im-

[7] See Scott Parrish, "Soviet Reactions to the Security Dilemma: The Sources of Soviet Self-Encirclement, 1945–1950," (Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, April 1990).

[8] The domestic legitimating role of foreign policy myths and their impact on U.S. and Soviet policies is discussed in B. Thomas Trout, "Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War," *International Studies Quarterly* 19 (September 1975). My analysis differs from this excellent study in emphasizing the ability of competing interests to use this mythology to mobilize resources for partisan purposes and thus sustain the mythology even when leaders desire to change it.

[9] An excellent analysis of the institutional roots of foreign policy belief systems and their stability can be found in Douglas Blum, "The Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System: Continuity and Change in Ideology and Politics" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1990).

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ages, therefore, open themselves to political attack. In other words, once external pressures prompt a government to adopt a particular course in foreign policy, this course and its corresponding myths soon put down autonomous roots in the domestic environment and may persist well after the international rationale for such behavior has passed.

Because of these domestic roots, in fact, a country's prevailing myths about its role in the international system are likely to change significantly only in times of great instability or uncertainty. For example, international crises may make it clear to a large section of the elite that continuing the existing foreign policy would result in heavy and immediate costs, perhaps even threaten the survival of the state, though even then domestic politics may prevent a change. Conversely, domestic instability—often exacerbated by growing pressures from the international environment—may allow political leaders to redefine a state's international role in search of a new basis of legitimacy.

The foregoing analysis suggests that the domestic politics of the world's great powers will play a significant role—if not decisive—in creating and sustaining the pattern of behavior particular to a given international order. Rapid changes in the international system may force states to reconsider their world roles, but these states cannot completely discard or transform the myths and institutions left over from their previous position; they must adapt or supplement them to perform the tasks required by the new conditions.[10] How small states adapt their systems to a changing international environment will have little impact on an emerging international order. But as great powers define the conditions under which other states must act, domestic constructs already existing in emergent great powers may play a tremendous role in shaping new patterns of international behavior.

Domestic politics of the great powers will also act as a brake on change once the international system has stabilized. Leaders will hesitate before departing from an established line in foreign policy because of the domestic political costs they might incur. Furthermore, to the extent that rapid changes in the international environment would force all great powers to alter their foreign policies contemporaneously, domestic structures in each of these powers will reflect the patterns of behavior emerging from this change. These structures could then continue to reinforce each other and preserve these patterns even after further changes in the international environment would allow a different, more profitable type of interaction to emerge.

This article examines how domestic politics helps explain the emergence and persistence of counterproductive behavior in the cold war. The first section describes how existing domestic political conditions in both countries combined

[10] An analogous point is made in Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy" in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 233–62.

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with the unstable postwar international situation to produce the confrontational character of the cold war. It then discusses how these images, once embedded in the political systems of the two countries, persisted into the 1980s. I examine three cases in which a leader of at least one of the two superpowers sought to redefine the prevailing foreign policy myths of his country in order to lower the danger of nuclear war, limit his country's commitments in the peripheries, and/or reduce defense spending: the Stalin succession in the Soviet Union; the period after the Cuban missile crisis until Khrushchev's ouster; and the period of détente from 1972 to 1979. In each case, the confrontational behavior of one country, often prompted by domestic considerations, reinforced the proponents of a similar policy in the other, thereby undermining the attempt at accommodation.

This does not suggest that structural incentives for a more managed superpower competition were not important nor that the domestic regimes in these countries remained frozen in a cold war stance for the entire postwar period; clearly this was not the case. Leaders of both countries did seek from time to time to overcome the domestic barriers to a more cooperative foreign policy, and each success in this direction reduced the barriers for subsequent leaders. The level of domestic support for détente grew as the costs of the counterproductive cold war policies became clearer. Still, until at least 1987 the burden of proof lay on those political figures who challenged the prevailing image of the enemy rather than on those who accepted it. To sustain a conciliatory policy for very long, therefore, a leader needed to provide some evidence that the other side would reciprocate rather than exploit such a policy, and this evidence would have to be convincing enough to neutralize the arguments of those who played on established images to oppose change.

The existence of similar constraints in both superpowers made it unlikely such evidence would be available. Only very rarely were leaders of both countries simultaneously willing to accept the domestic costs involved in altering their countries' prevailing images; and even when they did, the persistent influence of hardliners on each side provided ample evidence for their counterparts in the other to cast doubt upon the intentions of the other and so undermine the rapprochement.

The Emergence of Cold War Images after World War II

The belief systems in both superpowers at the end of the war did not bode well for postwar cooperation.[11] Both the Soviet Union and the United States relied

[11] This article borrows heavily from the following accounts about the immediate postwar period: on the American side, John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy: 1932–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Deborah Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Norman Graebner, ed., *The National*

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heavily on universalistic ideas to create a national identity and both justified their foreign policies not only as a means to protect the national interest but also to protect and even propagate the way of life (whether Soviet-style socialism or liberal democracy) these ideas would prescribe. As a result, they perceived threats to this way of life not only in the physical power of potentially hostile countries but also in alternative belief systems claiming universal validity. During the interwar period, for example, a strong isolationist strain existed in both countries that regarded interaction with the outside world as potentially contaminating the existing order at home.

This clash of legitimating myths did not make the virulent hostility of the cold war inevitable, however. By 1945 the U.S.–Soviet collaboration in the anti-Hitler coalition and the impact of the war on domestic institutions in both countries provided each country an opportunity to overcome its isolationist, xenophobic legacy. Franklin Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman as well as Josef Stalin sought to establish some sort of modus vivendi between the two powers. Each of these leaders, though, had to define and justify this foreign policy within the framework of existing legitimating myths, which in the unstable international conditions of the postwar era reinforced the elements of hostility and distrust contained in the myths of the other, finally overwhelming the incentives to cooperate. By 1950 ferociously hostile images of each other prevailed in both countries and had become embedded in their domestic institutions.

Of the two powers, the Soviet Union was the most constrained by the images and institutions left over from the interwar period and the least flexible. In the late 1920s, Stalin came to power in part by appealing to "red patriotism." He coupled an image of the party at home as an "island of state power in a sea of worker-peasant Russia" to a corresponding image of the Soviet international role as a vulnerable island of socialism encircled by imperialist aggressors.[12] This vision of the Soviet international role then helped justify the rapid industrialization and the campaign of terror during the 1930s and informed the creation of enormous bureaucracies to administer this revolution from above, including the

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Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945–1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Jeffry A. Frieden, *Banking on the World: The Politics of International Finance* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Ernest R. May, "The Cold War" in Joseph Nye, ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy"; Parrish, "Soviet Reactions to the Security Dilemma: The Sources of Soviet Self-Encirclement, 1945–1950"; on the Soviet side, William O. McCagg, Jr., *Stalin Embattled* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978); William Taubman, *Stalin's America Policy: From Entente to Cold War* (New York: Norton, 1982); Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Werner Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–1953* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).

[12] Robert C. Tucker, *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Norton, 1987), 65–70.

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party apparatus, the industrial ministries, the military, and the secret police. As a result, these institutions relied on the vision of capitalist encirclement to ensure their privileged position in society. Stalin, too, used the threat of impending external danger to preserve his status as an indispensable protector of international socialism.

But after the war, Stalin's actions suggested an attempt to reconcile two desirable but potentially conflicting aims. He clearly wanted a security zone of friendly countries in East Central Europe and, therefore, imposed regimes in these countries, and especially Poland, dominated by communist parties. This conflicted, however, with an interest to maintain the working relation with the West he had attained in the anti-Hitler coalition, because the western countries were demanding representative, freely-elected governments there.

This dilemma was exacerbated precisely because Stalin continued to rely on the hostile image of imperialism to justify his own authority within the communist movement. According to Milovan Djilas, for example, Stalin told his Yugoslav comrades near the end of the war that "we shall recover in fifteen or twenty years, and then we'll have another go at it."[13] Bolstered by such rhetoric, elements of the communist movement outside Stalin's direct control often went further in confronting the West than he desired. The Yugoslavs, in particular, pursued an assertive anti-imperialist policy—such as supporting the communists in Greece without Stalin's approval—that provided ample cause for East-West misunderstandings.

A similar dilemma faced Stalin in domestic politics.[14] During the war Stalin had loosened the rigid ideological underpinnings of his rule in order to mobilize the entire nation behind the war effort and had raised expectations that life would be easier after it was over. Administering this effort had strengthened a managerial tendency within the Soviet bureaucracy that aspired less to the revolutionary mission of the 1930s than to the incremental improvement of the domestic economy. The evidence suggests, however, that Stalin had every intention of returning to the severe social discipline of the 1930s once the war was over. To do so, therefore, he again pointed to impending danger from the international environment. His speech of 9 February 1946 announcing the first postwar five-year plan echoed his statement to Djilas that the Soviet Union must be prepared to fight a war in fifteen years.

Despite Stalin's public rhetoric, however, his struggle to resolve the tensions between his domestic and foreign policy goals left Soviet policies somewhat flexible. For example, he constructed people's democracies in Eastern Europe, which, while not fully representative, allowed noncommunist parties to participate in the government in subsidiary ways. Meanwhile, a limited debate over both domestic and foreign policy arose in the Soviet media between the managerial

[13] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 114–5.
[14] This argument borrows in large part from arguments in McCagg, *Stalin Embattled*.

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tendency in the elite and those who favored a resurgence of revolutionary ideals. In foreign policy, the former tendency was best represented in the writings of Yevgenii S. Varga, who argued that the capitalist economies were sufficiently healthy to endure for some time, implying the need for achieving some means of coexistence between the two camps.[15]

The debate ended, however, after U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet Union, especially the Marshall Plan, raised fears in Moscow that the West hoped to extend capitalism throughout East Central Europe and deprive the Soviet Union of its security zone. To consolidate Soviet control before this could happen, Stalin opted to crack the ideological whip. In the fall of 1947, Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov made his famous two-camp speech calling for discipline among the communist parties in the Cominform. Soon thereafter, the Soviets extinguished any genuinely pluralist elements remaining in the people's democracies, most dramatically in the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia.

Stalin's decision to unleash the ideological hardliners had long-term consequences in the Soviet Union. The prewar image of capitalist encirclement again ascended to a status of unquestioned orthodoxy, while the arguments of a more moderate tendency were forced underground.[16] As a result, when Stalin's death allowed this moderate tendency to reemerge in the political debate, the ideological assumptions underlying his foreign policy had been reaffirmed and adapted to fit the new international conditions, which made them that much more difficult to overcome.

In the United States, meanwhile, domestic politics placed far fewer constraints on foreign policy after the war, as several different visions of the American international role competed for influence. Although the war had severely weakened the isolationist sentiment that had been so strong in the early interwar period, an influential sector of Congress still remained that opposed active U.S. leadership in world affairs, particularly the expenditures and the more intrusive state that would be necessary to sustain such a role. Meanwhile, those who favored an active foreign policy disagreed about what sort of action was needed: some, like Averell Harriman and George Kennan in the Moscow embassy, had become highly suspicious of Stalin and advocated taking a firm position against Soviet activities; others, including influential segments in both the Republican and Democratic parties, subscribed to the old Wilsonian vision of national self-determination, world government, and the spread of democracy.

Roosevelt, too, desired an activist policy, but his strategy differed from those found in the State Department and among the internationalists. He preferred an arrangement somewhat analogous to the Concert of Europe that would acknowledge spheres of influence in Europe while calling on the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union (and potentially China) to act as international guardians

[15] Varga's argument is described in detail in Franklyn Griffiths, "Images, Politics and Learning in Soviet Behavior Towards the United States" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972).

[16] Ibid.

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of peace. Toward the Soviet Union, he favored a policy that would assure the Kremlin through limited accommodation that its security interests would be respected. Because Roosevelt needed the internationalists' support to sustain any activist foreign policy at all, however, he muted his recognition of spheres of influence in his public statements in deference to the Wilsonian values of self-determination.[17]

This presented Roosevelt with a dilemma of his own: he could not appease domestic demands for self-determination while at the same time granting Stalin a security zone in Eastern Europe. To reconcile this tension, he tried to convince Stalin, with references to U.S. public opinion, to retain at least a pretense of self-determination in Eastern Europe. This may have contributed to Stalin's decision initially to create people's democracies in Eastern Europe rather than rigid communist systems.[18]

By 1947, however, a confrontational image of the Soviet Union had gained prominence among the U.S. foreign policy elite. In part, this reflected Truman's inclination to accept Harriman's and Kennan's harsher views of the Soviet Union far more than Roosevelt did. More importantly, though, Soviet actions during the early postwar years, including the occupation of northern Iran, the pressure on Turkey, and most importantly the continuing crackdown in Poland and Rumania, tended to reinforce their arguments that the Soviet Union was not a reliable negotiating partner. Stalin lended further credibility to this image when he predicted in his speech of February 1946 that another war would break out in fifteen years. While most of the U.S. foreign policy elite interpreted this statement correctly as directed to domestic audiences, others regarded it as a "declaration of World War III."[19]

Still, if American tactics under Truman shifted from limited accommodation to hard bargaining, the new president also preferred negotiating with the Soviets to confronting them unconditionally.[20] In fact, as Deborah Larson points out, he might have continued exploring different tactics against the Soviets had not the restabilization of Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the entire internationalist vision of a liberal economic order, required the mobilization of vast domestic resources.[21] To overcome potential resistance to such expenditures in the fragmented American political process—particularly from the Republican majority in Congress—Truman oversold the communist threat to the American

[17] This interpretation of Roosevelt's policy strategy derives from Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*; George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy"; and especially Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, 482–484, 505–507, 524.

[18] That Roosevelt referred to U.S. public opinion in order to gain from Stalin some pluralism in Eastern Europe, see Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, 505–507, 513–515, 524. We cannot know if these pleas were decisive in Stalin's decision to create the people's democracies, but they likely played some role.

[19] Larson, *Origins of Containment*, 252–5.

[20] Ibid., 266.

[21] Ibid., 302.

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way of life.[22] The Truman doctrine, in fact, skillfully joined the internationalist and unilateralist perspectives to gain bipartisan support for the containment doctrine: he appealed to the internationalists' calls for American world leadership in a new liberal economic order, while preserving for the unilateralists the isolationist vision of an ideological threat from outside.[23]

Truman became hostage to his own rhetoric, however. In uniting the country behind an activist foreign policy, he also provided a banner for any segment of the elite to mobilize support in the domestic competition. This fact, combined with changes in the international environment after the Marshall Plan, helped entrench into American domestic politics the hostile image of the Soviet Union and also the two persistent, counterproductive characteristics of U.S. foreign policy in the cold war: overreaction to events in the periphery and overreliance on the military.

First, the decision in 1949 not to give the Nationalist Chinese the massive support they needed to prevent a defeat enabled the Republicans to accuse the Democrats of losing China. As a result, few future U.S. leaders could look on quietly while national liberation movements triumphed in the periphery without severely damaging their political position.

Second, the doctrine of containment became increasingly militarized. In the course of World War II, American public opinion had come to accept the need for a powerful military "to safeguard postwar America *and* to maintain world order."[24] Still, the Truman administration relied heavily on political and economic instruments of foreign policy until 1950, by which time the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade in 1948, and the Soviet development of the atomic bomb of 1949, not to mention the success of China's communist revolution, had reinforced the view among members of the foreign policy bureaucracy that only military power could guarantee Soviet restraint. This view was articulated in the document, written by Paul Nitze and a group of officials in the State and Defense Departments, known as NSC-68. It called for a massive increase in U.S. defense capabilities and then became the basis of American national security policy after the North Korean invasion of South Korea. It consolidated military power as the chief instrument in American containment strategy.

To conclude, though the competition to control the unstable center of Europe may have made tension between the United States and the Soviet Union inevitable after World War II, the interacting influence of both countries' domestic politics translated this tension into a cold war between two unconditionally hostile powers. In each country, strong interests left over from the prewar period defined

[22] For a discussion of how the fragmentation of authority in the United States often requires overselling a threat to mobilize domestic support, see Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: Norton, 1969), 174–186.

[23] Frieden, *Banking on the World*, 68.

[24] From Richard D. Challener, "The National Security Policy from Truman to Eisenhower: Did the 'Hidden-Hand' Leadership Make Any Difference?" in Graebner, ed., *The National Security*, 41.

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and legitimated their countries' international and domestic policies through opposition to the ideology of the other. Both leaders, therefore, had to appeal to this mythology in order to reconcile their foreign policies—which sought to balance competition with negotiation—with domestic needs and goals. As a result, they emphasized the confrontational aspects of their policies. This created a spiral of hostility as the actions of each country reinforced the image of an aggressive enemy in the other and allowed elements in both countries to seize upon the images of outside aggression to mobilize support for their own policies.

The Stalin Succession

The first opportunity to ameliorate the cold war came after Stalin's death in 1953.[25] The new Soviet leaders had to create a basis of legitimacy at home that was less reliant on the dictator's personality and that in foreign policy enabled them to alter the myths that accompanied his rule. Indeed, Stalin's foreign policy had not left the Soviet Union in an enviable position: it faced the nuclear superiority of a hostile power, the prospect of German rearmament in the European Defense Community, and the potential escalation of the war in Korea. Furthermore, the Soviets no doubt remembered Stalin's warning that "when I'm gone the imperialistic powers will wring your necks like chickens."[26]

Under these circumstances, nearly everyone in the leadership agreed that changes in both domestic and foreign policies were necessary to raise the status of society, improve the population's living standard, and ease the international threat. The new leaders disagreed, however, on what form these changes should take, how much change was necessary, and how fast it should be implemented. They had to make such decisions within a collective leadership that strived for consensus and where no one could impose his will upon the others.

In the first year after Stalin's death, the most influential member of the Soviet leadership, G. M. Malenkov, favored relatively rapid and far-reaching reforms. A former proponent of the managerial tendency after World War II, on 8 August 1953, he introduced a domestic program that called for a shift in investment toward consumer industry and a lessening role for the party bureaucracy.[27] And in fact, the Soviets announced a reduction in defense expenditures later that fall.

[25] This account of the period between 1953–1955 relies highly on the American side on the following works: Richard Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*; Graebner, *The National Security*; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower, volume 2: The President* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1984); Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982). Most of the arguments on Soviet politics can be found in James Richter, "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy: How Leadership Politics Affect Soviet Responses to the International Environment," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989), chap. 2.

[26] Nikita S, Khrushchev, Strobe Talbott, ed. and trans., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 392.

[27] For Malenkov's domestic strategy, see George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 24–7, 40–1, 51.

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Malenkov coupled his domestic program with a foreign policy strategy that mitigated the perception of an impending outside threat, basing this strategy on the assumption that nuclear weapons made war unlikely. According to Malenkov, nuclear weapons placed "a special responsibility" on both superpowers to seek accommodation in the interest of international survival: "In our days, the government of any country, if it is seriously concerned for the fate of its own people, is obliged to take measures in order to effect in deeds the regulation of disputed international questions."[28]

Furthermore, Malenkov argued that a conciliatory foreign policy, by depriving the United States of the enemy image, would best cause the disintegration of NATO: "The aggressive circles consider also that if the North Atlantic bloc is racked with internal struggles and contradictions now, in conditions of a tense international situation, with an alleviation of tensions things will lead to its collapse."[29]

Malenkov's strategy encountered strong resistance in the leadership. In the ruling Presidium, he could count only on the active support of M. G. Pervukhin, M. Z. Saburov, and possibly A. I. Mikoyan. He faced the outspoken opposition of N. S. Khrushchev, V. I. Molotov, N. A. Bulganin and L. M. Kaganovich. The reasons for such resistance are not hard to find. Given the Soviet elite's prevailing view about the West's insatiable hostility, Malenkov's willingness to deal with the West to avoid nuclear war could be interpreted as an invitation to the imperialists to use nuclear blackmail against the Soviet Union. As Bulganin argued: "we must not . . . rely on the humanity of the imperialists."[30]

The division in the collective leadership manifested itself in a contradictory and confused foreign policy, especially toward Germany.[31] Though they shared the goal of preventing the rearmament of West Germany, they disagreed on how this could be done or what role East Germany should play in this solution. For example, although Soviet policy after June 1953 had emphasized the construction of socialism in the East German territory, Soviet declaratory policy and especially Malenkov still recognized that the four allied powers, rather than the German states themselves, held the chief responsibility for resolving this question.[32] This allows some speculation that Malenkov, at least, might have traded reunification for the neutralization of Germany.

[28] *Pravda*, 9 August 1953.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., 11 March 1954. Khrushchev describes Malenkov at this time—in specific reference to the advisability of a summit—as "unstable to the point of being dangerous because he was so susceptible to the pressure and influence of others"; see Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 393.

[31] For discussions of Soviet foreign policy toward Germany during this period, see Ann L. Phillips, *Soviet Policy Toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Paul Raymond Willging, "Soviet Foreign Policy in the German Question, 1950–1955" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1973). For a discussion on the related question of Austria, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

[32] See Malenkov's speech in *Pravda*, 9 August 1953.

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To overcome the opposition to his policy, however, Malenkov needed evidence that Soviet accommodation would be reciprocated. At first, international events seemed to provide such evidence. Despite his earlier, harsher views of the Soviet Union, Winston Churchill now spoke out for a summit between East and West and urged dialogue. Malenkov could also cite President Eisenhower's Chance for Peace speech of April 1953 as an indication of realism in the United States.[33] Finally, Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech before the UN in December 1953 seemed to concur with Malenkov's argument that even a few nuclear weapons on each side changed the calculus of war.

Beginning in December, however, U.S. foreign policy began to confirm the arguments of Malenkov's opponents. At the western summit in Bermuda in December 1953, for example, the United States and the western allies made clear that they could not be induced to sacrifice West Germany's inclusion in NATO even for reunification, and they reaffirmed this stance at the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference in February 1954. Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration began articulating how it intended to use U.S. nuclear superiority and particularly its growing tactical nuclear arsenal in its military and political strategies.[34] In the Atoms for Peace speech, Eisenhower's statement of concern about nuclear war was accompanied by boasts that "the United States stockpile of atomic weapons . . . increases daily" and that the weapons had gained a "virtually conventional status within our armed services."[35] More importantly, Secretary of State John F. Dulles's New Look speech of January 1954 announced that the United States would defend against communist aggression "with a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and places of our own choosing."[36] Not surprisingly, these expressions of foreign policy indicated to the Soviet leadership that the United States, contrary to Malenkov's arguments, did intend to use nuclear weapons to impose one-sided solutions to international questions.

While Eisenhower's policies might be regarded to some extent as a reasonable response to Soviet conventional power in Central Europe, the administration's public adherence to cold war myths rigidified U.S. policy and closed off opportunities to explore alternative solutions. Dulles, for example, described Soviet-led communism as a movement that "believes that it cannot survive except as it succeeds in progressively destroying human freedom."[37] Accordingly, he dismissed the evidence of change after Stalin's death, warning that "Soviet Communists have constantly taught and practiced the art of deception, of making conces-

[33] Ibid.

[34] On the developmnent of U.S. military doctrine at this time, see David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy" in Graebner, ed. *The National Security*, 144–46.

[35] *New York Times*, 9 December 1953.

[36] Cited in Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 172.

[37] Dulles speech at Geneva Conference in April 1954, cited in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 140.

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sions merely in order to lure others into a false sense of security."[38] The fear of deception could be detected in U.S. negotiating positions: in the words of one historian, for example, Eisenhower's speech of April 1953, which Malenkov cited for its reasonableness, "asked for . . . many obviously impossible concessions from the Russians as 'proof' of their good intentions."[39]

Recent research shows that the private communications of Eisenhower and Dulles, while generally accepting the image of the Soviet Union as an aggressive enemy that understood only strength, still betrayed a more sophisticated understanding of the U.S.–Soviet competition than their public statements would imply. In October 1953, for example, even Dulles mitigated his ideological stance to say that negotiations "could not reduce tensions with the USSR if in each case we expected to gain all the advantage and the Soviets none."[40]

This discrepancy suggests that domestic constraints contributed as much to the administration's rigid positions as international pressure did. In particular, the new administration had to sustain the support of such hardline anticommunists and unilateralists of the Republican party as Robert Taft, William Knowland, and Joseph McCarthy. This wing of the party influenced Eisenhower's choice of Dulles as secretary of state and played a key role in drafting the 1952 party platform, which lambasted the Democrats' "passive" containment strategy and pledged to "roll back" Soviet influence.[41] Eisenhower could not readily escape from this rhetoric so early in the administration. Even Dulles felt constrained: at the Bermuda Summit in December 1953 he cited domestic pressures when he pleaded with the British to cooperate in his confrontational posture toward China.[42]

The administration's defense policy, too, sought to reconcile international pressures with domestic demands. On the one hand, Eisenhower and others in the Republican party, particularly in the Taft wing, felt it imperative to reduce federal spending. At the same time, the administration also faced pressure from the military to increase defense spending and to use U.S. nuclear superiority even more assertively for political advantage. The administration's harsh rhetorical stance against the Soviets and its heavy reliance on nuclear deterrence, therefore, sought to neutralize the pressures from the military while holding the line on spending.

Whatever its sources, the rigid hostility of U.S. policy provided Malenkov with little evidence that Washington would reciprocate his conciliatory strategy, while

[38] Dulles remarks to Republican State Dinner, May 1953, cited in ibid., 141.

[39] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 96.

[40] For the discrepancy between the public and private views of these leaders, see especially John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism and the Russians" in Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, 47–77.

[41] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 128–9.

[42] Ronald W. Preussen, "John Foster Dulles and the Predicaments of Power" in Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, 29–30.

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providing his opponents with ample evidence that it would exploit Soviet weakness as far as possible. In response, the Soviet position hardened. At the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Conference, for example, Molotov altered the Soviet position toward a more confrontational posture, insisting that the German states themselves, rather than the four powers, should decide questions on reunification.[43] In this context, Malenkov's fateful statement that nuclear war would destroy world civilization probably represented a final attempt to force a change in the course of Soviet foreign policy.

Malenkov retracted his remarks one month later in April 1954, and he strongly insinuated that he did so in response to domestic criticism: "the Soviet people," he said, "distinguish themselves by their sober approach to appraising the international situation" and "warn against overestimating the significance of the achieved easing of international tensions." He further admitted that the imperialists "threaten the world with hydrogen bombs and openly proclaim the establishment of a policy of strength and prolonged cold war, allowing them to resort to methods of threats and intimidation." In such conditions, the USSR could not afford to show weakness: "If the aggressive circles, putting their trust in atomic weapons, decide on insanity and want to test Soviet . . . might—then one may not doubt that the aggressor will be suppressed with the same weapons, and that similar adventures inevitably lead to the disintegration of the capitalist social system." Finally, Malenkov accompanied these arguments with a call for the Soviet Union "tirelessly" to strengthen its defense capabilities.[44]

Though Malenkov remained in his position until February 1955, he never articulated his strategy of mutual concessions again in public. Can one attribute the failure of Malenkov's foreign policy to the actions of the United States? The extreme nature of Malenkov's strategy—given the context of Soviet opinion—suggests that he might have failed no matter what the United States had done. Still, U.S. actions clearly weakened his position and accelerated his decline, if only by providing his opponents a club with which to beat him. While Malenkov cited Eisenhower's reasonableness, for example, Khrushchev emphasized the darker presence of the U.S. administration:

> [Soviet foreign policy initiatives] . . . evoke irritation and malicious attacks of certain officials occupying quite responsible posts in the USA and other countries. I have in mind, primarily, the U.S. Secretary of State Dulles. . . . It is known that insanity may occur to a person in rage. But is it really fitting for a government official to proclaim a government's foreign policy when he is drunk with rage and malice to other nations?[45]

[43] Though the Berlin Conference represented a turning point in the leadership debate about the creation of socialism in East Germany, in fact the issue about the status of Germany in Soviet foreign policy still may not have been decided completely. The recently published memoirs of Khrushchev, for example, note that Molotov opposed the inclusion of East Germany into the Warsaw Pact in 1955. See N. S. Khrushchev, Jerrold Schechter, ed. and trans., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990).

[44] *Pravda*, 21 April 1954.

[45] Ibid., 27 April 1954.

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More importantly, U.S. actions defined the boundaries of the Soviet foreign policy debate for the rest of the succession. Judging by Malenkov's retraction, the leadership clearly had decided to uphold the theses that the western powers were inherently aggressive, that Soviet foreign policy remained primarily an ideological struggle against imperialism, and that the ultimate and inevitable end to this struggle would be the victory of socialism, even in case of nuclear war. Anyone who argued differently became suspect for years to come. When Khrushchev announced his policy of peaceful coexistence in 1956, for example, he affirmed these tenets of the socialist image of the international environment even as he accepted the need for international stability and negotiations.[46]

Khrushchev emphasized conciliation and peaceful coexistence in his policies through the end of 1956, but an opportunity to rethink dramatically the cold war myths created in the postwar period ended with Malenkov's speech of April 1954. But how great an opportunity? After all, given the continuing asymmetry in the two countries' conventional strategic military power and the remaining uncertainties regarding the fate of Central Europe, one cannot wonder that the actions of one state were regarded suspiciously by the other. The Soviet leadership still had not decided what interests it had in Germany or what role the strategic imbalance would play in a nuclear world, suggesting that some other outcome was possible. In fact, examining external conditions alone does not account for Malenkov's willingness to provide an alternative vision to the cold war, the defeat of this vision, the rigidity of American foreign policy, or the discrepancy between the public and private rhetoric of Dulles. To explain these aspects of the period, one has to examine the domestic debates in each country, their context within prevailing images in those countries, and how they interacted with each other. In this case, Malenkov's reformist policy extended his position beyond the leadership consensus and left him vulnerable to attack, while Dulles, keeping his public rhetoric within the boundaries set by his own domestic base, provided the ammunition.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis

The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis opened a promising opportunity to overcome the spiral of "peace through strength" arguments.[47] Both Khrushchev

[46] See Richter, "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy," chap. 4.

[47] This account relies heavily on Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, (New York: Fawcett Premier, 1971); Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Harold Karan Jacobsen and Eric Stein, *Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians: The United States and Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations*. I also rely on Richter, "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy"; Alexander Yanov, *The Drama of the Soviet 1960's: A Lost Reform* (Berkeley, CA: Institute for International Studies, 1984); Christer Jonsson, *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York: Viking Press, 1967); Carl Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet*

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and Kennedy, shocked by the nearness of catastrophe, sought to overcome the psychological and domestic political impediments to a more stable relation between the two superpowers. Both leaders were also concerned about the increasing assertiveness of a militant China.[48]

Kennedy offered a new vision of U.S.-Soviet relations in his speech at the American University in June 1963. In the nuclear age, he argued, peace must be the "necessary rational end of rational men." The United States should pursue this end even if the Soviets did not; the United States "must reexamine our own attitude—as individuals and as a nation—for our attitude is as essential as theirs."[49] In short, Kennedy rejected the logic of peace through strength and intimated support for a policy of accommodation.

Khrushchev also called on his country to pursue a more conciliatory policy in order to avoid nuclear war. He told an audience of East Germans, for example, that "Marxist-Leninists . . . cannot think in terms of a communist civilization built upon the ruins of the world's cultural centers, on ravaged Earth contaminated by thermonuclear fallout."[50] Later, he averred that realists in the West, too, "understand that going to the thermonuclear button means suicide."[51] Finally, though he continued to argue that the ultimate guarantee to peace lay in Soviet strength, he also emphasized that the Soviets had to make concessions in order to gain western concessions: "in the interests of preserving the gains of socialism we are ready to make and we do make reasonable political compromises."[52]

The two leaders pursued these strategies from very different domestic positions, however. In the United States, the Cuban missile crisis had raised Kennedy's prestige and made him less vulnerable to accusations that he was giving in to the Russians.[53] Khrushchev pursued his strategy from a far more precarious position. He still had enough power to make his own decisions in foreign and domestic policy, but his authority was on the wane.

Khrushchev's loss of authority stemmed in part from his attempts since 1958 to push through a military strategy of minimal deterrence and a reduction of conventional forces.[54] To implement this strategy at an acceptable political cost,

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Leadership, 1957–1964 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966); William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969); Franklyn Griffiths, "Images, Politics and Learning in Soviet Behavior Towards the United States."

[48] For the role China played in these leaders' considerations, see Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 228–253.

[49] *New York Times*, 11 June 1963.

[50] *Pravda*, 17 January 1963.

[51] Ibid., 12 June 1964.

[52] Speech of 12 December 1962 in N. S. Khrushchev, *Predotvratit' voinu, otstoiat mir* [*Prevent war, defend peace*] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963), 400.

[53] Seaborg, in fact, argues that Kennedy would not have been able to make the American University Speech without this enhanced prestige; see his *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, 212.

[54] See Richter, "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy," chap. 5.

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Khrushchev initially tried to prove this strategy was consistent with prevailing cold war myths by demonstrating through his threats against Berlin that a small nuclear force could impel the aggressive enemy to recognize Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. Except for glimmers of success in 1959, though, his tactics merely confirmed the prevailing image of the Soviet Union in the United States, damaged Eisenhower's attempts to restrain defense spending, and paved the way for an even greater military build-up after Kennedy became president. In fact, Khrushchev decided to place missiles in Cuba in part to redress the strategic imbalance resulting from the Kennedy build-up.

The Cuban missile crisis ended Khrushchev's coercive campaign. Kennedy's determination to risk war rather than accept the missiles in Cuba demonstrated to the Soviet leader the danger and futility in seeking to coerce concessions out of the West, while Kennedy's willingness to guarantee Cuba's security and withdraw the missiles from Turkey indicated that the United States shared an aversion to nuclear war. As a result, Khrushchev shifted to an accommodationist strategy to induce the concessions he needed from Washington.

But Khrushchev's shift in policy met strong resistance among many in the Soviet elite who felt the Caribbean crisis reaffirmed the image of a warmongering West. Defense Minister R. Ya. Malinovskii, for example, clearly rejected Khrushchev's arguments about the imperialists' attitudes toward nuclear war: "We have no facts to indicate abandonment by U.S. imperialist circles of a policy of war." Indeed, he averred that "preventive war against the Soviet Union all along has been within the range of possibilities envisaged by the Pentagon."[55] For those sharing this view, the crisis undermined completely Khrushchev's claims that a small number of missiles could deter a superior force and that conventional weapons, in this case a surface navy, no longer had any political utility. The lesson drawn by many Soviets, in fact, was that "the Soviet Union would never again face a 4-to-1 missile inferiority."[56]

Khrushchev's change in foreign policy also met resistance from ideological guardians in the Soviet leadership. For example, M. A. Suslov, the most prominent ideologist in the leadership, analyzed the crisis in a classic presentation of the peace through strength argument. In his view, the imperialists had acted in Cuba as they had in other adventures: "they backed down every time, breaking their head on the solidarity and might of the socialist camp." Accordingly, he called on "all peace-loving forces on Earth" to "preserve vigilance, strengthen their solidarity, not weaken but strengthen the struggle against aggressive forces."[57]

[55] *Pravda*, 23 February 1963.

[56] Soviet negotiator Vasily Kuznetsov said this to U.S. diplomat John McCloy soon after the crisis. Cited in Benjamin Lambeth, "Contemporary Soviet Military Policy" in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds., *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1986), 46.

[57] *Pravda*, 7 November 1962.

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In this embattled position, Khrushchev quickly grasped at Kennedy's conciliatory gestures as evidence that his accommodationist strategy would meet a favorable response from the United States. Within days of Kennedy's speech at the American University, for example, Khrushchev made a key concession by accepting a limited rather than a comprehensive test ban. Later, just before the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was signed, he told a delegation of American agricultural experts that "we will now reduce expenditures on defense . . . and direct this money into the production of chemical fertilizers."[58] This prediction was then realized in December 1963, when Khrushchev announced an unspecified reduction in Soviet troop levels and a cut of 600 billion rubles in the official defense budget.

But if the LTBT and other small treaties emerging from the détente of 1963 bolstered Khrushchev's ability to pursue a conciliatory policy, continued skepticism within the leadership hampered his ability to do so consistently. U.S. foreign policy, too, offered an uncertain mix of conciliatory gestures and the politics of strength, partly because of continued domestic support for cold war myths but also because of the inertia of decisions taken in 1961, when Kennedy promised to replace Eisenhower's passive brand of containment with a more vigorous assertion of American power. As a result, the détente of 1963 did not improve relations as much as either leader desired, as illustrated in their failure to reach a comprehensive test ban, which both of them wanted.

In November 1962, Khrushchev, returning to a position he held in 1961, announced that he would accept three on-site inspections every year to verify a comprehensive ban. Apparently Khrushchev based this proposal on a conversation between Soviet scientist Yevgenii Fedorov and Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Jerome Wiesner, in which Wiesner had told Fedorov that such a gesture would open the way to resuming serious negotiations. Though Wiesner reportedly added that Kennedy would counter this offer by proposing eight to ten inspections, and perhaps bring it down to five or so during the negotiations, Khrushchev's communication suggested that he believed the United States would accept three inspections in a final agreement.[59] Khrushchev later told Norman Cousins that he had persuaded the Soviet Council of Ministers to agree to this initial offer only with great difficulty. As a result, when the president rejected this offer and proposed eight inspections instead, "once again [an allusion to the U-2 incident?] I was made to look foolish." He then added: "But I can tell you this: it won't happen again."[60]

In fact, Wiesner did try to get Kennedy to soften his stand, but the president

[58] N. S. Khrushchev, *Stroitel'stva kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie sel'skoyo khoziaistra* [The Construction of Communism in the USSR and the Development of Agriculture], vol. 8 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1964), 51; cited in Yanov, *The Drama of the Soviet 1960's*, 76.

[59] See Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, 180–181.

[60] Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1963 Visit With Khrushchev," *Saturday Review*, 7 November 1964, 21.

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felt he could not get congressional support for fewer inspections unless he had some guarantees about how these inspections would be conducted. Meanwhile, opponents to a comprehensive test ban within the United States began to rally their forces, including members of the military and scientific communities such as Curtis LeMay and Edward Teller; influential Democratic members of Congress such as Henry Jackson, Christopher Dodd, and Stuart Symington; and the Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing, led by treaty opponent Representative Craig Hosmer. By May it had become clear that the comprehensive test ban could not be ratified as it stood.[61] Indeed, Kennedy had to make important concessions to these interests even to ratify the less ambitious LTBT, including a promise to accelerate underground tests.

In short, domestic constraints prevented the product of the negotiations from meeting either leader's expectations. As a result, though the treaty clearly strengthened Khrushchev's position, he still qualified his enthusiasm for the LTBT with reservations that it did "not yet mean a cessation of the arms race or by itself prevent the danger of war."[62] Instead, he argued that the decline in tensions brought about by this limited agreement would lead to more significant cooperation in the future.

Khrushchev was to be disappointed. General opinion in the United States attributed Kennedy's success in the Cuban missile crisis more to the firmness of his resolve than to his willingness to deal with Moscow, with the result that the crisis reinforced rather than challenged the myths about the politics of strength.[63] Furthermore, Kennedy could or would not extend his more accommodative stance with the Soviet Union to the German question, again partly for domestic reasons. In the summer of 1963, for example, Khrushchev had proposed that a nonaggression pact in Europe accompany the limited test ban, which if concluded would greatly support his contention that realism had gained the upper hand in the West. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Kennedy expressed serious interest in this proposal, but did not want to pursue it until after the Test Ban Treaty was concluded. As it happened, he dropped the proposal when he felt it would complicate the struggle for ratification.[64] As Schlesinger puts it:

> For a moment the treaty seemed to be opening up a whole new range of possibilities. This treaty was deeply disturbing to those accustomed to the familiar simplifications of the cold war. . . . one felt an almost panicky desire in some parts of the government to return to pre-test ban normal as soon as possible.[65]

Despite the change in Kennedy's rhetoric, the administration did not alter many

[61] Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, 227.

[62] *Pravda*, 6 August 1963.

[63] For evidence of this point, see James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), 280–286.

[64] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 835–838.

[65] Ibid., 837.

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of the policies introduced in 1961. The United States continued to deploy strategic missiles in 1963 in spite of its vast strategic superiority and in addition expanded its military commitment to South Vietnam.

Conceivably, Kennedy might have tried to change these policies had he lived, particularly in respect to Vietnam. Lyndon B. Johnson did not. Even if he shared the doubts about prevailing American foreign policy beliefs that Kennedy seems to have entertained—and there is little evidence to suggest that he did—his domestic position after Kennedy's assassination would not have allowed him to challenge them directly. Unlike Kennedy, he still had not demonstrated his firmness in dealing with the Russians and with no mandate of his own would be quite vulnerable to accusations that he departed from the perceived legacy of his popular predecessor.

Furthermore, Johnson understood very well what would happen to his domestic position if he did not prop up the anticommunist regime in Saigon:

> I knew that if we let Communist aggression succeed in taking over South Vietnam there would follow in this country an endless national debate—that would shatter my presidency, kill my administration, and damage our democracy. I knew that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost their effectiveness from the day that the Communists took over in China. I believe that the loss of China had played a large role in the rise of Joe McCarthy. And I knew that all these problems, taken together, were chickenshit compared with what might happen if we lost Vietnam.[66]

Thus, despite Khrushchev's success in easing tensions in 1963, U.S. actions gave those who opposed his policy of accommodation plenty of evidence against it. In June 1963, for example, Khrushchev complained that the U.S. military build-up had reached "gigantic proportions unprecedented in history."[67] Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's and others' boasts about U.S. military superiority enabled Malinovskii in February 1964 to claim a lack of realism among U.S. ruling circles.[68]

The most controversial issue in the Soviet debate in 1964, however, concerned aid to national liberation movements, especially in Vietnam. Since 1961, Khrushchev argued that since local wars between the superpowers would necessarily escalate, the Soviets did not need (and he implied that they did not dare) send direct military aid to such movements: Soviet strategic capability would deter imperialist intervention in these struggles and allow the local revolutionary forces to win on their own. This view had always been hotly contested by the Chinese, however, who accused Khrushchev of cowardice in the face of the nuclear threat; but after the Cuban missile crisis one could find muted criticism of the policy in the Soviet press as well.[69] When the United States undermined Khrushchev's

[66] Cited in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 242.
[67] *Pravda*, 25 June 1963.
[68] Ibid., 23 February 1964.
[69] See Mark Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* (London: Croon Helm, 1982), 19.

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arguments by beginning a secret campaign of harassment against North Vietnam in February 1964, it could not but undermine Khrushchev's strategy even further.

By the summer of 1964, Khrushchev's decline in authority was evident in his public rhetoric.[70] His speeches usually included a long list of hotbeds of international tension in the developing world, and in July he explicitly linked these hotbeds to the need for more defense spending: "such is the realistic international situation we must consider in deciding questions of economic and cultural development and of the strengthening of the countries' defenses."[71]

But Khrushchev's rhetorical retreat did not mean he had given up the fight. Quite the contrary, he prepared another diplomatic and political offensive against the politics of strength that surpassed anything else in the history of the cold war: he sent his son-in-law, Alexei I. Adzhubei, to Bonn to arrange a summit meeting between Khrushchev and the West German leaders, which might have led to a Soviet concession over Berlin;[72] in August and September 1964, he reduced his commitments to both North Vietnam and North Korea; and in October he seemed to be preparing another assault on the defense budget. Unfortunately, the October Plenum intervened and halted this initiative.

In all likelihood, Khrushchev's foreign policy did not play a decisive role in his ouster. During the last four years, his attempts to improve the Soviet economy had alienated virtually every major sector of the Soviet elite, especially the party apparatus. Still, the failures of his foreign policy probably accelerated the decline in his authority.[73]

How do we account for these failures? As in the period after Stalin's death, a vast disparity in military power and continuing uncertainty about Germany's fate suggest that international conditions played some role. By 1963, however, most of these problems were eminently soluble. The military imbalance, as Khrushchev appreciated, meant much less after the Soviets could deliver nuclear warheads on U.S. soil reliably than it did in the early 1950s, when they could not. Moreover, the Berlin wall helped stabilize Soviet control over East Germany; by allowing its construction, the United States implicitly accepted that control. Indeed, both leaders seemed to have recognized the new, stabler situation, but both had to contend with domestic oppositions that limited their ability to make any far-reaching concessions while pointing to the other's unwillingness to deal as evidence of bad faith. In particular, the inertia of decisions Kennedy made in 1961, especially after the president was killed, called into question all of Khrushchev's claims about western realism.

[70] According to recent memoir accounts, the conspiracy to remove Khrushchev was already being prepared at this time; see especially Sergei Khrushchev, William Taubman, ed. and trans., *Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and His Era* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), chap. 3.

[71] *Pravda*, 22 July 1964.

[72] See Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955–1980* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 118–21.

[73] See Yanov, *The Drama of the Soviet 1960's*, 103–105.

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Indeed, the legacy of Kennedy's initial vigor affected Soviet policy even after Khrushchev's ouster. The new Soviet leaders resumed the rhetoric of the politics of strength soon after the October Plenum: they spoke favorably of détente but also explicitly denounced a policy of appeasement, reaffirmed the commitment to North Vietnam, and ended all discussion of unilateral cuts in Soviet defenses. They disagreed, however, on the amount of resources to devote to defense, the extent to which they should commit themselves to national liberation forces, and the priority that should be given to stabilizing relations with the United States. The Americanization of the Vietnam war, occurring only months after Khrushchev's ouster, reinforced the forces behind L. I. Brezhnev that emphasized a commitment to national liberation struggles and the development of a conventional military capability that could project Soviet power to this purpose. The essential framework of this coalition then persisted through the Brezhnev period.[74]

Détente

By the early 1970s, the governments of both the United States and the Soviet Union again developed a strong interest in a managed relation.[75] The passage of time since 1964 had removed many of the obstacles that hampered earlier efforts to ease tensions: the status quo in Europe had been temporarily stabilized by the Berlin wall, while the vast numbers of nuclear warheads on both sides precluded a rapid change in the balance of power. Meanwhile, each side had its own particular reasons for détente. Brezhnev sought improved relations with the United States in order, first, to offset the continuing antagonism between the Soviet Union and China and to prevent the formation of a hostile, U.S.–China alliance, and, second, to import new technology from the West and so forestall the need to reform the Soviet economic system. In the United States, the trauma of the Vietnam war caused a large segment of the population to reject the cold war mythology, severely weakening its ability to mobilize the necessary resources to pursue a politics of strength.

[74] This argument about the impact of the Vietnam war on Soviet policy is drawn from Richter, "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy," chap. 7. Other scholarship noting the effect of Vietnam on leadership politics includes Richard D. Anderson, "Competitive Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy: Authority Building and Bargaining in the Brezhnev Politburo," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989).

[75] This account draws heavily from Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985); Stanley Hoffmann, "Détente" in Nye, *The Making of America's Foreign Policy*, 231–264; Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983); Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Peter M. E. Volten, *Brezhnev's Peace Program: A Study of Soviet Domestic Political Process and Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983); Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders*.

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These converging forces resulted in the most extended and successful period of cooperation between the two superpowers during the cold war period. The most virulently hostile images of each other became less evident in both governments' rhetoric, and they codified their intentions to deal with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity in the Basic Principles Agreement in 1972. They also made significant progress towards arms control in the ABM (Antiballistic Missile) Treaty, SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) I and the unratified SALT II. Finally, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin of 1971 and the Helsinki Pact in 1975 formally recognized the status quo in Europe.

Despite these achievements, the two governments—at least initially—challenged neither the prevailing myths about the essential hostility of the other side to its own interests nor the institutional arrangements supporting these myths. In the Soviet Union, for example, the détente policy stretched the prevailing myths but did not abandon them. Brezhnev did occasionally accept substantial political costs to offer concessions necessary to make his Peace Program successful.[76] However, he took care never to stray too far from the post-Khrushchev foreign policy consensus or to disturb the essential elements of his own coalition.

Indeed, the collective leadership described détente not as a change in Soviet postwar policy, but as a success of that policy: Soviet strength, especially the emergence of strategic parity, had forced the United States to abandon its dreams of imposing one-sided solutions to international disputes and to recognize the continuing, inevitable changes in the correlation of forces. Accordingly, Soviet foreign policy continued along the same course it had taken after Khrushchev's ouster.[77] Soviet defense expenditures increased steadily through 1977, and the Soviets maintained an active commitment to clients in the Third World, as demonstrated in the airlift of Cuban troops to defend leftist governments in Angola in 1975 and in Ethiopia in 1977, and of course in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

In the United States, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger viewed détente less as a success of U.S. postwar policy than as an attempt to salvage it from domestic challenges. Recognizing that the Vietnam experience made it impossible for the government to devote as many resources to the East-West competition as it had before, these leaders sought to use the threat of a Sino-American alliance and U.S. economic advantages to entangle the Soviet Union in "a network of relationships with the West" that would increase the Soviet stake in the existing interna-

[76] In the long term, the policy also helped erode the domestic foundations for Soviet cold war myths by providing the proponents of more stable East-West relations with access into the policy-making process. See Franklyn Griffiths, "The Source of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and Their Policy Implications," *International Security* 9 (Fall 1985); and Allen Lynch, *The Soviet Study of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[77] For Soviet perceptions of détente, see especially Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 36–52. For its origins in the Brezhnev coalition of the 1960s, see Richter, "Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy"; Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente.*

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tional system. The United States would then manipulate the levers provided by this network to prevent Soviet expansionist behavior in the Third World.[78]

Thus, if Nixon and Kissinger changed the instrumentalities of containment, they did not reject its assumptions. They both considered the Soviet Union—or more precisely Russia—an expansionist, revolutionary power that understood only countervailing power. They still blurred the distinction between peripheral and vital interests: Kissinger lobbied hard for U.S. military aid to prevent the fall of South Vietnam and Angola to Soviet-backed forces. Despite its advocacy of strategic sufficiency over superiority, the Nixon administration escalated the U.S.–Soviet arms race by deploying MIRV missiles that theoretically provided greater advantages in a first strike than in a retaliatory strike.

That both leaders framed their policies within cold war assumptions may explain in part why détente achieved more in the 1970s than in earlier periods. Certainly it was a substantial reason for détente's failure. While the United States expected the Soviet Union to curtail its activities in the periphery in order to preserve superpower collaboration, the Soviet leadership felt détente opened the way to a more active Soviet presence all over the world. When both sides began to act according to these conceptions, conflict inevitably arose. But the key to détente's failure lay less in misconceptions among the leaders, who tended to defend their policies' accomplishments, than in the expectations their rhetoric raised among domestic audiences. In each country, the other side's failure to live up to these expectations provided the opponents of détente a basis for attack.

The domestic roots of détente's decline were especially evident in the United States. The Nixon administration failed to create a public rationale for its attempts to link further U.S.–Soviet cooperation to Soviet behavior in the Third World, as these negotiations were carried out largely in secret. Instead, Nixon and Kissinger oversold détente as an attempt to overcome the cold war on U.S. terms.[79] Not surprisingly, the policy dissatisfied both the cold warriors who opposed cooperation in any form as well as the revisionist elements who objected to the administration's continued support for interventions abroad and its neglect of human rights violations. Soviet activity in support of Third World clients exacerbated the situation, for it reinforced the hardline criticism that détente encouraged the Soviets to more aggressive action, even as the administration's attempts to respond to these actions with military aid further disenchanted the revisionists with Kissinger's strategy. By 1976, détente had been so undermined at home that President Gerald Ford, attacked both by the hardline wing of the Republican Party and among the Democrats, avoided all references to détente in his campaign.

[78] See especially Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, chap. 9; Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 25–36.

[79] For the pressure to oversell foreign policy in the United States, see Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 174–180.

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Jimmy Carter entered the presidency with a vision of U.S. foreign policy that deemphasized and recast the cold war mythology without overtly challenging it. He found support among those who became disillusioned with America's policy after Vietnam and also among hardliners who disliked Kissinger's nonideological approach to Soviet domestic politics. Carter's rhetoric portrayed the United States less as a defender of the free world against an onslaught of Soviet expansionism than as an advocate of peace and individual human rights. Thus, Carter advocated arms control negotiations as a means to prevent nuclear war but did not link it to Soviet actions in other spheres. Similarly, he felt that the Soviets should pursue arms control on its own merits and not link it to his own vigorous attacks on Soviet human rights violations. Most significantly, Carter argued that cold war politics should not spill over into U.S. policy in the developing countries; instead, the United States should concentrate on protecting human rights in all countries regardless of a government's political orientation.

Carter's foreign policy failed for many reasons. First, the strategy was poorly conceived. If Carter saw no linkage between pursuing arms control negotiations and criticizing the Soviet observance of human rights, the Soviets certainly did. Carter soon had to choose between arms control and a vigorous support of Soviet dissidents, and his retreat from his human rights policy did him serious political harm. Second, he did not execute the strategy well. For example, the administration's initial arms control proposal jettisoned the Vladivostok framework for SALT II, which Brezhnev had worked out with President Gerald Ford in 1974. It was a comprehensive plan that boasted more ambitious arms reductions but in fact asked the Soviets to reduce their heavy land-based missiles by half without any corresponding reductions in existing U.S. forces. To make matters worse, the administration announced this proposal publicly without first giving Moscow a chance to study it carefully. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin interpreted the proposal as a crass propaganda ploy and rejected it. As a result, SALT negotiations were unnecessarily halted for six months. When Carter finally returned to the Vladivostok framework, he again lost credibility at home for giving in to Soviet demands.

More importantly, Carter's attempts to challenge the prevailing cold war mythology aroused strong resistance at home, even within his original coalition. For example, Carter's one-sided proposal of March 1977 aimed to ease the arms race but to do so in a way that would also find the support of Senator Henry Jackson, who as the Senate's foremost Democratic critic of Kissinger's détente strategy represented part of the cold warrior leg of Carter's coalition as well as a potentially decisive opponent to the ratification of any arms control treaty.[80] When Carter then returned to the Vladivostok framework, he prompted opposition not only from such conservative opponents as the Committee on the Present Danger, but

[80] Talbott, *Endgame*, chap. 3.

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also from Jackson as well. Meanwhile, even Carter's selective defense of human rights against rightwing dictatorships provoked opposition among hardliners, who argued it betrayed U.S. allies and facilitated the victory of anti-U.S. revolutionaries.

In these circumstances, the Soviet pursuit of its own conception of détente weakened Carter's arguments further. When a new generation of accurate Soviet MIRVs were deployed in the late 1970s, for example, American opponents of arms control argued—incorrectly—that the Soviets might soon possess enough warheads to destroy the U.S. land-based missiles in a first strike. Meanwhile, Soviet activities in Ethiopia and Afghanistan raised questions about Carter's claim that cold war politics should not intrude into U.S. policies in the Third World.

One further episode might be cited to illustrate how partisan appeals to cold war myths helped undermine détente. By mid-1979, domestic support for Carter's foreign policy had dwindled, and the ratification of SALT II remained in doubt. In the fall Senator Frank Church of Idaho suddenly drew attention to a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and declared its presence there unacceptable, even though the brigade had been there since 1962 and did not violate the Khrushchev-Kennedy understanding about Cuba. Church took this action at least partly to stave off a challenge in the upcoming elections, in which the American Conservation Action Coalition had targeted him for his dovish policies in the past. Still, his maneuver and Carter's inept handling of the affair—first he joined Church in calling the brigade's presence in Cuba unacceptable, then he accepted it—strengthened the opponents of SALT II. Even before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, détente had all but died in the United States.

In the Soviet Union, the effect of domestic politics on changes in Soviet foreign policy is less evident. Brezhnev retained his dominant position in the Politburo throughout the period, and the basic line of Soviet foreign policy remained relatively stable as well. Still, there were occasions when Brezhnev did extend himself beyond the leadership consensus in an effort to solidify détente, as well as occasions when U.S. actions increased the political costs of this stance and apparently caused a retrenchment in the Soviet position.

The Soviet response to the Jackson-Vanik amendment provides an example of such an occasion. Brezhnev's intention to improve trade relations with the United States aroused some controversy among leadership members, especially A. I. Kosygin, who believed the Soviets should not delay reform and become dependent on western technology. In 1972, Brezhnev seemed close to his goal when the Nixon administration agreed, among other things, to grant Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union. In 1974, Congress passed a law that required the Soviet Union publicly and explicitly (rather than quietly as Kissinger had done) to change Soviet immigration policy before such status could be granted. This Jackson-Vanik Amendment represented to the Soviet Union not only an

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affront to its sovereignty but also an escalation of American demands over a supposedly resolved issue.

Despite the Kremlin's distaste for the amendment, the Soviets—very likely on Brezhnev's insistence—indicated privately they would accommodate congressional demands so long as it could be done quietly. Moscow repudiated the trade agreement only when Jackson responded much as the aggressive enemy image would predict: he gloated publicly over the concession and began making more demands. This put Brezhnev on the defensive. As Raymond Garthoff notes, N.V. Podgorny's protest that "questions of sovereignty and of our internal affairs have never been and will never be a matter for public bargaining" seemed to convey an indirect criticism of Brezhnev's willingness to bargain on such matters just a short time earlier.[81]

A second case in which U.S. policy undermined an extended position taken by Brezhnev occurred after he declared, in a speech in Tula in January 1977, that the Soviets would not seek strategic superiority. This speech—which did not receive universal approbation in the Soviet elite, especially among the military—most likely represented an effort to signal to the incoming Carter administration a continuing Soviet interest in détente and arms control.[82] Not surprisingly, the Soviet position hardened when Carter answered this speech with his attempt to undo the advances made at Vladivostok and at the same time launched an attack on Soviet human rights policy.[83] And though no one has given convincing evidence that these events affected Breshnev's authority in any serious way, they did result in a cooling of U.S.–Soviet relations by the summer of 1977.

To conclude, the détente period provides the best example of how domestic cold war myths constrained efforts to cooperate during the postwar era. The difficult questions of the superpower competition—the division of Europe and the strategic balance—had all been resolved, leaving only influence in the periphery and an illusory fear of nuclear inferiority as arenas for competition. In this case, however, the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, proved to be the more flexible party when disillusion over Vietnam allowed it to redefine the cold war mythology. Its failure to do so could be traced in part to Kissinger's unwillingness and Carter's incompetence. More importantly, however, détente failed because powerful domestic interests on each side used prevailing myths about the unconditional hostility of the other to attack conciliatory policies as encouragement of aggression. In each case the actions of the other side provided evidence to support attacks.

[81] See Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 466.

[82] On Brezhnev's likely motives, see Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 585–6. On the reaction in the Soviet Union, see Bruce Parrot, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations" in Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds., *Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 90.

[83] Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 573.

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Conclusion

In each of these cases, leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union who sought to change the confrontational pattern of behavior associated with the cold war had to overcome not simply the entrenched image of an aggressive enemy existing in the other superpower, but also the roots of a similar cold war mythology in their own domestic systems. Not surprisingly, leaders challenged this mythology only after domestic or international upheavals shook the internal bases of the cold war images enough to admit an alternative vision of the state's international role in the policy debate. Even when this happened, the behavior of the other power, similarly constrained by domestic forces, reinforced the advocates of confrontation at home and the inertia of the cold war myths prevailed. On the rare occasions when both leaders sought a more conciliatory policy simultaneously, domestic constraints on both sides often made it impossible for the leaders to reach common ground.

In the late 1980s the cycle of U.S.–Soviet aggression was broken. After 1987, in particular, the Soviet regime articulated a New Thinking in foreign policy that recognized the Soviet role in sustaining America's image of the enemy and sought to erode this image by offering an escalating series of concessions. This process was accelerated by the positive response of President Ronald Reagan, who was less vulnerable than most to charges that he was appeasing the Russians. Under Reagan the U.S. government did not offer any real concessions to Soviet bargaining positions, but simply accepted Gorbachev's concessions. Furthermore, the administration did not abandon the policy of negotiating from strength, but rather acclaimed the Soviet new thinking as a confirmation of that policy. Only during the summer of 1989 did the Bush administration announce that it would meet Gorbachev halfway in order to support the process of *perestroika*.

How do we explain this change? On one level, the events provide convincing evidence for the Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) strategy formulated by Charles Osgood and more recently championed by Deborah Larson.[84] This strategy emphasizes the stability of cognitive images in human consciousness and argues that a succession of concessions are necessary to undermine an image of an insatiably aggressive enemy. Yet one must remember precisely what concessions were required before the United States abandoned its policy of containment. In addition to meeting American demands on middle and short-range missiles, the Soviets had agreed in principle to asymmetric cuts in conventional forces in Europe and also accepted in large part the U.S. framework for strategic cuts. More importantly, *glasnost* had opened the political debate in unprecedented ways: a parliament had been chosen in semicontested elections that rejected the candidates of the party apparatus in key Soviet cities, and Poland

[84] See Deborah Welch Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987): 27–60.

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and Hungary were both moving with Soviet blessing toward more pluralist regimes.

In short, by the time the United States altered its policy, many of the fundamental attributes of the Stalinist system had come under attack, and it seemed likely that this process would continue. Clearly, no leader before Gorbachev had been willing or in Khrushchev's case able to go this far. Gorbachev himself succeeded as far as he did only because the decline of the Soviet economy, its inability to meet the international demands for technological development, and the domestic crisis of legitimacy in the Soviet Union had shifted the burden of proof, once the old guard had departed from the scene, to leaders who favored the status quo rather than those who advocated change.[85] It is likely that Gorbachev himself would not have taken the actions he did in 1989 had not events forced him. This suggests that under most conditions the GRIT strategy, while undoubtedly effective in eroding existing images in the other side, is impractical due to domestic constraints.

Since only the domestic collapse of one of the superpowers enabled these governments to overcome domestic mythologies and end their confrontational behavior, perhaps domestic politics played an intermediate role—a brake, as it were—between changes in the international structure and changes in international patterns of behavior. Is this likely to hold true for all systems? This question must be left for future research. One reason to think that the cold war might be different from other eras is that in a bipolar world, where only two powers set the tone of international politics, the domestic structures of these powers would have a greater impact on the international system than if five or six powers competed for influence. Stephen Krasner argues that even in the multipolar world of the interwar period, the breakdown of the international trade system occurred in part because domestic interests and institutions in the United States and Britain did not adapt readily to changes in the international structure of trade after World War I.[86]

What does this analysis of the cold war portend for the emerging world order? Because most of the likely great powers of the future, including the United States, Germany, and Japan, have participated in the international regimes created during the period of American hegemony in the capitalist world, powerful groups and institutions embedded within these countries are firmly interested in continuing this cooperation, though they may have difficulty in adjusting to the new roles they will play in these regimes. The great question, however, lies on the territory of the former Soviet Union. While the preceding analysis suggests that the international community's influence in shaping domestic structures is limited by preexisting constructs, the extent to which domestic structures have broken

[85] For an analysis of the collapse of the old Soviet foreign policy ideology under Gorbachev, see Blum, "The Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System."

[86] Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976): 317–347.

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down in this territory provides the West with great opportunities as well as risks. The West should expand or develop existing regimes to include Russia and the newly independent republics in order to embed in them institutions that would increase the domestic costs their leaders would face in choosing a confrontational foreign policy.

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The Political Bases of Activism in the Israeli Labour and Herut Parties

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As in other democracies, party activists operate the political networks of Israel. Most citizens confine their political participation to voting at elections, and members of the Knesset and government bureaucrats are enmeshed in the demands of office. The activists, however, work in election campaigns; meet privately with national leaders; battle for control of their parties; solicit and convey the particular requests of their friends, neighbors, and associates to those in parliament and the national bureaucracy; attend party meetings; search for and ride herd on voters; and occupy local government offices. Our analysis of activists in the Israeli Labour and Herut parties demonstrates that the ethnic and class divisions that split Israeli society and the marked contrasts in the histories, organizations, and ideologies of the two parties have little effect on the social and political lives of their activists. Instead, they respond to the calls of a separate political world, whose demands and obligations overcome the social and electoral cleavages of the society at large. Party activists are enveloped by the world of party politics.

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It is easy to suppose that the contrasts that separate parties in the visible world of electoral competition distinguish their activists as well. In Israel, Labour and Herut have long presented themselves and have been perceived as being dramatically different. For most of this century, these two political movements have battled over the nature of Zionism, the proper boundaries of the country, the place of Judaism in the state, and the structure of the economy. In these debates, the Labour party has donned the mantle of socialism; Herut and its forebears in the Revisionist Movement have worn the garb of the rightwing. Labour is uniformly perceived as hierarchical, well-organized, and involved in patronage politics, while Herut is still viewed as a party of ideological firebrands. From the 1930s, Labour controlled the political organization of the Jewish *yishuv* (settlement) in Mandate Palestine and then dominated the Israeli state until 1977. For decades, most Labour activists have been political professionals, joining work in the party with a job in agencies of local and national governments and positions in the construction conglomerates, banks, and health offices affiliated with the economic networks of the labour federation, the Histadrut.[1] In direct contrast, during the long years of Labour dominance, the Revisionists and Herutniks were political amateurs tied by ideological commitment to their nationalist principles, loyalty to their leaders – first Zev Jabotinsky and then Menahem Begin – and to opposition to the Labour Movement. In the last decade, Herut has become an uneasy alliance of veteran members of Begin's "fighting family" and political professionals who have fueled and have been attracted by the party's electoral successes as the leader of the Likud bloc.[2] Highlighting the rift between Labour and Herut, the former's willingness to trade parts of the occupied territories for peace and Likud's demand that Israel retain control over these areas have made up the central issue of recent national elections. Furthermore, Labour and Herut have distinctive electorates. Reflecting the ethnic and social class divisions that separate Israeli Jews, a plurality of those whose origins lay in Asia or Africa vote for Herut, and Europe-American ethnicity is associated with electoral support for Labour.[3] Nevertheless, we will show that these historical, ideological, and

[1] Myron Aronoff, *Frontiertown: The Politics of Community-Building in Israel* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1974); Myron Aronoff, *Power and Ritual in the Israeli Labour Party* (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1979); Peter Medding, *Mapai in Israel: Political Organization and Government in a New Society* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Yonathan Shapiro, *The Formative Years of The Israeli Labour Party* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976); Yael Atzmon, *Representation and Mobilization in Local Politics: The Israeli Labour Party* (Ph. D. dissertation in Hebrew, Hebrew University, 1975); Yael Atzmon, "The Labour Party and Its Factions," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 29 (Fall 1984): 118–19.

[2] Yonathan Shapiro, "Politics of the Plaza," (Hebrew) *Politika* 11–12 (October-November 1986): 30–32; Yonathan Shapiro, *Chosen to Command: The Road to Power of the Herut Party – A Socio-Political Interpretation* (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1989); Yonathan Shapiro, *The Road to Power: Herut Party in Israel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Alan S. Zuckerman, Hanna Herzog, and Michal Shamir, "The Party's Just Begun: Herut Activists in Power and after Begin" in Gregory Mahler, ed., *Israeli Politics after Begin* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990).

[3] See, for example, David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom, *Bureaucratic Culture: Citizens*

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social cleavages help to channel the flow of the activists into the two parties, but they do not affect the activists' social and political lives.

The world of party activists displays a logic of its own distinct from electoral politics.[4] In Labour and Herut, as well as in other political parties that control national and local governments, the demands and obligations of political careers structure the behavior of most activists. Those elected and appointed to political office and those who busy themselves in the internal lives of their parties are especially likely to assist the policy demands of their friends, neighbors, and constituents. Those who control power and those who seek it come head to head at party meetings and conferences. In Labour and Herut, political careers provide opportunities for social and occupational mobility that span the ethnic and class

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and Bureaucrats in Israel (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978); Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978); Michal Shamir and Asher Arian, "The Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Election," *Electoral Studies* 1 (October 1982): 315–31; Amiram Gonen, "A Geographical Analysis of the Elections in Jewish Urban Communities" in Don Caspi, Abraham Diskin, and Emmanuel Gutman, eds., *The Roots of Begin's Success: The 1981 Israeli Elections* (London: Croom, Helm, 1984), 59–84; Asher Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 2nd ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1989); Michal Shamir, "Realignment in the Israeli Party System" in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel—1984* (Tel-Aviv: Ramot, 1986), 267–96. Alan S. Zuckerman, "The Flow of the Vote in Israel: A Reconsideration of Stability and Change" in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel—1988* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990) argues that previous studies have exaggerated the level of stable voting by individuals and, therefore, have overstated the ability of ethnicity or any other social cleavage to determine vote choice. For a view of ethnicity as a product of politics, see Hanna Herzog, "Ethnicity as a Product of Political Negotiation: The Case of Israel," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 7 (October 1984): 517–33; and Hanna Herzog, "Social Construction of Reality in Ethnic Terms: The Case of Political Ethnicity in Israel," *International Review of Modern Sociology* 15 (Spring-Autumn 1985): 45–61.

[4] H. McCloskey, P. J. Hoffman, and R. O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review* 54 (June 1960): 406–27; Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Alan S. Zuckerman, *The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979); Alan Abramowitz, John McGlennon, and Ronald Rapoport, "Party Activists in the United States: A Comparative State Analysis," *International Political Science Review* 4 (January 1983): 13–19; Gerard Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983); William Crotty, "An Agenda for Studying Local Politics Comparatively" in William Crotty, ed., *Political Parties in Local Areas* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 1–38; William Crotty, "Local Parties in Chicago: The Machine in Transition" in Crotty, ed., *Political Parties*, 157–96; Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Party Activist in Detroit and Los Angeles: A Longitudinal View, 1956–1980" in Crotty, *Political Parties*, 89–120; Anne Hopkins, "Party Activists and Local Party Organization in Nashville" in Crotty, ed., *Political Parties*, 65–88; Dwaine Marvick, "Stability and Change in the Views of Los Angeles Party Activists, 1968–80" in Crotty, *Political Parties*, 121–56; Michael Margolis and Raymond Owen, "From Organization to Personalism: A Note on the Transmogrification of the Local Political Party," *Polity* 17 (Winter 1985): 315–28; Warren E. Miller and Kent L. Tedin, *Parties in Transition: A Longitudinal Study of Party Elites and Party Supporters* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); Richard W. Murray and Kent L. Tedin, "The Emergence of Two Party Competition in the Sunbelt: The Case of Houston" in Crotty, *Political Parties*, 39–64; Walter J. Stone and Alan I. Abramowitz, "Winning May Not Be Everything, But It's More Than What We Had Thought: Presidential Party Activists in 1980," *American Political Science Review* 77 (December 1983): 945–56.

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rifts of Israeli society. Israel's social cleavages help to guide the activists to their parties, but do not much affect their social identities and how they choose friends to share hours at cafes and allies who will help in times of need. Political involvement frequently feeds on itself, drawing the activists into a separate world of politics.

We examine three dimensions of the activists' social and political worlds. The first details the extent to which the ethnic divisions that distinguish Herutniks and Labourites influence their social identifications, their perceptions of ethnic discrimination and conflict in Israel, and their choice of friends and allies. We then explore two components of their political work—engaging in social contacting and attending party meetings. The former examines the extent to which they seek to assist citizens in solving problems with government agencies, and the latter specifies the extent to which the activists take part in the organized life of their party. Together, these three dimensions tap distinct elements of the social and political world of Israeli party activists.

Party, Ethnicity, and Social Ties

The Data

Our analysis draws on a study of delegates elected from local branches to the congresses of the Herut and Labour parties held in the spring of 1986. Labour's assembly was one of a series of regularly scheduled conclaves that have been held every two or three years since the party's founding six decades ago. The Herut convocation was the first such event in seven years. Following the literature, we take these delegates to be a reasonable representation of the activists in these two parties.[5]

The data came from two interwoven sources: a telephone survey of a large sample of the delegates and wide-ranging discussions of a few topics held in the homes and offices of a subgroup selected from the general sample. We drew a random sample from the list of delegates for each party's congress. The 399 surveyed on the telephone, 200 from Herut and 199 from Labour, amount to approximately 8 percent of all the delegates (10 percent of those in Herut and 6 percent of the Labourites). We tried first to obtain permission to interview the delegates on the floor of the Herut congress. When our request was denied, we turned to the use of a telephone survey, conducted by the Modiin Ezrahi research

[5] Roland Cayrol and Karlheinz Reif, "Conscience Individuelle et Discipline Partisane," *International Political Science Review* 4 (January 1983): 36–47; Oscar Niedermayer, "Methodological and Practical Problems of Comparative Party Elites Research: The EPPLME Project," *European Journal of Political Research* 14 (May 1986): 253–59; Jon Piere, "Attitudes and Behaviour of Party Activists and 'Middle-Level Elites,'" *European Journal of Political Research* 14 (July 1986): 465–79; Paul Whiteley, "Who Are the Labour Activists?" *Political Quarterly* 52 (April-June 1981): 159–68; see also the sources cited in footnote 4.

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group. The nature of telephone surveys allows for relatively few questions, all with very precise meanings. Therefore, we conducted longer face-to-face interviews structured around a few topics with fifty of the delegates, chosen so as to enable us to focus on ethnicity and patronage. These discussions supply the color and details that help us to elaborate the quantitative analysis. Together, the two sets of data allow us to draw a portrait from complementary perspectives on the party activists.

Ethnicity and Party

The overlap between party and ethnic origin that structures the electoral competition between Herut and Labour reappears among the activists. Westerners (so defined if the delegate or his or her father was born in Europe or America) accounted for 59 percent of the Labourites; Orientals (similarly defined if the delegate's or father's country of origin is in Asia or Africa) are 33 percent, and native Israelis (those born in Israel of a father born in Israel) are 10 percent. The ethnic origins of Herutniks are reversed: Westerners are 34 percent; Orientals are 53 percent, and native Israelis are 14 percent.[6] Similarly, members of the ethnic groups distribute themselves unevenly in the two parties. Sixty-five percent of the Orientals and the native Israelis in our sample are in Herut and 65 percent of the westerners are in Labour. As in the case of many aspects of Israeli society, there is a skewed relationship between ethnicity and recruitment into the two political parties.

Following the overlap between ethnicity and social class in Israeli society,[7] our data also display a strong correlation among education, ethnicity, and party. Asian-African activists tend to have spent fewer years in school than have their American–European counterparts. There is also an association between membership in the Labour party and higher levels of education, especially among those of Oriental origin. Twenty-seven percent of the Asian-Africans in Labour have university degrees compared to 12 percent of those in Herut, while one-third of the European-Americans in Herut and 35 percent in Labour have been graduated

[6] This distribution matches those obtained by the Herut party's own department of organization. For a more detailed analysis of the social bases of Labour and Herut activists, see Hannah Herzog, Michal Shamir, and Alan S. Zuckerman, *The Israeli Politician* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1989).

[7] Vivian Klaff, "Ethnic Segregation in Urban Israel," *Demography* 10 (May 1973): 161–84; Alex Weingrod, "Recent Trends in Israeli Ethnicity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 (January 1974): 55–65; Sammy Smooha, *Israel*; Eliezer Ben-Rafael, *The Emergence of Ethnicity: Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); Gabriel Weimann, "The Not-So-Small World: Ethnicity and Acquaintance Networks in Israel," *Social Networks* 5 (September 1983): 289–302; Calvin Goldscheider and Alan S. Zuckerman, *The Transformation of the Jews*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Transformation of Israeli Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1985); Hannah Ayalon, Eliezer Ben-Rafael, and Stephen Sharot, "Variations in Ethnic Identification Among Israeli Jews," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 8 (July 1985): 389–407.

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from universities. The converse applies among those with lowest levels of education. Forty-four percent of the Asian-Africans in Herut have not completed high school compared to one-fourth of their counterparts in Labour, while approximately 13 percent of the European-Americans in both parties were characterized by this relatively low level of education. Variations in the level of formal education between the activists resemble the differences between those who vote for the parties.

Differences in ethnic origin or party membership, however, have little influence on whether the activists identify with the ethnic groups. Approximately two-thirds of the Asian-Africans in both parties define themselves as Sephardim (the name denoting Asian-African ethnicity); 62 percent of the westerners in Herut and 57 percent of the European-Americans in Labour define themselves as Ashkenazim (westerners), and 60 percent of the native Israelis identify with one or the other ethnicity. Similarly, Herutniks and Labourites are equally likely to have ethnic identifications. Differences of ethnic origin and party do not affect the likelihood that a party activist will define himself as an Ashkenazi or a Sephardi.

The delegates deny that ethnicity is salient in Israeli social life in general and in their own social worlds in particular. Eighty percent claimed that ethnic discrimination has a "small" or "very small" place in Israeli society. Orientals in Labour are most likely and westerners in Herut are least likely to see the importance of ethnic prejudice among Israelis. Similarly, more than 90 percent responded that they have encountered no more than a "very small" or "small" amount of ethnic discrimination in their own lives. Here, Orientals (20 percent of those in Herut and 13 percent of the Asian-Africans in Labour) reported the highest levels of these encounters. Given these findings, it is not surprising that the delegates choose their friends with very little regard for their ethnic origins. Three-fourths of the activists in both parties reported that half their friends are Ashkenazim and half Sephardim. Differences in the delegates' ethnic origins or parties do not directly affect the perception of ethnic conflict in Israeli social life and the selection of friends. For these activists, ethnicity remains a category of social definition but does not provide the bases of their social lives.

Family, Friendship, and Party

The delegates' strongest associations tie them to their party comrades. Approximately 60 percent of our sample, with only slight differences among members of the ethnic categories and parties, claimed that a "large part" or "all" of their family members and closest friends are in their party. Even larger numbers have jobs with political connections. Eighty percent of the Labourites work for the government or branches of the Histadrut and half the Herutniks are located in jobs with patronage connections. Furthermore, the delegates control a broad array of political positions: 40 percent (37 percent of the Herutniks and half the Labourites) occupied both an elected and appointed office in the three years

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preceding the convention; 8 percent (6 percent in Herut and 10 percent in Labour) controlled one or the other position; and one-third (43 percent in Herut and one-fourth of the Labourites) held no political position during that period of time. Ties of family, friendship, political association, and work link activists to each other and to their parties.

Personal experiences at home and work first drew many of the delegates into politics. "It began with my father," a Labourite recounted. "My father has been a politician for many years. For fourteen years he's been the branch secretary; he's been deputy mayor, and head of the region, a true politician. What influence does that have? You grow up living and eating politics." A Herut veteran agreed: "I'll tell you. I saw politics in my father's house. He worked for Herut, even before the establishment of the State. Those are my roots. . . . I joined, because I believe. That is my belief, that this is the right way." A Herutnik who had been a career officer in the Israel Defense Forces for more than twenty years reported that he first considered joining a political party when he left the military. Recruitment into Herut grew out of his first civilian job as an adviser to a cabinet minister and the personal friendship that developed between his family and that of the minister. Joining the party, he said, was like, "many things in life, which happen without planning for them." A Labourite told us, "I began a job in an area heavily involved in politics. Through the job, I met many colleagues who are party workers. They pulled me into political activity." Another detailed two sources for his entrance into politics. "The first was my feelings about policy issues, especially about things that I have seen in the development towns. I thought that I could make a difference. The second is that whoever lives in a small town, whenever he enters public life, whether he wants to or not, must enter politics too. When I completed my university studies and returned here to work in the department of culture and education, the mayor was in the Labour party. So it was natural, even if I had never before been involved in politics and . . . even if my social roots really are with Likud to get pulled into Labour. . . ." Working in politicized jobs and surrounded by friends and family members who are in their party, the activists' strongest social ties bind them to the world of politics.

Recruitment

Broad differences in party history and ethnicity act through family connections and occupational opportunities to help structure recruitment into the parties. Nearly half of the Labour delegates (46 percent) entered politics between 1949 and 1960, while fewer than one-fifth of the Herutniks joined their party during those years of Labour dominance. Better than three-fourths of the Herut activists entered after 1960 and about half enlisted after 1977, when Herut gained political power, compared to 14 percent of the Labourites who joined after 1977. Political conditions in Israel during those early years helped to condition the flow of activists into the parties. Many of the delegates described personal circumstances

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that decisively affected their decisions to enter politics. Several of the Herutniks recounted how representatives of the Labour machine refused jobs to their parents. "We lived in Ramat Gan, and my father simply had no work," said one. "They wouldn't give him work. I remember this myself, when I was a boy. . . . I can never forget what they told him: 'You are a Revisionist. You have no work.'" Others were new immigrants, who bridled at Labour's arbitrary ways. After detailing how he had lost several jobs because he refused to join Labour, a Herutnik proclaimed: "Today, I hate the Labour Alignment, and I do so for just this reason, their arrogance, the slaps in the faces that they handed out." At the same time, delegates to both conventions uniformly praised Herut's openness and decried Labour's rigidity. "In Herut, everything is open," a young Herutnik told us. "You can stand for any office. There is no appointments committee. If you want to compete, you can. The opportunities are wide open. Everyone has the same chance. A professor at Tel-Aviv University and a garbage collector are equal." Two Labour activists, both young Sephardim, who were recently recruited into the party, agreed:

> It is easier for Orientals to advance in the Likud [i.e., Herut]. They let them. One of the Likud ministers told me, "Anyone who can sign his name, I will appoint as an assistant director [of a ministry]." That's funny, but it gives you a sense of how aware they are of the need to advance.

Perceiving a relatively open Herut organization, new activists moved easily into the party.

The relative ease of entry into Herut and the overlap between Labour activism and European-American ethnicity that has marked Labour since its inception join with patterns of residency, educational achievement, and social ties to create the overlap between Herut activism and origin in Asia and Africa. There is little evidence in our data that ethnic discrimination drew Orientals to Herut. The ethnic divisions of Israeli society filter through family ties and the organizational histories of the parties before they affect the activist's decision to join Labour or Herut.

In both Herut and Labour, politics directly structures the social worlds of many of the activists. Most of their friends and family members are in their parties, and most of the delegates occupy political offices and hold jobs with political connections. Ethnic cleavages have little salience in their lives, and issues associated with ethnic conflict played indirect and limited roles in decisions to enter politics. Ethnic differences filter through the ties of family, area of residence, and occupation, which directly structure recruitment into the two parties. Ethnicity per se has a weak and indirect effect on the social ties of the activists. The traditional differences that separate Herutniks and Labourites fade as both sets of activists display a similar tendency to overlap their social, job, and party ties. As a group, Herut and Labour activists live in a distinct world of party politics.

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Political Careers and Social Contacting

All party activists are not alike. Some spend their days going from meeting to meeting in clubhouse, restaurant, cafe, and office in a whirl of political activity. Some are born into their parties, commence campaign work as children, and never leave the political world. Others move into and out of the parties, taking on a task when asked, occasionally appearing at local meetings or national conventions, while remaining on the fringes of the political world. Some leave politics altogether. They vary as well in the extent to which they reach out to voters, try to provide assistance in handling problems with government bureaucracies in resolving issues of tax abatements, in obtaining government contracts, and in smoothing the other links between citizens and bureaucrats. Party activists differ in the extent to which their lives are enveloped by politics.

In the interviews, the delegates described diverse political lives. A Herutnik illustrates the extreme of intensive involvement in politics: "Everyday, I am somewhere else. Only on Friday night, do I belong to my wife. Ask her. She'll tell you that she never sees me during the rest of the week. There is an exception. I return home every afternoon for a nap. That is a fixed rule." Another reported:

> This is my daily calendar: Phone calls every day that are tied to politics; meetings every day that are tied to politics; not necessarily meetings at the local party headquarters, but with all kinds of people. I am one of those who believes that in order to keep on top of things you have to make sure that your connections with your supporters are strong. I initiate meetings with them. I ask for their views. I am their address for requests.

Another described a less active political life:

> It's very difficult to describe how much time I devote to politics, because it depends on the time of year. Most of the time, I put in four to eight hours each week at the local party branch, the national offices, and in phone conversations. I would estimate that I have a conversation every other day or so on political matters.

A Labour activist told us that the constraints on his time imposed by his job and university studies make it very difficult for him to be active. Others reported reducing their political work when their children were born in order to spend more time with their families. The Herut and Labour delegates vary from moderate to extremely high in the extent to which they are engaged in political activities.

"I am their address for requests." "Could you see if it is possible?"

Social contacting connotes approaches to government officials in order to obtain help for the contactor's friends, neighbors, or associates.[8] In Israel and other

[8] Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

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polities for which we have information, party activists are much more likely than other citizens to contact government officials to help their friends, neighbors, and associates. In India, the Netherlands, Austria, and Yugoslavia, party members who frequently engage in electoral campaigns are five to ten times more likely than others in their countries to engage in social contacting.[9] Sixty percent of our sample—several times the figure in the Israeli population—have engaged in this form of political participation.[10] Forty-two percent (38 percent of the Herutniks and 46 percent of the Labour delegates) engaged frequently in social contacting during the preceding three years; another 17 percent (the same proportion in the two parties) reported occasional social contacting; with the remainder (45 percent of the Herut delegates and 38 percent of the Labourites) doing none at all.

For many activists, contacting is the essence of their political work. "I see myself as the spokesperson of my neighborhood," said one of the Labourites.

> I am the channel between the mayor and the local council, on the one side, and the public, on the other. People usually ask me to help them solve problems in things like taxes, housing, and sewage. The requests come in the form of, "Could you get a clarification? . . . Could you see if it is possible? . . ."

A Herut delegate told us that while declining a government position for himself, he made a request of his own. "Leave me alone. I'm too busy. I just have one request. I want you to help those who come to me for assistance. That's all I want." This form of political work does not imply corruption, only the effort to help. Several of the activists told us that trying to help is what matters. "When they come to me, I tell them one thing, 'I will try, but I don't promise.' If it happens, I am happy. If it doesn't, then I tried." Even some of those who described themselves as not active in their parties, as political loners, engage in social contacting:

> Look I do try to help, but I don't go out of my way to stimulate it. For example, someone came to me who used to work in a firm and is owed a pension, but the director of the fund doesn't want to give it to him. The worker says, "I am a simple Jew. I need the money. For me, it's a large amount. Must I wait until I die to get the money?" Enough! I accepted his complaint, and I set up a meeting with the director, and got him the money.

The extent to which the Israeli activists engage in social contacting rivals those in the Democratic party of Chicago, the Christian Democrats of Italy, the Liberal Democrats of Japan, and the Indian Congress—parties famous for the joining of service work and electoral mobilization.[11]

[9] Alan S. Zuckerman and Darrell M. West, "The Political Bases of Citizen Contacting: A Cross-National Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 79 (December 1985): 117–31.

[10] Nachmias and Rosenbloom, *Bureaucratic Culture*; Brenda Danet, *Pulling Strings: Biculturalism in Israeli Bureaucracy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

[11] See, for example, Milton Rakove, *We Don't Want Nobody Nobody Sent* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979); as well as Zuckerman, *Politics*; and Crotty, *Political Parties*.

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The Political Bases of Social Contacting

The analysis of social contacting requires the specification of particular variables likely to influence the rate of contacting. In order to consider the interaction between the ethnic origin and party membership, we defined six types of delegates: Asian-Africans in Herut; European-Americans in Herut; natives in Herut; Asian-Africans in Labour; European-Americans in Labour, and natives in Labour. Because studies have frequently found that rising levels of education are associated with increased political participation,[12] we examined this factor as an additional control variable. We separated the delegates into five categories: those who have no more than an elementary school education; those who attended but were not graduated from high school; high school graduates; those who have some post-high school education, but no university degree; and university graduates. We contrasted these factors with two variables associated with political careers—the control of political office and the rate of attendance at party meetings.

In order to sort the relative influence of these variables, we subjected our data to Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA). This technique assesses the relative ability of explanatory factors (which are measured as nominal or ordinal variables) to account for variation in a dependent variable (which is measured on an interval scale). As such it is analogous to multiple regression with dummy variables.[13] We use MCA to test the relative ability of each of the explanatory variables to influence the rate by which the activists engage in social contacting and attend party meetings.

The level of social contacting is primarily a function of two political factors. Those who occupy political office, whether elected or appointed, are the most likely to engage in social contacting, after controlling for the other explanatory variables. Ninety percent of those delegates who frequently engage in social contacting control a political office, and 75 percent of the office-holders report that they have engaged in this form of political activity. At the same time, relatively high levels of involvement in the organizational lives of the parties further increase the extent to which delegates engage in this form of political participation (although it does not reach the .10 level of statistical significance). Only office-holders who hardly ever attend party meetings report relatively low levels of social contacting. Having especially active political careers raises levels of social contacting among the activists. In a separate analysis, we found that these two political variables alone account for 90 percent of the variance explained. The explanatory variables account for 28 percent of the variation in social contacting.

The delegates detailed how other citizens perceive them as having the best access to government agencies and turn to them for assistance. Some of the

[12] See, for example, Verba, Nie, and Kim, *Participation*.

[13] Frank M. Andrews, *Multiple Classification Analysis* (Ann Arbor, MI: The Institute for Social Research, 1973). The authors will be happy to provide copies of the tables upon request.

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delegates use time on their government jobs to assist friends, neighbors, and constituents. "Now that we are talking, I will tell you something that I would not tell most people," admitted one especially busy activist. "I see my public activity as an extension of my party work. For example, during work yesterday I called a rabbi to help arrange a bar-mitzvah for an orphan I know. The conversation lasted half an hour. Most days, I spend four hours on government work and four hours on party work." A Labourite told us, "I get many requests for assistance. There is no end to them, but most are tied to my position of director of an education project, not to my party work. In fact, it's the opposite. Sometimes, my contract does not permit me to do any party work at all." A Herutnik described the crush of requests that reach him. "Look, the truth is that I receive requests all the time, but when I was on the local council, the pressure was extremely heavy. Really, a thousand and one problems. When you are on the local council, people come to you. They certainly do, many, many persons." Another described how he helped the father of a poor family in his town obtain adequate housing. "I had to help them even without their asking me, because they supported my party. When I came to him for his vote or to ask him for help, he never refused me. So, there is no reason for me not to go to him, if only to listen to his problems." Both sets of data underline the powerful association between controlling a political office and pursuing an active career in the party with social contacting.

The Relative Unimportance of Education and Ethnicity in Social Contacting

Variables associated with party membership, ethnicity, and level of formal education do not account for variations in the level of social contacting. The finding that Orientals in both parties are more likely to engage in social contacting than are their western and native colleagues does not reach accepted levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, Herut activists with no ethnic identification and Labourites who identify themselves as Sephardim or Ashkenazim are the most frequent social contactors. None of the others is above the grand mean. When we analyzed each set of party delegates separately, the explanatory strength of ethnicity disappeared among Labourites. The differences that we observed in the combined sample come from the tendency of Orientals to live outside the central cities, areas where Labour activists are especially prone to engage in social contacting. In Labour, as in the sample as a whole, holding a political office has the strongest relationship with this form of political participation. Only among Herutniks does ethnic origin, but again not identification, retain any effect on social contacting after controlling for the other variables. Education has no consistent or significant effect on social contacting. The level of social contacting among activists is primarily a function of holding political office and being involved in party politics. Both encourage and allow for this form of political participation. The Herut and Labour delegates exemplify a crossnational unifor-

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mity: the more political ties and obligations that adhere, the higher is the level of social contacting. Nothing else matters.

Political Contexts of Party Meetings

Meetings occur in diverse ways and places. Local branches and national committees hold formal sessions. There are also informal get-togethers for "gossip and coffee," trips to national headquarters to "see and be seen" by party bigwigs, and even expeditions to the Knesset. A Herutnik reported:

> People go to *Metzudat Ze'ev* [national headquarters]. They see and greet people there. They are seen. Listen, it has its plusses. If a person wants to be known in the party, then this is really important. There are people who go there as much as twice a week. Thursday, though, is the busiest day. There are usually meetings of the national secretariat or the various committees, like organization and propaganda. If not, they sit at a nearby cafe where all of our party's Knesset members gather.

Nearly 60 percent of the delegates (58 percent of the Herutniks and 56 percent of the Labourites) go to meetings at least two or three times per month, and one-third (30 percent in Herut and 32 percent in Labour) attend at least once per week. Attending party meetings assesses the extent and regularity with which the activists take part in the organizational lives of their parties.

Variations in attendance at party meetings reflect the particular conditions present within Labour and Herut. There are no variables of theoretical significance that strongly influence rates of attendance among all the activists. Rather, differences in the workings of the parties affect the uniform tendency for delegates pursuing political careers to frequently attend meetings. As a result, the explanation of attendance rates varies in precise ways for each party. Our analysis unfolds in two stages. First, we negate hypotheses which maintain that a uniform set of factors explains attendance rates among all the activists. Then, we present separate analyses of Herut and Labour activists, demonstrating the power of different explanatory variables in each case. Adding the second set of analyses markedly improves the ability to account for variation in the rate of attendance at party meetings.

Two factors—the location of the delegate's branch and the level of formal education, neither of which carries much theoretical weight—have the greatest statistical impact on the frequency of going to meetings. Activists who live outside the major population centers reside in areas in which fewer meetings are called and from which they must travel to visit national party headquarters. More generally put, where activists do not have frequent opportunities to go to meetings, they do not attend. Although the effect of education on the frequency of attending party meetings is statistically significant and displays the highest beta weight, the relationship is not straightforward. Formal education does not have a linear effect on party activism. Having no more than an elementary school education greatly depresses the level of activism, but those who have high school diplomas are more likely to attend meetings than are those who have studied

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beyond high school. Moreover, the relatively high explanatory strength associated with the education variable results from the very low levels of participation among the handful (fourteen) who have no more than an elementary school education. When these delegates are removed from the analysis, the beta weight of education declines to a level substantially below that of party branch. Activists with high school diplomas who live near party branches have the highest rates of attendance. Having said that, we have only begun to explain what accounts for the likelihood that an activist will attend party meetings.

The relationship among party, ethnicity and attending meetings is weak and ambiguous. Although the overall relationship is not statistically significant, variations according to the particular category appear. Orientals in Herut have the highest levels of attendance; westerners in Labour have the lowest levels. In both parties, Asian-Africans are more active than others. It is, however, not correct to interpret these findings as a manifestation of Sephardic ethnic identification. Party activists in Herut with no ethnic identification have the highest rates of attendance (adjusted deviation from the grand mean of +3.3) and Labour Sephardim are the next most active (+2.3). No other category of activists is above the grand mean. Our data provide no support as well for the hypothesis that members go to meetings to see their friends. Membership in a party or ethnic group or the desire to spend time with friends do not bring the activists to meetings of their parties.

At the same time, this analysis, which combines Herutniks and Labourites together, provides only weak support for hypotheses that associate going to meetings with having a political career. Those who work in a politicized job, defined in Israel to mean the Histadrut, the government, or the party, are more likely to attend meetings than those who labor in the private sphere or in a cooperative. On the other hand, the period in which the activist entered politics has little influence on attendance rates, and the relationship between holding a political position and going to meetings dissolves in the multivariate analysis. None of these variables tied to the elements of a political career has a strong impact on attendance.

Perhaps what is most striking about the findings is the similarity in the rate of attendance across all the explanatory variables and the relatively low rate of explanatory power exhibited in the analysis. If we exclude farmers and those with less than an elementary school education, a very small fraction of the sample, almost all activists are within two to three meetings per week of the overall mean attendance for the year. As we shall now show, including the particular political contexts of Herut and Labour markedly increases the proportion of the variance accounted for and details the variables that carry explanatory weight in each case.

Faction Conflict and Activism in Herut

Since Menahem Begin's retirement from political life, Herut has been divided into organized and warring factions. One indicator of the high level of internal

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conflict is the extreme length of time that it took to organize the 1986 convention. The fist-fights, shouting matches, and flying chairs that erupted on its second day and led to the adjourning of the congress for an entire year underscore the bitterness present. Faction conflict pervades the Herut party.[14]

The frequency with which the Herutniks attended meetings during the period preceding the convention and our survey derives in large measure from this competition. Two elements are crucial to this process: the rise of the faction led by David Levy, minister of Housing and deputy premier under Begin, and the response of other Herutniks long active in the party who control patronage positions and who battled Levy's supporters at party meetings. As a party veteran reflected,

> Here, the branches live. No one sends a letter from Metzudat Ze'ev, that these ten men should be picked . . . or those five should be chosen and you can pick another five. In our party, the branches send their own people. . . . Certainly, this would cause a crisis for the veterans. All of a sudden, they see that we, the fighting family, [the veterans of Herut] are a only few.

Another veteran, who joined the Revisionist movement Vilna during the 1920s echoed this lament:

> Now, I sometimes ask myself, "Who? What? What have we become?" On Sunday, I attended the meeting of the party Center in Jerusalem. Of the two thousand persons there, maybe one hundred could sing the *Betar* hymn or the song of *Etzel*. . . . So I ask: Where is my movement?

The drive to capture and defend political positions, not variations in ethnic origin or level of formal education, explains the frequency with which Herutniks attended party meetings.

The Factions in Herut

We assessed the delegates' identification with a faction by asking them two questions. The first was who they supported for party leader: Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir; Levy; Minister of Trade and Industry and former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon; or Moshe Arens, former minister of defense and ambassador to the United States, currently minister without portfolio. Because all the faction leaders proclaim their support for Shamir's leadership and maintain that the competition was really over who should lead when he retires, we asked a second question: if your first choice cannot serve, who would you prefer to take his place and listed the same four leaders. Based on our substantive knowledge of Herut party politics, we defined those who did not answer both questions as not supporting any faction (15 percent); those who mentioned Levy in either answer as being in

[14] Zuckerman, Herzog, and Shamir, "The Party's Just Begun," presents a more detailed and elaborate analysis of the factions' structures and their competition.

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his faction (22 percent); those who mentioned Sharon in either answer as a member of his faction (16 percent); and the remainder, 47 percent of the activists, are members of Shamir's faction, whose second in command is Arens. Our data correspond rather well to the estimates of informed observers and the one vote that took place at the convention, indicating the sizes of the factions.

Ethnicity and Faction. Once again, there is a strong but indirect association between ethnic origin and membership in the different factions. Nearly two-thirds of the westerners back Shamir; fewer than 20 percent follow either Levy or Sharon. Those whose origins are in Asia or Africa are almost evenly divided among the four categories: slightly more than one-third for Shamir; 27 percent for Levy; 23 percent for Sharon, and 14 percent with no faction loyalties at all. Native Israelis distribute themselves much like the party as a whole. Very few westerners follow Levy (16 percent) or Sharon (13 percent). Asian-Africans predominate in both—65 percent and 75 percent respectively. In addition, westerners make up nearly half of Shamir's faction. Ethnicity per se, however, has a weak effect on the choice faction. Sharon, born in Israel of Ashkenazi descent, and Levy, who was himself born in Morocco, draw activists of very similar ethnic origins. As challengers to the domination of Shamir and the remnants of Begin's original followers, Levy and Sharon draw the support of new activists living outside the oldest centers of Herut power. In addition, veteran Herutniks, most of whom are Ashkenazim, have banded behind Shamir to resist the rise of the political professionals. Political factors shape the ethnic differences among Shamir's, Levy's, and Sharon's followers.

Patronage and Faction. The factions vary in the extent to which they use patronage to attract members. Levy, the first to organize, has constructed a political machine by distributing government jobs and political offices. Nearly 60 percent of Levy's supporters work for the government, compared to 45 percent of the Shamir-Arens and Sharon factions, and about one-third of those in no faction. Two-thirds of Levy's backers also have held public office in the last three years compared to 62 percent of Shamir's faction, half of the Sharon supporters, and about one-third of those who claim no faction membership. Levy's faction, more than any of the others, is primarily composed of persons for whom politics is their career.

Conflict among the factions has increased the strategic and career reasons for joining the factions at the expense of ideological and other loyalties. One of Levy's followers highlighted the tactical bases of his faction:

> I belong to Levy's faction because of my ties to Micha Reisser [his ex-lieutenant, now deceased]. I know what the factions are really about. Political life rests on alliances, such as the alliance between Levy and Reisser, themselves, and my association with them. This is the way to political survival. Obviously, I would prefer that the factions be abolished, but until then, you have to extract the maximum from them.

A delegate who denied membership in a faction reported:

> I don't belong to any of the factions and I will tell you why. What does "belonging"

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> mean? . . . It's thinking only about what you can get. There is no crisis of ideology. There is a crisis of seats [of power]. . . . All of them are for settlements in the territories; all are for social justice, and that's everyone, everyone. They all play the same tune. But what is it? Everyone wants the seats [of power]. . . .

A leader of the Shamir-Arens faction complained about these developments. "In my youth, we discussed important issues, like the settlement of the land and the meaning of the state. We cared deeply and debated passionately. Now, the activists seem to care only about power, especially those who follow Levy and Sharon." A delegate from a city on the coast told us about Sharon's effort to break into the game: "Didn't Arik send members of our branch to work in embassies and consulates in Europe? Weren't they commercial, economic, and cultural attaches?" The distribution of these trips abroad and jobs holds the key to power in the local party. "This is called 'gathering power from honors.' You can go to your friends here and. . . . You can help them get jobs." The political return from the distribution of these jobs built Sharon's faction in the city. Conflict within Herut focuses on the control of patronage, not debate over policy differences or ideological principles.

Faction conflict and attendance at party meetings. Our analysis underscores the powerful and direct effects of political variables and the relatively weak and indirect effects of class and ethnicity on the frequency with which Herut activists attend party meetings. Members of Levy's faction attend most frequently (level of statistical significance,. 07). Ethnic differences disappeared when the particular political context of Herut is introduced to the analysis. Once again, living close to the political center and having at least a high school diploma are prerequisites for frequent attendance. Here, the effect of a job in a politicized workplace is diminished, because of the overwhelming association between the Histadrut and the Labour party. In Herut, too, the explanatory power associated with variations in formal education reflects the very low rates of attendance among those with less than eight years of schooling. Instead, the analysis indicates that meetings are the locale for the conflict between Levy's political machine and an older generation of Herutniks who also work in government jobs and whose closest friends are in the party. These activists go to meetings in order to defend themselves against Levy's forces.

Political careers, not education, matter in Herut. In Herut, activists with the most electoral support obtain the most political opportunities. The mere possession of a university degree does not bring political success. Attending meetings, seeing and being seen, making the right friends, and demonstrating the ability to bring in votes do. One of the activists described how to make it in Herut:

> There are two ways of being successful in the local branch of the party. The first is personal. You introduce yourself as a lawyer, for example, and say that you would like to work on a particular task. Usually, people don't know you, and don't know much about you, but there is still a good chance that the lawyer will not be chosen for the task. Instead, many times, regular people, not especially smart, even the opposite, are chosen. When you check to see why this happened, you find that 90 percent of those

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who voted are tied to the winner, whether through family or other connections. There is a general rule: whoever controls the most voters has the best chances of being selected.

There are no particular political benefits in Herut for those with a university education. Attendance at Herut meetings during the period of our survey was tied closely to taking part in the faction conflict that wracked the party.

Building Political Careers In Labour

The Labour party entered the 1986 national congress at peace with itself. The deep split between the two dominant leaders, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, had been resolved several years earlier in favor of Peres; and the internal conflict that marked the Herut congress and previous Labour convocations was nowhere to be found. The old factions and groups, such as those associated with the kibbutz organizations and other agricultural settlements, activists in the Histadrut, and the young members of the party were not then central to the life of Labour. A Labourite echoed several others as she described the change in the party during the last decade:

I had always identified with Labour but was not active until I joined the party in 1977. I strongly agreed with one of the warring sides then, that of Yitzhak Rabin, and so I enlisted. The need to say what I felt moved me . . . and so I joined his followers in my city. . . . I called Rabin's office at the Ministry of Defense, and told them that I was a supporter, and they made the connection to my local branch. They signed me up. It was all very organized. I attended meetings and discussion groups. Things were different then.

In 1986 the groups were not competing factions, and attendance at Labour party meetings did not respond to the demands of internal party conflict. Therefore, the primary factor that increased the participation of Herutniks—engaging in internal party conflict—is of no analytical utility in accounting for the frequency with which Labourites attended party meetings.

Political careers and attendance at meetings. In Labour, the effort to build a political career draws activists to party meetings. Those who have a politicized job (+1.9)—who work for one of the affiliates of the Histadrut, the party itself, or a government agency—and those who do *not* control a political office are the most active (+3.9). Delegates who do not have a politicized job are the least likely to attend meetings. In addition, those who entered politics at the end of Labour's dominance and who live in peripheral cities have especially high rates of attendance. In addition, old-timers, who joined the party before 1948, all of whom are retired or close to retirement, and the youngest members are especially active. Attending meetings is critical to building a career in Labour, but it is of little significance to those whose careers are already established.

As a result, the image of Labour as a party led by persons happy with what they have and unwilling to change appears in many of the face-to-face interviews. One Labourite told us:

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> They haven't yet learned from what's happened. . . . There is a lot of bureaucracy. There are many things with which they agree or they say they agree, but there are political interests, which to our sorrow, perhaps they really believe that they should change, but they just don't move.

An activist from a poor neighborhood of Jerusalem described how he and his friends had been recruited into Labour as a separate group. "They gave us a small budget too, but the really important things, like access to the Ministry of Education, areas where we can really make policy, they keep from us. We are still fighting them." Another activist bemoaned the absence of vision in Labour:

> Look, a party is something which is founded on power and which seeks to monopolize power, but at the heart of this effort must be a purpose. I have stopped seeing this purpose among most of the leaders of Labour. Certainly not in Uzi Baram [the secretary], certainly not among a considerable part of the ministers. Only Peres still exhibits the dream, and perhaps a drop of it remains with Rabin and a larger drop with Kessar [the head of the Histadrut]. All the rest are powermongers.

Without the kinds of threats to their political positions, such as those which accompany internal party conflict, activists who already control government positions and have long controlled the local party organization do not spend a lot of time at party meetings. Instead, those most likely to display high levels are persons seeking to create political careers.

Another activist gave us a lesson in how to make it within the Labour party. He formed a club of religious workers:

> Two things happened to this club. The first, the item of greatest importance in Israeli politics, we were recognized by the party. I received all kinds of letters containing all kinds of promises from the party's leaders, especially because it was close to elections. After that came something else, which I understood only later. I uncovered one of the fundamental rules of Israeli politics: This is one's ability to create political fictions, the image of power, and to build on this image in order to push what interests you. We didn't have many members in this club. I wrote some articles. That's all. Still, I was invited to become a member of the commission on state and religion.

The image of power stands as its first demonstration.

Ethnicity, education, and political careers in Labour. The effect of ethnicity and class on attendance among Labourites is different from Herutniks. While ethnicity's explanatory power is not statistically significant, the multivariate analysis shows that native Israelis have the highest levels of attendance and westerners the lowest. In addition, having a university diploma strongly influences the activity level among Labourites. It smoothes connections in a party already controlled by the dominant segments of Israeli society.

Labour activists apparently go to party meetings in order to make the connections that lead to nominations to political office. The most active have the patronage connections that spur Labour activity and the university degrees that ease entry into the party in the first place. In the absence of internal party conflict,

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the effort to build political careers demands high involvement in the organizational life of the party.

Conclusion

Our analysis points to the powerful role of specific political factors in explaining the political work of activists in the Israeli Labour and Herut parties. The issues, ideologies, and social cleavages that divide voters help to channel the flow of activists into political parties. After that, the activist's behavior responds to the demands of political careers: The more that one's working life is bound up with the party, the more one engages in the life of one's party and performs other political activities. In addition, the greater the threat to one's political position, the more active is one in the party. Political involvement by party activists feeds on itself; in doing so, it increases the differences between activists and the rest of the electorate.

Very similar politicians work for the Herut and Labour parties. They do not differ much in how frequently they attend party meetings. Ethnic and party differences alone or in combination do not form wide gaps among the activists. We found differences between the parties only with regard to recruitment patterns. Variations in the ethnic composition of the parties, however, have no impact on differences in the delegates' political participation. Similarly, the marked and frequently vituperative conflicts on policy issues between Herut and Labour politicians do not mean that activists in the two parties lead very different political lives. Whether in Herut or Labour, whether right-wing nationalists or socialists, whether Orientals or westerners, these politicians behave in rather similar ways.

Having a high level of formal education is not a resource that automatically translates into a high rate of activism. Neither frequency in engaging in social contacting nor involvement in party life is directly related to variations in level of formal education. Almost all of the delegates have more than an elementary school education, and for them increasing years of schooling does *not* produce greater levels of activism. In Herut, the ability to attract votes, not education level, is the critical resource that brings political success. In Labour, only a university degree smoothes entry into the party. Variations in the level of formal education do not directly and uniformly affect the political behavior of the activists.

Social contacting responds powerfully to the demands and opportunities of political careers. Delegates who control governing positions, whether by election or appointment, have the very highest rates of this form of political activity. People in their towns and neighborhoods know that these party activists have access to persons who make decisions, that they have answers to their questions, and that they have the political motivation to help them; so they seek out these activists with requests for assistance. In addition, some of the activists, presum-

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ably those with the most ambition to capture votes and to retain a loyal political following, are more than passive "addresses for requests." They search out those who need assistance, offering to help them resolve their problems with the government bureaucracy in implicit exchange for the supplicant's vote. In Israel, as in other polities about which there is information, party activists are much more likely than others to knock on the doors of government agencies in search of assistance for their friends, neighbors, and associates; the more politically active and visible he or she is, the more he or she engages in social contacting.

The particular political context of each party directly affects who comes to meetings and how frequently they attend. Demands of political careers and the presence of conflict for control of the party lead the delegates to party meetings. In Herut, Levy's political machine battles veterans who joined Herut while the party was still in the political wilderness and have controlled the party's organization and control of patronage. Herutniks with the highest rates of attendance are those who are involved in this conflict. Labour's context is different. Attending party meetings is the first step to building a political career, and so veterans who already control party and government positions rarely attend. Party meetings are arenas in which activists conquer new positions and defend old ones. They are places to see and be seen, the locations where activists build political careers.

Political factors explain variations in the extent of political participation among this especially active group. Social class, ethnicity, and other social divisions do not play a strong and direct role in this process. The exigencies of political careers, the drive to conquer and defend party offices, the contacts engendered by controlling government positions all increase levels of political participation of the party activists. Among this group—already highly involved in politics—increasing levels of participation leads to even more activism.*

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On Understanding the Present by Analyzing the Past in Latin America: A Review Essay

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ

Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier seek to explain the shape and evolution of the political systems of eight Latin American countries in their magnificent book.* During a given period of time, an historic change—from repression to incorporation—took place in the relationship between the state and organized labor. The terms of incorporation differed among these countries, however. The alternative strategies of control and mobilization during the incorporation period, the authors argue, generated different patterns of conflict and accommodation that launched the contrasting political legacies of the incorporation for decades to come. The notion of incorporation period is analytical: similar incorporation events and processes occur across countries, even though these happen at different chronological moments.

To analyze the eight countries, the authors follow two strategies of comparison: most similar and most different systems design. The eight cases are broadly similar in many ways, especially in contrast to the rest of the world. Within that broad similarity, the authors find four broad types of incorporation periods (that is, four pairs of countries) and argue that the corresponding contrasts among the four pairs reemerge in the legacy subsequent to incorporation. But the compar-

* Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, The Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

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ison of countries with similar types of incorporation (comparisons within each of the four pairs of countries) allows the Colliers to explore the major socioeconomic contrasts within each pattern: "Within the framework of these differences, if countries that had a similar incorporation experience were also similar in terms of longer-term outcomes, then one has a stronger basis for inferring that these outcomes were indeed a consequence of the type of incorporation" (p. 15).

A common feature of the incorporation period is that the state seeks to control the unions. The authors argue that Brazil (1930–1945) and Chile (1920–1931) featured state incorporation, because the state acted alone and bureaucratically. Labor support was not mobilized electorally by a political party or movement; nor was organized labor linked to a party; nor was the peasantry incorporated. The second major pattern is party incorporation, typical of the other six cases, which, however, differ among themselves. In all party incorporation cases, labor support is mobilized by a party or movement that exercises state power at the moment of incorporation. In Uruguay (1903–1916) and in Colombia (1930–1945), the electoral mobilization is carried out by a traditional party that does not connect the party to the unions (or does so weakly) and does not incorporate the peasantry. In Peru (1939–1945) and Argentina (1943–1955), the party/movement link with the unions is established, but the peasantry for the most part remains unincorporated. Finally, in Mexico (1917–1940) and in Venezuela (1935–1948), party mobilization not only establishes the link between party and unions but also incorporates the peasantry.

With regard to the legacy, the Colliers distinguish between what they call the "aftermath" and the "heritage." During the aftermath, in state incorporation cases there is the unfinished business of the political role of the working class. In both Brazil and Chile, they argue, workers are repoliticized and radicalized. The parties linked to the workers never achieve majority status; nor do they occupy the center of the political spectrum. The eventual result in the heritage period is centrifugal multiparty polarization and eventually a military coup. In contrast, in Mexico and Venezuela the parties that led the incorporation period remain dominant and fashion conflict-limiting strategies. They also shift programmatically toward the center and expel the left from their midst, while retaining the party-union links and support from workers and peasants. During the heritage period, there is a stable centrist majority bloc that contains social conflict, defeats insurgencies, and prevents military coups.

One intermediate legacy outcome is found in Uruguay and Colombia. The parties that led during the incorporation remain powerful and contain some political conflicts, but they fail to establish a link with the unions, which will open the way in the heritage period to substantial labor union autonomy, increased social conflict, and eventually a coup or sustained political violence. The other legacy outcome is what the Colliers call the stalemated party systems of Argentina and Peru. The party that led during the incorporation is either subordinated sharply (APRA) or excluded from power by force (Peronismo). These parties become somewhat more centrist, while retaining worker support and the

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party-union link. By the heritage period, the veto of the armed forces against such parties leads to repeated coups and eventually to a military effort to reshape the political system altogether.

The best tribute to such an impressive work is to engage it in argumentation from within its own analytical premises. For lack of space, I will take issue with the Colliers only on four points.

First, the choice of critical junctures is at times arbitrary. The decision to declare the Chilean incorporation over in 1931, for example, seriously distorts the analysis: Chile is made to look artificially like Brazil. As the Colliers recognize empirically but not analytically, state-sponsored official unionism in Chile collapsed shortly after 1931, whereas such unionism endured for decades in Brazil. In Chile in the 1930s, parties with strong working-class appeal became legal and grew rapidly. The Popular Front won the 1938 presidential elections; Chilean labor unions founded a strong autonomous confederation. This is a far cry from Brazil. In terms of the Colliers' logic, whatever similarity they eventually find between Chile and Brazil should not be explained as resulting from a similar process of incorporation. The Colliers should have taken the Chilean period of incorporation to the 1938 Popular Front victory to highlight the more complex nature of labor incorporation in Chile, which included (the Colliers are right) a highly statist labor code but also a vigorous political party life. This point can be made more sharply by comparing Chile to Venezuela. The Colliers recognize that Venezuela's incorporation period followed two distinct moments. Appropriately, the Colliers did not claim Venezuela's incorporation ended prior to the electoral mobilization period begun in 1945. Nor should they have stopped the Chilean incorporation prior to Chile's electoral mobilization.

Second, the otherwise useful organization of the material into four pairs leads the Colliers at times to read the history of country A in terms of the history of country B. For example, the following reads the history of Chilean labor politics as if Chile were Brazil: "the political leadership was not willing to mobilize the working class by strengthening and politicizing the union movement" (p. 400). The notion that the Chilean party system lacked conflict-limiting mechanisms, moreover, makes little sense. Chile had had such means; the intellectual task is to explain why they broke down in the short period prior to the 1973 coup. And, despite the Colliers' sustained recognition of the differences between Chilean and Brazilian parties, somehow they insist on not cutting the analytical cord in this pair.

There is also a Venezuelan reading of Mexico. Though the Colliers note that they seek to explain the predominance of center-hugging hegemonic parties, and not democracy, they write about Mexico as if it were a democracy without qualifications. In particular, they discuss the electoral role of the dominant parties in both countries in the same breath. This Venezuelan reading of Mexico is also evident in the omission of any discussion of the major electoral fraud committed in 1940 as President Cárdenas sought to ensure his legacy. The effect is to obscure the means whereby the center has governed these two countries: in

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Venezuela it is a legacy of the incorporation, but in Mexico it is a legacy of the pre-revolutionary Porfiriato. Whatever similarities they find between Venezuela and Mexico cannot be traced to rather different processes of incorporation or of regime procedures to rule.

Third, the approach in pairs also becomes a straight-jacket that prevents the Colliers too often from exploring richer comparisons. Instead of being wedded, for example, to an Argentina-Peru and a Mexico-Venezuela pair, they might have explored the Argentina-Mexico and Peru-Venezuela pairs. Arguably, neither Argentina nor Mexico had real parties of the sort that led the incorporation in Peru and Venezuela. In Argentina and Mexico, a towering figure (Juan Perón and Cárdenas) carried out labor incorporation from the presidency, assisted by a party or movement created from above, and did not hesitate to use authoritarian means to get his way, including tampering with elections. In neither case had incorporation begun from the opposition. In Venezuela and Peru, multiclass parties emerged from sustained political party organizing of the society, operating in each case from years in opposition; in both Venezuela and Peru, the incorporating parties respected the electoral process much more. In terms of the Colliers' logic, whatever similarities they eventually find between Argentina and Peru or between Mexico and Venezuela should not be explained as resulting from similar within-pair processes of incorporation.

Fourth, the outcomes to be explained are difficult to process-trace back to the incorporation. If the points made above are valid, all pairs except Colombia and Uruguay are analytically suspect, and it is unlikely that the processes during the incorporation can be causally related to processes during the legacy.

The problem appears as well with other more specific but important factors. Consider three examples. First, by the account of the Colliers, parties that led the incorporation become more conservative during the aftermath in Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela; these cases cut across all pairs except Brazil-Chile. (I would argue a conservatizing effect also occurred in Chile in the 1930s and 1940s until the Communist party was banned.) Second, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay end with institutional military coups at the end of the heritage period; these cases cut across all pairs except Mexico-Venezuela. Third, at some point the labor movement escapes from the control of the state. The Colliers argue that this is to be expected in the state incorporation (Brazil-Chile) pattern. But such escape is also evident in Colombia, Uruguay, and Peru; these cases cut across all pairs except Mexico-Venezuela. In what way can any of these common outcomes be explained in terms of variance in incorporation patterns?

Despite these criticisms, the Colliers argue subtly with an impressive command of the empirical material and with admirable fairness toward the many traditions of scholarship to which they refer. Their arguments are often persuasive; they reveal relationships hitherto unclear (at least to me). The book displays a stunning integration of theoretical and empirical analysis. It addresses concerns that are central to the social sciences as well as to historiography. Its self-conscious comparative methodological rigor and its substantive focus should give a wide reader-

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ship beyond experts on Latin America. The authors and the publisher should be praised for giving us a book that can be read on different trajectories thanks to their clustering of theoretical and empirical sections. The book has helpful charts, tables, a glossary, a list of abbreviations, eight lists of presidents, a wide-ranging bibliography, and two indexes (one by country and one general). To paraphrase the book's title, this masterful work deserves to shape the intellectual arena for social scientists and historians for years to come.

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Book Reviews

Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration *by Keith L. Shimko. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1991. 288 pp. $37.50.*

By now, few scholars need to be convinced that there are links between a person's image of another country and his or her policy preferences toward it. But the nature of these links and the factors that determine how tight they are need more attention. While Shimko has some difficulty with the former subject, his contribution to the latter is significant. Along the way, he provides a nice summary of the evolution of arms control policy under the Reagan administration and a subtle and intriguing sketch of Ronald Reagan's thinking about Soviet-American relations.

Richard Perle and Casper Weinberger held the classic hardline images of the adversary, seeing the Soviet Union as seeking expansion without limit, backing down only in the face of western firmness, violating every agreement when able to do so, and knowing that the West is not a threat. These items hang together logically, which is not true for the fact that they also saw the Soviet Union as having a significant military lead over the United States. The result of these beliefs was a preference for only air-tight, deeply asymmetrical arms control agreements and a deep skepticism toward the whole negotiating process. Richard Burt and George Shultz, although agreeing that the Soviets would exploit American restraint and respond favorably only to firmness, entertained the possibility of fruitful arms control, because the rest of their image left a bit more room for common interest. Reagan shared the hard-liners' image of the Soviet Union yet proved more open to arms control than they were. When faced by disputes between the two factions in his government, he often compromised. How is this to be explained? The obvious factor is domestic politics, but Shimko shows that there is more to it than this. First, although Reagan generally blamed the cold war on the Soviet Union, "at other times, he spoke of the Soviet-U.S. rivalry as being propelled by *mutual* suspicions" (pp. 217–18; also see p. 236). Second, he did not share the view of Weinberger and Perle that the impact of public opinion

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on democracies made negotiations and arms control inherently dangerous. Shimko also notes the interesting silences in the officials' discussions of the Soviet Union, such as the fact that Burt and Shultz said nothing about how Soviet leaders perceived the United States; Perle said nothing about the motivation for Soviet policy.

Shimko argues that the nature and strength of the relationship between images of the adversary and policy preferences are determined by three factors: characteristics of the image (its density and consistency as well as the specificity with which it leads to conclusions about the policy under consideration); the person's cognitive style (for example, whether an ideologue, an intellectual, or a practical politician); and the person's degree of knowledge and interest. Although these variables are a bit under-conceptualized, this explanatory scheme fits the cases quite well and helps tell us why it is easier to infer preferences from images in the case of Perle and Weinberger than for Burt and Shultz.

As Shimko notes, images not only influence preferences, they also can be influenced by them – that is, they can be rationalizations. But he does not explore this possibility and the associated process of motivated bias as well as he might. He also is less than fully convincing in his argument that the difference between the "offsetting asymmetries" approach and the "equal aggregates" approach constitutes a fundamental divide on arms control issues (pp. 195–97). The argument is intriguing but would need more analysis before it could carry much weight. Finally, the study does not shed much light on how Reagan and colleagues reacted to the enormous changes in the Soviet Union and Soviet policy under Mikhail Gorbachev. In part the reason is that, as Shimko notes, few changes were necessary in American arms control proposals because most of the movement was on the Soviet side. Furthermore, Perle, Weinberger, and Burt left office before some of the more dramatic changes occurred, thus preventing what would have been an interesting experiment.

Images and Arms Control contributes to our knowledge of both of these subjects and sheds light on the policies of the Reagan administration and the elusive thought processes of the president himself. It can be read with profit by all students of American foreign policy and the policy-making process in general.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years *by Thomas Carothers. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991. 309 pp. $29.95.*

The number of book-length studies published since 1979 on U.S.–Central American relations probably amounts to between seven- and nine-hundred. Thomas

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Carothers's volume is one of those that deserves close reading. About half the book deals with South America and the problems of imposing U.S.-style democracy on the southern hemisphere, so the Central American relationships are placed in a broader, instructive perspective. Carothers, moreover, worked in the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser in the mid-1980s (apparently as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow), and then was a guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. He thus saw some policy making from the inside and had access to officials who were willing to discuss policy. One such interview produced a notable Reaganism. According to a participant, during a meeting called to discuss how to remove the stumbling Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, the president looked up and blurted out, "Pinochet saved Chile from Communism, we should have him here on a state visit" (p. 156). After a moment of astonishment, the meeting returned to its original discussion.

Of particular importance, Carothers focuses on the Reagan administration's use of democracy as a diplomatic tool and objective—that is, how the term originated in policy making, how it was applied depending on whether hard-liners or moderates were employing it, and how much it actually affected the development of the more democratic Latin American regimes. On the first point, Carothers notes that officials began to use the term to try to undermine Nicaragua's Sandinista regime after it was clear that other arguments were having little effect on Congress or the American people. Carothers argues persuasively that although some officials came to believe in the virtues of democracy itself, most applied the term, especially in Central America, to put a more attractive face on less lovely motives such as helping free-market authoritarians. (Bolivia, interestingly, is an exception in this regard, because the Reagan hard-liners paid little attention to it, and moderate professionals could take a more enlightened, long-term view.)

On how democracy was applied, Carothers uses the term to sort out the complex factions who struggled over control of Latin American policy. The hard-liners do not appear to advantage, especially when such figures as Alexander Haig, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, and James Theberge are arguing that their favorite generals in Argentina, Chile, or El Salvador should be totally supported, democracy or no.

Carothers is unequivocal in believing that in nearly every instance, U.S. pressures, whether applied by the State Department or the semi-independent National Endowment for Democracy, were not decisive in transforming authoritarian regimes. His argument here is important, nuanced, and persuasive. His book can be read with *Exporting Democracy*, edited by Abraham Lowenthal, as a guide for understanding how U.S. officials used, misused, and manipulated the idea of democracy for ends both good and bad in Latin America. Carothers is also helpful when he explains how we must come to terms with the hubris and lack of historical comprehension that led to the shaping of the concept of democracy in the Reagan administration, if the concept is not to lead us astray about the

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deeper Latin American realities—and about the U.S. power to reshape those realities, especially, as the author emphasizes, at the crucial economic level.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years *by Joseph A. Califano, Jr. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991. 399 pp. $25.00.*

Few of Lyndon Johnson's White House aides had a better vantage point from which to observe that formidable bundle of contradictions than Joseph Califano, his chief domestic policy adviser from June 1965 to January 1969, and later a prominent Washington attorney and secretary of health, education and welfare under Jimmy Carter. Califano wrote at length on Johnson in his memoir of his Carter years (*Governing America*, 1981), but did so mainly to contrast Johnson's mastery of Washington politics with Carter's innocence of what it takes to succeed within the beltway. Here Califano's focus is directly on the prodigiously skillful Johnson, who, of course, can scarcely be said to have made an unqualified success of his presidency.

The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson examines its protagonist mainly by describing the Great Society policy making with which Califano was associated, but with side glances at the Vietnam war that compromised Johnson's domestic programs and brought his presidency to grief. Califano's portrait of Johnson as "brave and brutal, compassionate and cruel, incredibly intelligent and infuriatingly insensitive" (p. 10) is familiar in its larger outlines, but his account adds instructive side-lights to the characterizations of Johnson by other of his aides, such as Jack Valenti, Harry McPherson, George Reedy, and Richard Goodwin. In particular, it documents Johnson's boundless impulse to dominate his associates and through them his larger political environment.

The elemental nature of Johnson's preoccupation with control (often expressed in sexual or scatological terms) brings to mind ethological accounts of male dominance in the animal world. Johnson obliterated the boundaries between public and private space, requiring aides to consult with him while he was in bed with Mrs. Johnson, or dressing, or (as has often been reported) using the toilet. He seemed almost to revel in his demands on associates' time, depriving them of the company of their families and working them to exhaustion. He ordered that a telephone be installed in Califano's bathroom so that he could instantly reply to all presidential calls and instructed Califano to sit in the back row of church so that he could be summoned if needed. While such demands served to advance Johnson's policy aims, they appear to have been grounded in his insecurities and were in many ways counterproductive.

Johnson's main policy concerns were with the Vietnam war, which he reluctantly prosecuted, and the Great Society domestic program, which he sought zealously to bring into being. Although Califano's account of the latter is some-

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what sketchy, his book and the sources it draws on will be a boon to the study of domestic policy making in the 1960s. As Califano notes, he kept hundreds of pages of notes on his countless discussions with Johnson and other contemporary actors. Many of these are fastidiously cited in the careful scholarly apparatus Califano's research assistant Marcel Bryar has appended to the book. More important, with the publication of the book, Califano has deposited his papers in the Johnson Library where they are bound to be the basis of an impressive body of inquiry.

In spite of its rich documentation, Califano's book lacks a quality that would make it of scholarly value in and of itself. It makes literally no reference to other writings on Johnson (including Johnson's memoirs), providing readers with no insight into whether others accept the author's interpretations and conclusions. Still, it prompts reflection on what makes for effective presidential leadership. Few presidents have come as close as Johnson to the ideal presented in Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power* of a chief executive who knows the rules of Washington politics and consistently makes it evident to others in the Washington community that he has the will to act on them. And few have had more of an impact on public policy. Yet much of what made for Johnson's successes contributed to his failures. His hypertrophy of political skill was of a piece with his insensitivity to the substance of policy and its long-run consequences. His will to dominate his associates and adversaries made him vulnerable to disloyalty and retribution. Califano does not explain such paradoxes, but he does help to adumbrate a complex political figure whose historical impact can scarcely be exaggerated.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN
Princeton University

Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics *by Thomas Byrne Edsall with Mary D. Edsall. New York, Norton, 1991. 339 pp. $22.95.*

For those who would understand how and why the Republicans have become the country's majority party in presidential politics, there is no better starting point than this book, nor is there likely to be. It is not only a thoroughly documented campaign-by-campaign history of political events from 1964 through 1990 but also a penetrating and convincing interpretation of the causes and consequences of those events.

The authors have successfully synthesized a mass of data from diverse sources—contemporary news reports, interviews, economic and demographic

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statistics, and analyses by political practitioners, pollsters, other journalists, and social scientists. The bibliography is vast, well digested, skillfully utilized.

The thesis is this: three interacting sets of issues have created the new conservative Republican majority. Central is race; as the Democratic party embraced the black demands for civil rights, many whites concluded that black gains meant white losses and reverse discrimination. As the Democratic espousal of individual rights extended to other minorities—welfare recipients, criminal defendants, prisoners, feminists, homosexuals—voters who saw those groups as threats were alienated. Even the issue of taxation had a racial tinge, because taxes were seen as redistributing wealth from working whites to idle blacks.

Democrats will take little comfort from the book. While crediting the party with high moral principle, the authors are merciless in detailing its mistakes. It permitted itself to be seen as a congeries of "special interest" minority groups. It refused to acknowledge the "burdens and costs" that black equality would impose on whites and "to make adequate efforts to minimize those costs and to distribute them more equitably" (p. 282). It failed to couple welfare rights with reciprocal obligations. It should have thrust more of the burdens and costs on Republican rather than its own constituencies. Now it is a debilitated party, "intellectually fearful, reluctant to engage in the values debate," and bereft of "capacity to learn" (p. 286). Sometimes, however, the authors leave unclear just how the competing demands of whites and blacks could possibly have been reconciled and why the party's decline among whites is not simply the inexorable consequence of morally unavoidable policies.

But Republicans—except for the anything-goes school of party activists—cannot take comfort either. The authors are equally relentless in portraying the GOP as amoral and destructive in its deliberate exploitation of divisive racial issues. Its leaders appear positively conspiratorial in using value issues to win majority support for policies to make the rich richer—against the plain economic interests of the very lower-income former Democrats they recruit.

A questionable tone of finality pervades the book. The Democratic party "no longer has the capacity to establish a reliable national voting majority" (p. 286). That the "top-down" conservative coalition will remain dominant is "guaranteed" (p. 282). The authors do acknowledge that voters hold ambivalent views, but generally those views are portrayed as fixed. And just one line considers the possibility that the focus of politics may shift to economic factors and in so doing restore the old "bottoms-up" (p. 283) Democratic majority. So much for economic determinism in explaining presidential elections.

Nor is there place for random factors and accidents of personality. But suppose Jimmy Carter had possessed a different temperament, which had inspired confidence? Suppose Michael Dukakis had reacted differently when journalist Bernard Shaw asked him how he would react if his wife Kitty were raped? Much evidence and many pundits tell us that presidential elections are now essentially contests between television personalities appealing to voters who pay little heed to party

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identification. What if the Democrats just happen to nominate in 1992 the candidate with superior personal appeal and make fewer campaign blunders?

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST
The Brookings Institution

Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.: The Political Biography of an American Dilemma *by Charles V. Hamilton. New York, Atheneum, 1991. 545 pp. $24.95.*

Charles Hamilton has written a prodigious, balanced, sophisticated, meticulously researched, and exciting biography. In a preface he suggests that Powell's leadership was focused on the American dilemma best described by Gunnar Myrdal—that is, whether in racial matters the nation would follow its creed, defined by Myrdal as Christian ethics and democratic ideals, or hew to existing practice. For Powell, practice was to be attacked in terms of the American creed to insure better institutions in matters of race. He had little faith in the temporizing of liberals, most race leaders, and the black bourgeoisie.

The first chapter of the work describes Powell's fall from political power. Thus the reader knows at the outset that a man who achieved much was destroyed at the end by the racially tainted unconstitutional action of the House of Representatives and the flaws of his own character. A last chapter provides us with Hamilton's judgment of Powell's legacy.

The early history of Powell's career is a case study of mobilization of political power on the local level, a subject of continuing interest to Hamilton. Politics before Powell in New York City was what Martin Kilson has called clientage politics—that is, black politicians as clients of white bosses, most often holding positions as the head of some ancillary organization. By the time Powell was in mid-career, he and Raymond Jones dominated Harlem politics, and Jones was the leader of Tammany Hall.

Starting his career in his father's church, Powell developed for his parishioners new self-reliant, community-building services. A compelling orator, he quickly moved to social action in the community: fair treatment for the few black doctors on the staff of Harlem hospital, fair employment organizations to mount picket lines against offending businesses. Much of Powell's untrustworthy political style may have stemmed, the author admits, from this period, for Powell's campaigns required the alliance of groups with different objectives. Powell was pro-labor but attacked unions with color bars. He utilized the Communist party (CP) but opposed the Stalin-Hitler pact, CP infiltration of black organizations, and CP abandonment of civil rights during World War II.

By 1941 Powell was able to run for the new City Council. In addition to his church with its 13,000 active members, he had a cadre of workers from his campaigns, the support of the American Labor party, and the acquiescence of the national Negro leadership living in Harlem. He won and began to attack

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discrimination in the institutions of the city government, thereby antagonizing Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. In 1942, he and Charles Buchanan became publishers of a new paper, *The People's Voice*, whose editor became Doxey Wilkerson, a self-proclaimed Communist. In 1943 Powell resigned from the City Council to run for Congress, designating Ben Davis, Jr., a Communist, as his successor. Davis won. At that time the CP was an ardent supporter of the war effort.

For a political maverick without a black caucus, Powell's achievements in Congress were considerable: his amendments requiring nondiscrimination attached to all proposals of grants-in-aid to states (opposed by liberals but finally resulting in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); his courageous chairmanship of a subcommittee on the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) in 1949; his exemplary chairmanship of the House Education and Labor Committee at the time of the most fruitful legislation for education in modern times; his actions taken against segregation in congressional facilities and the use of racial epithets on the floor of the House; and his service at the 1955 Bandung Conference.

None of these things was achieved without political cost. His reputation grew for political unreliability; willingness to attack, embarrass, and double-cross political colleagues grew; and the reputation was only partly justified. National Negro leaders knew what they could expect when they used him as a platform participant, and he helped them work both sides of the street. Moreover, in Harlem he had many constituencies to be loyal to. Often his objective was right as in the case of his row with President Harry Truman, who deserted in the Senate the legislation establishing a permanent FEPC (S101) after it had passed the House. Truman's FEPC, an interdepartmental committee to coordinate the congressional requirement of a nondiscrimination clause in all federal contracts, was a sham.

Powell was condemned for bolting the Democratic party to support Dwight Eisenhower, but he did this only after Adlai Stevenson had twice given anti-civil rights speeches to black and liberal audiences, the first in Los Angeles and the second in Minneapolis. Powell's relations with Maxwell Rabb, Eisenhower's man on race matters, were productive, while those with Truman's Philleo Nash were sterile.

The denouement of Powell's career is given in painful detail by Hamilton: womanizing, junketing, tax problems, salary kickbacks, political unreliability, publicly displayed defiance of the norms of congressional behavior, the commission of libel in a good cause, cynicism, the unconstitutional and partly racially motivated refusal of the House to seat him, terminal illness. If Powell was a cynic in the end, then he became one in his struggle against American practice, for he began as an optimist who believed that our institutions could be changed when others were defeated in spirit or in action. It was clear that he was bitter about being bedevilled by the game he knew so well. The author does not deal explicitly with the psychological factors that may have shaped such a vital, talented and complex man; but he displays the pictures, presents the data, and recounts the history. As to legacy, since the publication of this volume, Adam Clayton Powell

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IV has taken his seat in another new City Council, looking the spitting image of his father.

JOHN A. DAVIS
The City College of New York

The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government *by James A. Morone. New York, Basic Books, 1990. 402 pp. $22.95.*

To understand the crisis of governability in the contemporary United States, James Morone tells us, we must look across all of U.S. political development—from the revolution of 1775–1789, through the rise of Jacksonian democracy, the Progressive movement, the New Deal, and the civil rights movement, to present-day disputes over governmental involvement in medical care. From then to now, Americans dread governmental authority while yearning for democratic community.

In each period populist-communitarian movements aspired to vest political authority "in the people themselves" as a "single, united political entity" dwelling in communities (p. 5). What Morone calls the "politics of the democratic wish" emerges whenever there are sociopolitical stalemates within U.S. liberalism. Calls to "the people" result in attempts to create reformed governmental institutions that focus "protest movements on organizational matters within the American state" (p. 12). New groups and bureaucracies come into politics, but communitarian hopes are never realized. In due course, matters settle back into a rearranged and ever-more-bureaucratic "liberal equilibrium" (p. 13).

Clearly organized and vividly written, *The Democratic Wish* will engage the minds and passions of many undergraduates, as well as those of scholars and members of the educated public. While historians are likely to think that Morone is using old-fashioned ideas (for example, how can one speak of a unitary "Progressive movement" and how can one leave women's movements out of an analysis of this period?), his dialectical model certainly accommodates many interesting stories about American politics. Reading this book was enjoyable. Yet the fuzziness of the argument repeatedly left me puzzled.

Why were certain key periods of political transformation left out? Morone blithely sets aside all wars, arguing that he will focus only on domestic politics. Yet popular political mobilizations for the Civil War may fit his domestic reform model better than any other in American history. Calls were made to the entire southern and northern peoples. Efforts at centralization and bureaucratization were fueled by unprecedented popular participation that occurred through elections, voluntary groups, and military action. And the end result was a restored liberal-federal U.S. state that frustrated the hopes of northern reformers as well as southern separatists. The various populist movements that agitated for new governmental regulations (for example, railroads) after the Civil War also fit Morone's scheme, but they do not appear in the book.

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Parts of the New Deal, on the other hand, are included, even though appeals to communitarian democracy were not an important aspect of Franklin D. Roosevelt's state-building efforts. Morone's attempt to analyze the Wagner Act, which used state coercion to promote independent labor unions, is not at all convincing. If New Deal governmental interventions to legalize labor unions had really been about consensual representation of all the people, the legislative victory would not have gone to the Wagner Act but to a competing proposal for the proportional representation of both independent and company-sponsored unions. If Morone's model has any analytical bite, the New Deal in general—and the pivotal Wagner Act in particular—remain unexplained by it. Indeed, much of the civil rights movement escapes the model as well. During both the New Deal and the pre-1964 civil rights movement, the federal government responded to sharp class and racial conflicts; and interventions were devised to empower not the people in general, but formerly subordinated and excluded workers and blacks.

In a book that places so much emphasis on popular political participation, why is there so little nuanced discussion of its various forms and consequences? For example, Morone seems to define nonelectoral popular participation as street demonstrations, understood as in tension with bureaucracy. But many social groups took part in U.S. state formation through federations of local voluntary associations. And some of the most effective agencies of the federal government institutionalized alliances with widespread voluntary groups and cooperated with them to nourish certain kinds of bureaucratization and centralized policy making. The alliances of the U.S. Department of Agriculture with the Grange and later with the Farm Bureau Federation, the U.S. Pensions Bureau with the Grand Army of the Republic, and the U.S. Children's Bureau with the General Federation of Women's Clubs and other women's associations—all exemplify a distinctively U.S. pattern of state-building that is entirely overlooked by Morone.

This historical journey is supposed to clarify possibilities for the American future. But does it? In his final pages, Morone suggests that there is little hope for effective governance today unless Americans can somehow leap out of the dialectic of democracy versus governmental authority that he sees as the essence of the past. Alas, this offers little realistic guidance. Perhaps we would have learned more about alternative possibilities for the future if Jim Morone's imaginative book had offered us a more rigorous and nuanced analysis of various patterns in the U.S. past.

THEDA SKOCPOL
Harvard University

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In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: The Political Roots of American Economic Decline *by William S. Dietrich. University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991. 343 pp. $24.50.*

This book has its place in a rapidly growing literature on U.S.–Japan economic competition. Dietrich's basic theme is "Why can't the Americans be more like the Japanese?" Japanese culture, industrial structure and policy, and governmental institutions, he argues, are *the* model for a successful modern democratic economy.

The arguments on U.S. competitiveness are familiar—low savings rates, loss of America's technological edge, and failed trade policies. What is different about this book is Dietrich's solution. The key to Japan's success, he argues, is a strong, professional central bureaucracy that can protect the public good against the vested interests that dominate parliamentary politics. American political institutions in contrast have systematically undermined the higher civil service through the machinations of political appointees in the bureaucracy and micro-management by the vested interests in Congress. Such a weakened bureaucracy cannot effectively pursue a state-managed industrial and trade policy. Without such a policy, he concludes, the United States cannot compete in the modern world.

The problem, Dietrich argues, is persistent individualism and antistatism in American political culture, which weaken government. He revisits most of the old cliches, including Jacksonian democracy and the frontier thesis. By their omission, we must assume that waves of immigration, the civil rights movement, the Vietnam war, or the current massive entitlement programs have had no impact on that culture.

Much current news is at odds with Dietrich's depiction of the Japanese political economy. Scandals remind us of the close historical connection between the Japanese civil service and the business community; and recent headlines report that Japanese firms are out of control. One now reads that a slump has hit Japanese electronics, that the Tokyo stock market is in trouble, and that the Japanese consumer will no longer tolerate high consumer prices in the interests of export growth. Students of the Japanese economy are already reporting evidence of significant restructuring of the Japanese economy.

For the United States, Dietrich fails to distinguish the effects of a restructuring of the world economy, resulting at least in part from successful U.S. policies of encouraging trade liberalization and economic growth, and the specific problems attributable to U.S. economic policy. For example, he argues that manufacturing capacity is the key to technological leadership and that the loss of competitiveness in steel, autos, and consumer electronics is the death knell of the U.S. economy. He fails to notice, however, that the share of capital goods in the U.S. manufacturing product has increased substantially over the past two decades and that capital goods exports have risen to 40 percent of U.S. exports. Further, a significant part of the decline of U.S. exports in the 1980s was due to the fall off of capital goods exports to Latin America caused by economic stagnation in the

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region. While there is obviously much room for improvement in U.S. economic policy, should we seek significant changes in the political system to support an outdated industrial structure? Twenty years ago the leading role of the civil service in the economy was doctrine among development theorists. However, experience has suggested that sound macroeconomic policies are more likely to provide incentives for investment, innovation, and efficiency than bureaucratic management.

It would be hard to find any historical period that would contradict Dietrich's observation that "[t]he forces of selfish and uncontrolled pursuit of private interest are steadily advancing against the weakened and demoralized defenders of institutional authority and the public good" (p. 257). His solution is to replace 2,000 political appointees in the national government with a top professional bureaucracy on the one hand and to drastically reduce the numbers of congressional committees and staff on the other. Whatever the merits of these proposals, it is hard to see how this would be possible in the political environment that Dietrich describes. It is equally hard to understand how these particular interventions would necessarily produce the centralized, ordered policy environment he desires.

NORMAN K. NICHOLSON
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International Center for Self-Governance

The Middle East from the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada *edited by Robert O. Freedman. Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1991. 441 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95.*

The papers contained in this collection were originally written in 1988 for the fifth in a series of conferences on the regional politics of the Middle East held at Baltimore Hebrew University. As with the proceedings of the four earlier conferences, which were also edited by Robert Freedman, the papers in this volume are of uniformly high quality. Most of the papers are case studies examining the regional foreign policies of the two superpowers or the major Middle Eastern states during the mid- and late 1980s, a period in which the region experienced considerable turbulence and change. Though much has changed in the region since these papers were written, they provide valuable accounts of the period under study and a useful basis for understanding what has occurred there in subsequent years.

The first two papers in the collection provide insightful analyses of Soviet and United States policy toward the Middle East in the mid- and late 1980s. Freedman gives a detailed account of Soviet policy toward the region during the first half of the Gorbachev era, focusing especially on the Soviet Union's attempts to involve itself in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and its efforts to undermine U.S.

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relations with Iran and certain Arab states. His main argument is that Soviet policy toward the region continued to be expansionistic and antagonistic toward the United States in this period, despite the new rhetoric and changes in other policy areas undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev. Freedman provides exhaustive evidence in support of this surprising conclusion, implying that a more benign, cooperative Soviet approach toward the region began only in the later Gorbachev years. Barry Rubin provides a useful account of U.S. policy toward the Middle East during the second Reagan term, focusing especially on the covert U.S. arms sales to Iran, U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf war, and U.S. efforts to promote Arab-Israeli peace talks. He concludes that U.S. interests in the region remained reasonably secure despite the many blunders of the Reagan administration, due mainly to the preponderance of U.S. military and economic power.

The collection also contains papers on Western European policy toward the Middle East and the foreign policy and domestic politics of Iran, Iraq, Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, the Sudan, Turkey, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Particularly notable among these papers is Helena Cobban's study of Palestinian politics, which examines the PLO's relations with the major Arab states and provides a very insightful account of the origins of the Palestinian *intifada* in the occupied territories. Also notable is Adam Garfinkle's study of Jordanian foreign policy, which examines the many domestic and foreign constraints bearing on Jordanian policy and their effect on King Hussein's relations with the PLO and other actors.

Perhaps the most interesting paper in the collection is Jerrold Green's provocative study of how the Iran-Iraq war affected intra-Arab politics. Green argues that the dire threat posed by Iran during the war promoted Arab unity but also distracted the major Arab states from their conflict with Israel. In the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and in light of Israel's creeping annexation of the occupied territories, this alarmed and emboldened the Palestinians, leading to the *intifada*. Of course, much the same occurred during Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the ensuing war in early 1991. Green's analysis is a cogent illustration of how external actors and occurrences have repeatedly disrupted intra-Arab politics and aggravated the plight of the Palestinians. One can only hope that the end of the cold war and moderation in post-Khomeini Iran will reduce the impact of external factors on the Arab world and foster the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

MARK J. GASIOROWSKI
Louisiana State University

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The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change *edited by Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991. 208 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $14.95.*

It has almost become cliche to assert that events in Europe are moving at a speed beyond our capacity for understanding. It is to a collective sigh of relief, then, that Harvard political scientists Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann have produced a collection of essays explaining recent changes in the functioning of the European Communities. The contributions by Keohane, Hoffmann, Andrew Moravcsik, Peter Ludlow, Wolfgang Wessels, Shirley Williams, and Federico Mancini touch on all aspects of the "New Europe" from its theoretical underpinnings to the Single European Act, the Commission, Council, Parliament, and Court of Justice. The scope of the book is ambitious, and despite its small size it is doubtless a major contribution to the literature in the field.

The essays are well balanced and well paired. Keohane, Hoffmann, and Moravcsik, academics geographically separated from events in Europe, skillfully demonstrate the continuing insights offered by the theory of regional integration. Borrowing from different analytical traditions, Keohane and Hoffmann combine a realist notion of "pooled sovereignty" (p. 7) with functionalist ideas of "supranationality" (p. 15) and "spill-over" (p. 18) to explain the post-1985 resurgence of Europe. Moravcsik, focusing on the negotiation of the Single European Act, more clearly establishes the national state as motor for European integration.

Ludlow and Wessels are closer to the fray. Writing in Brussels, Ludlow combines the insights of a practiced observer with an historian's grasp of detail to provide a remarkably readable account of the European legislative process. His approach is decidedly centralist and implicitly respectful of the original federalists and the ultimate "vindication" (p. 117) of their designs. Wessels, in Bonn, suggests a more nation-centric understanding of Europe. In contrast to Ludlow, he sees the imprint of national politics in the Council of Ministers, the committees that serve the Commission and, particularly, in the commissioners themselves.

Williams and Mancini share the benefit of experience. A cofounder of the British Social Democratic party, Williams brings the sensitivity of a legislator to bear on the problems of legitimacy and representation. Her concern is that while European integration weakens national parliamentary oversight, there is little movement to increase representative input at the supranational level. Mancini, a judge on the European Court of Justice, weighs the advantages of progress in integration against the danger of "judicial activism" (p. 189). Americans accustomed to the debate over substantive due process and the protection of civil liberties will find his argument surprisingly familiar, if not ironic.

If this collection has a shortcoming, it is a general failure to answer the question set out by its editors. None of the essays can truly be said to account for the "pooling of sovereignty and the unexpected institutional changes that have accompanied the process" (p. 8). None, moreover, provides a coherent theory for understanding and extrapolating on recent events in Europe. But perhaps what they do show is more important.

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Taken as a whole, the book demonstrates how observers with different training and experience struggle to make sense of a changing situation. The obstacles they face are the limitations of our theoretical language: words and ideas too overloaded with implication and too burdened by assumption to allow for clear analysis. Although without providing a solution, Keohane and Hoffmann have persuasively identified the problem. Their book is a strong signal that the time has come for theory to catch up to the reality of Europe. It is also an essential point of departure for anyone who would strive to accomplish that task.

ERIK JONES
The Johns Hopkins University

FDR's Fireside Chats *edited by Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. 315 pp. $24.95.*

Power corrupts, the maxim goes, but the proper use of power is what political leadership is all about. Among U.S. presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt stands near the top in asserting the prerogatives of the office. That he was able to do so, say Russell Buhite and David Levy, is less a tribute to his intellect and will than to his extraordinary skills as a communicator. In support of the thesis they offer the complete collection of his radio addresses to the nation, dubbed "fireside chats" in an early CBS publicity release and so labeled ever since.

It is an unassuming, low-key endeavor that provides a chronological tableau of the Roosevelt presidency from the bank crisis of 1933 almost to the Yalta conference of World War II. A wealth of significant twentieth-century American history is packed into those years.

The editors set the stage for two acts in the FDR presidency. The first act is almost entirely domestic in content. It covers his first- and second-term efforts to pull the American economy out of the ditch and rewrite the book on the government's role in the economy. The second act deals with FDR on the world stage, leading the United States into strong support of the nations fighting the Axis powers and then into open, triumphant conflict.

Each chat is preceded by a brief stage setting. The commentary is informed and nonpartisan. The weaknesses of FDR's positions and sometimes the ultimate failure of his efforts, especially in his domestic agenda, are noted. But this is not analysis of the merits of the New Deal and the federal initiatives Roosevelt launched. The emphasis is on style, not substance.

Roosevelt detractors, of course, are quick to dismiss his public persona as all smile and cigarette holder, with the ideas coming from a devious brain trust and put into words by the talents of Samuel Rosenman, Robert Sherwood, and Archibald MacLeish, among others. The historical record lends support to this position, yet Buhite and Levy refute the notion that FDR was merely a speech-delivery vehicle.

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His writers—perhaps a dozen in all—did draft speeches and provide eloquent lines, but Roosevelt's style was his own and he did not hesitate to impose it, altering or eliminating even the prize prose of his helpers. What emerged on the radio waves was FDR one-on-one with the ordinary American citizen.

Through these direct communications with the people as well as his expert manipulation of print journalists in cozy news conferences, Roosevelt led the United States and an often balky Congress through monumental domestic policy changes and to victory in a world war that the nation long and stubbornly avoided.

Almost a half century after his death, there is—among Democrats at least—a longing for another FDR to lead the nation out of its currently perceived wilderness. The desire is understandable; the hope may be misplaced.

What comes through—startlingly—in a reading of the fireside chats is the degree to which our political culture has changed. Roosevelt could summon a nation to accept hardship and sacrifice. He could challenge capital AND labor AND the farmer to meet their obligations to the greater general welfare. And he could acknowledge the road ahead would be long and difficult. Yet, he could inspire hope and effort.

Does the language of leadership in 1992 evoke any of these images? Is the American electorate, individually and collectively, prepared to hear and welcome such words? Perhaps some pollster could take a reading on FDR's approach to the nation's problems, updated for 1992. Odds on, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, pursuing such quaintly old-fashioned themes, wouldn't get his own party's nomination, let alone win a general election.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

Counsel to the President: A Memoir *by Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke. New York, Random House, 1991. 704 pp. $25.00.*

As an informal or formal adviser to Democratic presidents from Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter, Clark Clifford was at or very near the center of power in Washington for more than three decades. His memoir thus comprises an interesting and most useful account of the workings of the presidency and the operation of the American political system during the era of the cold war.

A lawyer by trade, Clifford appears to have prepared the volume with the care that he might have given a case to be argued before the Supreme Court. He took the time to supplement his personal papers and refresh his memory by reading in published sources, talking with former colleagues, and even doing some research in unpublished materials in the relevant presidential libraries. The result is a memoir rich in detail and filled with shrewd observations and revealing insights about the people with whom the author worked and the events with which he was involved. Like him, the volume has an air of authoritativeness about it.

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Fittingly, for a book published in 1991, the year the cold war ended, much of the volume concerns the four-decade conflict with the Soviet Union. Like Dean Acheson, Clifford was present at the creation of the post-World War II containment policy and the national security state that was its instrument. He goes over generally familiar ground in tracing the origins of the containment policy, in which, with the Clifford-Elsey Report, he played a key role. He adds new and useful material on the top-level negotiations on unification of the armed services, creation of the Defense Department, and establishment of a central intelligence agency.

Ironically, Clifford was also present, as Lyndon Johnson's secretary of defense, at the first great crisis of America's postwar hegemony—the fallout from the Tet Offensive of 1968. Perhaps surprisingly, for someone most often identified with the Truman administration, roughly one-third of his memoir deals with the Vietnam war, and more than half of this material concerns 1968, a time that he admits was the most difficult of his life, a year that by the recollection of his secretary lasted five years.

Clifford's account of the months after Lyndon Johnson's 31 March 1968 speech, a neglected period in the history of the war, is especially valuable and important. He recounts in considerable detail the bitter conflict between those like himself and Averell Harriman, who wanted to extricate the United States from a war they regarded as unwinnable, and those like Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, who clung to the original goal of an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam and insisted on staying the course. He laments Johnson's unwillingness or inability to decide between his advisers and his continued, desperate, and ultimately futile and tragic search for a consensus that could only prolong the bloody stalemate in Vietnam.

While acknowledging his own and the nation's mistakes in Vietnam, Clifford defends the larger containment policy that he helped to shape and from which the Vietnam commitment derived. "In my years in Washington this was the most enduring event with which I was associated," he concludes. "Its consequences and its legacy would keep the fires of freedom burning until communism reached the point of collapse from within" (p. 661).

Whatever the validity of this judgment, Clark Clifford's excellent memoir will remain an indispensable source for understanding the men who created this policy and the political system in which they operated.

GEORGE C. HERRING
University of Kentucky

Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908–1960 *by Robert Dallek. New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. 721 pp. $30.00.*

Lyndon Johnson presents a daunting challenge to a biographer. Despite his intelligence, incredible energy, and shrewd political insight, LBJ's vanity, arro-

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gance, and crudity made him an unattractive human being. The very scale of his ambition and opportunism creates a certain fascination, yet offers little one can admire. Johnson, however, had enormous impact on twentieth-century American life as the most powerful majority leader the Senate has ever seen and as a president who was responsible both for the legislative triumphs of the Great Society and the debacle in Vietnam.

Robert Dallek meets the challenge by employing the traditional tools of the political biographer—intensive research in the documentary record as well as in the large body of memoir and biographical writing on Johnson, supplemented by limited and careful use of interviews and oral histories. The result is the fullest, most comprehensive, and most reliable account in print of Johnson's life, from his boyhood in the Texas hill country through his domination of the Senate in the 1950s. As an historian, Dallek is able to relate LBJ to the larger themes of the twentieth century—to the New Deal reforms, to the interventionist response to aggression abroad, to the growing demand for racial justice in American society. He presents Johnson as a liberal nationalist dedicated to relying on an active federal government to help propel the backward South into the mainstream of American life.

Where Dallek has the greatest difficulty is squaring Johnson's inordinate ambition and willingness to use any means to achieve his goals with his portrait of him as a constructive political leader. The author falls back on the phrase "self-serving altruist" (p. 174) to describe the blend of opportunism and genuine public service that he feels mark Johnson's actions, from the building of the dams on the Colorado River to the passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. In Johnson's efforts to achieve economic progress in Texas and to persuade the South to overcome its debilitating legacy of racial inequality, Dallek sees the essential justification for the often underhanded means that LBJ employed. Without pleading the case for Johnson, he does present him as a complex and many-sided man whose political career combined both self-promotion and substantial benefits to the less fortunate in society.

Although Dallek is generally convincing in his portrait of Johnson as a flawed but effective political leader, at times the presentation seems to call out for a more decisive judgment. Dallek defends LBJ's tactics in passing a watered-down civil rights measure in 1957 as an important precedent for more significant legislation to follow. Yet in retrospect, it would appear that the 1957 Civil Rights Act did far more for Lyndon Johnson's growing presidential ambitions than it did for the cause of racial justice. He knew he had to change his image from that of a regional politician into a national figure; sponsoring historic legislation that in fact did very little to end segregation in the South proved to be a crucial step on his path to the White House.

In a larger sense, much of the good that Johnson did seems to have been incidental to his intense and relentless quest for power. Any overall evaluation of the relationship between Johnson's personal ambitions and his desire to serve the nation must depend on an accounting of his presidential years. We must thus

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wait for Dallek's second volume to discover his final evaluation of one of the most intriguing of all twentieth-century American political leaders. But until then, we are all indebted to him for providing us with such a balanced and thoughtful account of Johnson's rise to national prominence.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected *by Earl Black and Merle Black. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992. 400 pp. $29.95.*

The title and subtitle divulge the book's thesis. It is about the role of the South in American presidential politics since the replacement there of Democratic by Republican hegemony. As the authors put it: "A united South is the greatest regional prize in modern presidential politics. Sweeping the region provides a candidate with more than half—54 percent—of the minimum electoral votes necessary for victory" (p. 33).

The largest part of the book is devoted to the history of the South in American presidential politics. Rather than tell the story in one long chronology, the Blacks divide it topically—chapters on presidential primaries in each party, each party's nominations, the general election campaigns, transformations in the southern presidential electorate. As always, southern politics is entertaining even when it is not especially edifying, and the Blacks are sure-footed guides through its many terrains. Indeed, these are the best parts of the book—skillful and readable political history studded with telling illustrative detail.

Beyond the political history, the book is more problematical. Too much of the analysis or explanation is superficial. "What the Democrats need," the authors prescribe, "are extraordinarily skilled candidates who generate enthusiasm among the party's two essential groups, blacks and core white Democrats, but who are also attractive to the South's swing white, the conservative white Democrats, and moderate independents" (p. 270). Alternatively, the Republican party "will be open to challenge if and when the Democratic alternative seems preferable to most black voters and to a large majority of whites" (p. 350). There are unhappily too many other examples of similar pseudoanalysis.

Missing is a textured analysis that would go beyond historic voting trends and aggregates of states, races, and partisans. One wants, for example, fuller treatment of the impacts of economic issues, group politics, population changes, and personalism in southern politics. And what of the divergence between party coalitions in presidential and congressional voting? The South is after all the prime example of split ticket voting in national elections.

Moreover, the thesis of the book presumes a largely static view of southern politics. The authors do discuss some conditions under which the southern hegemony might vanish, but there is little attention to past and present volatility

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in the region's politics. As to that volatility, one need only mention names such as Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, David Duke, Pat Buchanan, and Ross Perot. Twenty years of conservative power are not forever. Some of us, indeed, can even remember when the feared adjective in American politics was not the "l" word but the "c" word.

Finally, the authors' point of view is unapologetically southern. The racial issue is handled with very great restraint and an occasional euphemism. "Southern whites unhappy with Democratic civil rights policies, however, do not have to forgo voting, for the Republican party offers a more conservative alternative" (p. 355). More broadly, southerners are wise and judicious in the face of Democratic programs. The liberalism of Humphrey and Mondale appeared to be "radical departures from common sense to most southern white voters" (p. 338). Perhaps after years of Southbashing we deserve another viewpoint.

All this aside, readers will find important issues and ironies to meditate on here. The central irony, of course, is that at a time of declining regionalism, the country's one identifiable region finds its regionalism enhanced by an anachronistic Electoral College and by the very national sorting out of liberal and conservative loyalties that marks the decline of regionalism. Behind the irony is the central issue: the nature and vitality of two-party electoral competition. Every reader will have to wrestle with it here.

FRANK SORAUF
University of Minnesota

Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–1990 *by David R. Mayhew. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1991. 228 pp. $25.00.*

David R. Mayhew's study of divided government in the United States in the years since World War II, like his earlier work on competition in congressional elections (*Congress: The Electoral Connection*) will stand for years as a classic. Divided government, in which one of the major political parties controls the White House and the other the Congress, has become the norm in the last forty years. Scholars and thoughtful practitioners from Woodrow Wilson to Lloyd Cutler and James Sundquist have decried the frequency of divided government, claiming that it leads to inefficient governing, ineffective policies, a falloff in the passage of necessary and significant legislation, and a decrease in the amount of careful legislative oversight of the executive.

Mayhew counters that these claims are wrong. Using careful, detailed research and innovative methods, he develops an exhaustive list of highly publicized investigations and important legislative achievements. In each case he justifies his criteria for inclusion. An investigation was included "if it generated a specified kind of content [committee-based charge of misbehavior against the executive branch, or an executive response to such a charge] in one or more *New York*

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Times front-page stories, on at least twenty days (not necessarily consecutive), during any Congress between 1946 and 1990" (p. 9). Thirty-one investigations met these criteria, and many of them are discussed in detail.

Laws (267 separate acts) were considered significant if they met a series of tests involving both contemporary and retrospective judgments. Mayhew's description of his research techniques and the lists he generated would be enough to command that every graduate student read this book. His knowledge is encyclopedic; and his methods are models of thoroughness mixed with appropriate cautions.

Once Mayhew has provided the lists of investigations and major acts of Congress, he demonstrates that they were just as likely to happen during periods of unified government as during periods of divided government. The sheer volume of his evidence and the power of his arguments make it virtually impossible to refute Mayhew's conclusion.

However, the book goes further to explain the findings. Mayhew posits three possible explanations of activity unrelated to divided government: finding some alternative pattern that might cause variation (for example, the cycle of presidential elections); a constancy of activity in all two-year periods (for example, one caused by a pattern of when laws expire and need reauthorization); or compensation (for example, responding to situations with increased activity). He goes on to explore these counterpatterns in depth, looking at other explanations for activity noted—electoral incentives, presidential leadership, broad congressional majorities, external events, issue cleavages within the political elite, and public moods. In each case Mayhew is careful not to claim more than his data allow, but in each case the conclusion in clear: divided government alone does not determine the amount or the effectiveness of policy making in the United States.

Mayhew concludes with a brief attempt to quantify the contributions of each of the factors he has noted to the patterns he has observed before he turns to counter the arguments of the final doubters—those who claim that this may all be well and good, but we would have had better laws, more coherent policies, more effective administration, more successful foreign policies, or policies that are fairer to those at the lower economic strata of society without divided government. Mayhew refutes each claim's best case with contemporary counterexamples.

At the end, one is left to marvel at the breadth of Mayhew's knowledge, at the skill of his analysis, and at the clarity of his argumentation. This is a work to read and reread and to keep close at hand for constant reference.

L. SANDY MAISEL
Colby College

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Senate Elections and Campaign Intensity *by Mark C. Westlye. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 265 pp. $38.50.*

Our understanding of Senate elections, because of the lack of appropriate data, has always lagged behind our understanding of House elections. Westlye, with an impressive compilation of statewide polling data and data about campaign coverage in the press, has successfully narrowed this gap. He illustrates the importance of campaign intensity for explaining vote choice in Senate elections. Although conventional wisdom suggests that all Senate campaigns are intense affairs, Westlye shows that about half of all races are low-key contests where entrenched incumbents face largely unknown challengers. Using information from *Congressional Quarterly* as well as spending figures, Westlye categorizes 57 percent of the races from 1968–1984 as hard fought, while 43 percent were categorized as low key.

The intensity of the race is important, Westlye explains, because campaign intensity is related to the amount of information available about the competing candidates. As the level of information increases, the influence of party and incumbency decreases, while that of ideology, issues, and other campaign factors increase.

Westlye does find evidence for a relationship between intensity and voting behavior. First, he shows that the amount of campaign information available in state newspapers is related to the intensity of the race. Coverage of low-key races is scant and comparable to the level of coverage found in House campaigns. Hard-fought races, on the other hand, generate a great deal more press attention.

Second, and for much of the remainder of the book, Westlye looks at whether the impact of statewide factors (for example, partisan distribution) and voter predispositions (for example, ideology) vary with the intensity of the race. Westlye finds, for example, that party and incumbency cues are more important in low-key races, while issues and ideology are more influential in hard-fought campaigns. Yet, the evidence, almost always presented in bivariate form, is not as impressive as it could be. A more sophisticated analysis with additional controls would have been useful.

Westlye's book, although an important and useful contribution to the literature on congressional elections, does have some limitations. First, Westlye conceptualizes campaign intensity as a dichotomy between low-key and hard-fought races. Yet, it is not clear why this simple dichotomy is more useful or more realistic than an interval level measure of campaign intensity. Second, some of Westlye's analysis seems unnecessarily dated. Even though the book was published in 1991, 1984 is the last election to be analyzed. For some of the analysis (see Chapter 5), inclusion of recent elections may have been a reasonable and useful addition. Similarly, the book fails to incorporate recent and relevant studies. For example, in the conclusion of the book, Westlye recommends an examination of the factors that are related to the the emergence of a quality challenger. Yet there is a growing literature on precisely this question, beginning about 1987. Finally, the author

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fails to mention an important new data source that will help answer some of the important questions raised in his book: the 1988/1990 National Election Studies' Senate Election Study.

Third, the organization of the book is somewhat confusing. In particular, Westlye has a detailed and interesting discussion of the importance of divisive primaries in Chapter 8. Yet it is not clear why this chapter follows chapters that examine the importance of campaign intensity on voters' attitudes in general elections. Instead, primary divisiveness may be a cause of campaign intensity and, therefore, should be discussed earlier in the book.

Yet even with these limitations, this is an important book that should be read by scholars interested in congressional campaigns. The theoretical discussion concerning campaign intensity, along with the detailed analysis of newspaper content and Senate survey data, make this book an important contribution to the congressional campaign literature.

KIM FRIDKIN KAHN
Arizona State University

Congress and Nuclear Weapons *by James M. Lindsay. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 205 pp. $29.50.*

From the onset of the nuclear age until the late 1960s or so, Congress rarely effectively challenged or for that matter even seriously examined the nuclear weapons strategies and weapons procurement programs developed by the executive branch. In the last two decades, however, Congress has played a much more active role, severely constraining the antiballistic missile program of the Nixon administration in the early 1970s, the B-1 bomber and MX missile programs in the late 1970s, and the Reagan administration's antisatellite and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programs in the 1980s.

As James Lindsay points out, somewhat surprisingly the newly-important role of Congress in nuclear weapons policy has not received much scholarly recognition or analysis: "most of the classic works on Congress and defense are more than two decades old and badly out of date" (p. xi). Lindsay has filled this gap admirably with an important book that is persuasive in its analysis, judicious in its conclusions, and generally well written.

Lindsay, who teaches political science at the University of Iowa, examines four case studies in which Congress has played a significant role: the antisatellite weapons program and the MX, Trident, and Pershing II missile programs. His research is based primarily on empirical analyses of committee and floor voting supplemented by extensive interviews with members of Congress, congressional staff members, and Defense Department officials.

The heart of the book is an examination of three different theories—or what Lindsay calls "perspectives" or "conceptual lenses"—on congressional voting be-

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havior. The first theory, labeled by Lindsay as "the deferential lens," holds that members of Congress routinely defer to the executive branch on nuclear weapons acquisition issues. The second, or "parochial lens," contends that members evaluate weapons systems in terms of how the programs affect the economic interests of their constituents. And the third theory, "the policy lens," holds that the most important explanation of congressional voting on nuclear weapons issues is the substantive policy preferences and opinions of each member.

As Lindsay points out, the conventional wisdom—largely based on unsystematic anecdotal evidence—holds that members usually vote the economic interests of their constituencies. However, he argues, statistical studies have repeatedly found that constituency interests fail to accurately predict or account for congressional voting.

As for congressional deference, it was indeed the case that prior to 1968 Congress was generally deferential to the executive branch on issues of nuclear weapons and strategies. However, Lindsay finds that congressional deference has dramatically diminished in the past two decades. Lindsay's most important argument, therefore, is that since the late 1960s the most important explanation of congressional voting on nuclear weapons is the personal preferences or ideologies of individual members. Deference is no longer routine; doves tend to vote against nuclear weapons even if they are manufactured in their states or districts, and hawks tend to vote for them even if there are few economic benefits to their constituents. To be sure, Lindsay notes, on other defense-related issues—such as the production of conventional weapons and especially the potential closing of military bases—parochial concerns are considerably more important, undoubtedly because the economic stakes for constituents are higher. Therefore, the political costs of voting against constituent interests would be substantially higher.

The author's overall conclusion is that neither the deferential, parochial, or policy "lenses"—or theories, as I would prefer—explain how Congress decides all defense issues. Each explains congressional decision making on some issues for some time periods, but it is substantive policy preferences or general hawk-dove orientations that best explain congressional voting on nuclear weapons issues. As a result, the central reason for the new assertiveness of Congress on these questions in the past two decades is the fracturing the post-World War II cold war consensus that began in the Vietnam war and was extended to nuclear weapons issues thereafter.

JEROME SLATER
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Social Science Quotations, Volume 19 of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences *edited by David L. Sills and Robert K. Merton. New York, Macmillan, 1991. 437 pp. $95.00.*

Polsby's Fourth Law ("Famous sayings migrate into famous mouths") carries with it the strong implication that the proper attribution of an aphorism is no mean feat. Therefore, it must be said immediately that this handsome effort by David L. Sills, indefatigable encyclopedist, in collaboration with his sometime mentor, Columbia's great sociologist Robert K. Merton, deserves the applause and appreciation of all those who, like me, have been nagged at by their inability to find in the literature the precise location of, for example, W. I. Thomas's aphorism, "If men define situations as real they are real in their consequences." This and dozens of other catch phrases, slogans, concepts, and ideas used or mentioned in the social sciences are, like a splendid collection of butterflies, here pinned down and displayed in their original texts and contexts.

The quotations in question are organized by author. A gigantic subject-matter index makes them readily available to users who follow that principle of search, and a section of full citations rounds out an attractive book that follows the generous and highly legible format of Sills's earlier seventeen-volume *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*

Putting together a compilation of quotations must be an extraordinarily difficult thing to do, and so it constitutes no real criticism for a reviewer to point out to readers a few of the singularities that seem to have informed the editors' judgments. In part, my expectations along these lines have been guided by what seemed to me to be certain prejudices displayed by editor Sills in his last supplement to the *International Encyclopedia*, the volume of social science biographies in which the field of public administration was nearly totally neglected, while welterweight sociologists were included to excess. These unfortunate tics have carried over into the new volume in which a reader will not find "A passion for anonymity" (Louis Brownlow), POSDCORB for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick), "The expert should stay on tap; not on top" (Paul Appleby), the "Rule of anticipated reactions" (Carl Friedrich), or Rufus Miles's law: "Where you stand depends upon where you sit." In what looks like a sort of friends-and-neighbors selection procedure (as V. O. Key, unmentioned, might have put it) contributions from persons having connections with Columbia and its sociology department seem unusually well represented. But the ban on public administration is so strict that not even sometime denizens of Fayerweather Hall as distinguished as Richard E. Neustadt ("A government of separated institutions sharing powers") and Wallace S. Sayre ("Academic conflict is particularly vicious because the stakes are so small") make appearances.

Who can blame editors for looking fondly on their own? If I had been at the helm, I should no doubt have made perfectly symmetrical errors, immortalizing Raymond E. Wolfinger ("The plural of anecdote is data"), Aaron Wildavsky

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("Doing better and feeling worse"), and Robert Fried ("What is an army? A kind of political party. What is a party? A kind of army."). All of these worthies received Yale PhDs in political science right around 1960, and two of them teach just a building away from where this is being written.

A certain porosity in criteria of inclusion no doubt contributes to the charm as well as to the individuality of this collection. Sometimes a quotation is included not for the crispness of its formulation but because of the importance of the idea the author is struggling to express. Thus Talcott Parsons, not hitherto known as a coiner of phrases, is given twelve entries, many of which circle about the scientific significance of conceiving of social life as in some sense or other a system. A more rigorous requirement that in order to be included a phrase had to be cogently expressed would no doubt have changed this collection quite a lot without making it more representative of the social sciences.

I do regret, however, the slighting of modern political science. For example, I miss Bernard Cohen's "the press doesn't tell us what to think but what to think *about*," and Richard Fenno's paradox (voters dislike Congress, but like their member of Congress), and "There is no such thing as a free lunch", whose derivation I don't know. (Neither "lunch" nor "free lunch" appears in the index.) "Satisficing" (Herbert Simon) and "Minorities rule" (Robert Dahl) are included, as they should be. I wonder if the political science public administration place at the table was largely preempted by the inclusion of various political actors such as Franklin Roosevelt, Robert Kennedy, and even Otto Kerner, whose ghost-written phrases certainly do not belong to social science or to social thought but rather to social action, as does Winston Churchill's Iron curtain speech and Bernard Baruch's use of the term "cold war" (both included).

A final oddity: occasionally the meat of a quotation consists itself of an embedded quotation from someone other than the attributed author. Thus Paul Lazarsfeld is given as the author of a quotation largely consisting of a quote from T. S. Eliot. Likewise, two psychologists are credited with a quotation consisting mostly of two very clever quotations from Michael Faraday and Benjamin Franklin. Their juxtaposition hardly creates a new and independent statement.

There is, clearly, more than one good way to construct a compendium of quotations. This way, which we may properly think of as a Columbia sociologist's way, has yielded an attractive, informative, eminently useful book.

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America *by Clyde Wilcox. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 249 pp. $34.00.*

When the Democrats lost control of the Senate in the 1980 presidential election, national pundits searched desperately for an explanation. Republicans had won

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presidential elections before without capturing nine senate seats from Democrats. What had happened? The answer at hand was a sudden surge of right-wing religious voting. A fundamentalist revolution was under way. Under the impetus of this sudden public attention, Reverend Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority became a popular bogeyman for the liberal left, and many liberal hands were wrung about the "rise of the moral majority"—although all three words were inaccurate—"rise," "moral," and "majority."

In retrospect it turns out that there were other reasons that accounted for the Democratic Senate rout in 1980 and that the "fundamentalist" vote was not decisive during the ensuing decade. Pat Robertson's failed presidential bid was proof enough that "God's Warriors," as Clyde Wilcox calls them in his incisive and competent postmortem, were not about to take over the country. Moreover, it also turns out that the fundamentalist political impulse has been part of American life for at least this century, as Wilcox also neatly demonstrates. Pundits operating out of Washington and New York had discovered what has been an important component of American religious and political life for all of this century and probably in one way or another since the First Great Awakening in 1740. That segment of Americans who can broadly speaking be called fundamentalist or evangelical is about 20 percent of the population. It is neither growing nor declining and is no more influential in political life than it has been in the past; it is influential but not decisive.

The research reported in *God's Warriors*, after a brief historical summary of the era before 1980 (including the Christian anticommunism of the era after World War II), relies on data from the Michigan election studies and special surveys of conservative Christians. It is a rigorously empirical effort and the best report yet on the phenomenon, neither exaggerating its importance nor minimizing it.

There are two especially important elements in Wilcox's careful and responsible analysis. First of all, he notes the crucial distinction between fundamentalists, who take their guidance from a literal (more or less depending on the person) reading of the inspired Bible and the Pentecostals, who are guided by the direct inspiration as they perceive it of the Holy Spirit in their reading of the Bible. Many of the more famous television evangelists are in the latter category, including Pat Robertson, who Wilcox's data show did not win much support from the fundamentalists in his bid for the presidency.

Second, God's warriors are not necessarily crazies, as many of the liberal left would like to believe. Quite the contrary, their political positions can be accounted for by rational choice models without any need to appeal to status anxiety or authoritarianism. Wilcox's data show that they are merely following in politics their religious and moral principles. "In this respect, support for the Christian Rights is no different kind than support for the Sierra Club, the National Organization for Women, or any other political group" (p. 40).

My only question about this admirable book is why in addition to the National

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Election Studies, the author did not also consult the General Social Survey data base, which would have provided more grist for his sophisticated mill.

ANDREW GREELEY
The University of Chicago

Financing the 1988 Election *by Herbert E. Alexander and Monica Bauer. Boulder CO, Westview, 1991. 160 pp. Cloth, $52.00; paper, $15.95.*

This eighth quadrennial volume on presidential campaign finance will be the authoritative source on funding the 1988 elections. Alexander and Bauer estimate total campaign costs in 1988 at $2.7 billion. Candidates for federal office and national party and nonparty committees spent $1.6 billion (59 percent), a commentary on the nationalization of American politics.

Presidential campaign spending of $500 million in 1988 represented an increase of 1566 percent since Alexander's first comprehensive compilation in 1960 ($30 million) and 81 percent since 1980 when $275 million was spent. The increasing uses of expensive technology, the professionalization of politics, compliance with the intricate Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the infusion of "soft money" outside the FECA's expenditure limits, and the heightened use of precandidacy political action committees (PACs)—which spent $25.2 million in 1988, compared to $7.5 million in 1980—are cited as reasons for rising campaign costs. But 1988 was also the first year since 1968 without an incumbent president seeking reelection; and fifteen candidates developed sufficient strength to qualify for public funds.

Presidential campaign costs appear less fearsome when adjusted for inflation: the increase was 322 percent since 1960. If the authors had also considered the growth in voting age population, the increase would have been even more moderate: 155 percent since 1960. Still, all campaign expenditures in the United States are less than Phillip Morris and Procter and Gamble spend annually for advertising and are "a mere fraction of 1 percent of the $1.9 trillion spent in 1988 by federal, state, and local governments" (p. 2). Moreover, the "most costly campaigns are those in which voters choose poorly because they are ill informed" (p. 45).

Congressional campaign spending rose from $239 million in 1980 to $457 million in 1988, an increase of 91 percent. However, expenditures scarcely increased over 1986, when $450.9 million was spent. In Senate races, total expenditures actually declined about $10 million. Alexander and Bauer attribute this to the decline in the number of hard fought congressional races, because of the overwhelming financial advantages of incumbents.

There were important changes in funding sources in 1988. Although PACs contributed only a tiny percentage of presidential campaign funds, they accounted for 24 percent of the funds of Senate general election candidates and 40

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percent of House funds. The average Senate winner raised more than $1 million from PACs, and 210 House winners received at least half their money from PACs. In the presidential campaign, soft money increased from $19.1 million in 1980 to $45 million in 1988. It remains to be seen whether post-1988 Federal Election Commission regulations will curb the use of soft money. The Dukakis campaign was a reminder of the continued fund-raising potential of some sitting governors: Dukakis raised $7 million in Massachusetts in the prenomination campaign, more than twice as much as from any other state.

Public participation in funding campaigns waned in 1988. The percentage making political contributions was lower than in any election since 1952. And taxpayer check-offs for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund declined to their lowest point.

Alexander, in a solo chapter, argues for substantial revision in campaign finance regulations. Expenditure limits in all campaigns should be repealed. Public funds should be "floors without ceilings" to provide "financial assistance that will permit candidates to have access to the electorate but not the accompanying price of spending limits" (p. 45).

Alexander is uncomfortable about the growing role of PACs, big givers, and solicitors of large sums; but he is also skeptical about contribution limits. He repeats his earlier appeals for tax credit incentives for small gifts; but nearly twenty years of federal and state experiments with credits have produced no expansion of the donor base. Whether one agrees with these reform proposals, Alexander and Bauer have provided the comprehensive picture of political money in 1988 that must inform any proposals for legislative revision of campaign finance laws.

DAVID ADAMANY
Wayne State University

Engendering Democracy *by Anne Phillips. University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991. 183 pp. Cloth, $28.00; paper, $13.95.*

One can not read this brilliant essay on how feminist theory challenges conventional forms of democratic thought without thinking about last fall's Hill-Thomas Senate hearings. With delicious wit, Phillips explains why modern democracy, whatever its form, excludes the concerns of women. Anita Hill never had a chance.

Feminists along with Marxists have long faulted the most common form of modern democracy—the liberal variant—for its glib distinction between public and private spheres. While liberal democracy accords formal equality to all in public life, the inequality that prevails in the economy and the family inevitably gets translated into politics. Even with universal suffrage some are more equal than others, and many, especially women, are never heard at all.

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Phillips sees little more to recommend in participatory democracy, a democratic form championed by 1960s unionists, civil rights workers, and many feminists as the answer to liberal democracy's exclusionary tendencies. Phillips concedes that participatory democracy granted a forum to many who had long been ignored and even led to new ideas about gender oppression and how to overcome it. Yet, all that participating took so much time and energy that it discriminated against those with family obligations—that is, most women.

Phillips saves her most withering criticism for the third form of democracy she considers—modern civic republicanism. By suggesting that the good society is one in which political participants are able to abstract themselves from their selfish interests and identify with the public good, republicanism inevitably overlooks the distinctive concerns of traditionally subordinate groups. Though not a believer that women are in any "essential" way different from men and mindful of the manner in which race, class, and religion often divide women from one another, Phillips nevertheless sees attention to gender differences as a necessary stage on the way to overcoming the advantages men routinely exercise over women.

In the end, Phillips concludes that liberal democracy, despite its flaws, holds the greatest possibility of giving voice to women's distinctive concerns. Based on universal suffrage and representation, it remains the most democratic. The problem of exclusion, however, persists. For economic, social, and psychological reasons, women continue to be vastly underrepresented in public office. The solution, Phillips declares, is affirmative action. Countries must either reserve a certain number of seats for women in the legislative branches of majoritarian systems like the United States or they must set a fixed percentage of seats to be filled by women under systems of proportional representation as in Britain.

From the vantage point of the United States, where only 2 percent of all senators are female and affirmative action is on the defensive, Phillips's plan to engender democracy seems utopian. But she points to the Nordic countries for evidence that change can happen. In 1972, for example, only 10 percent of public officials in Norway were women; by 1985, after a decade of self-conscious political engineering, 30 percent were. The difference this female presence has made in the advancement of policies important to women has been dramatic. Utopian or not, Phillips' ideas are worth pondering. Perhaps if America had female and male senatorial seats from each state, Anita Hill's charge of sexual harassment would have been handled differently from the start.

ROSALIND ROSENBERG
Barnard College

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The Japanese Voter *by Scott C. Flanagan et al. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1991. 497 pp. $45.00.*

This is an important book in the continuing expansion of western understanding of Japanese politics. The authors have successfully transferred Converse and Miller's *The American Voter* model to Japanese politics. *The Japanese Voter* carefully merges both traditional Japanese explanations with the University of Michigan model of the 1970s and produces a much fuller and satisfying description of Japanese voting behavior. One major contribution is the demystifying of Japanese political behavior. After reading this book, one is persuaded that Japanese voters can be understood within a combination of factors affecting Japanese society and a variety of models derived from western political systems.

Chapters 2 through 9 detail the various long- and short-term social and political influences on voting behavior. The influences include almost all the usual suspects: party, candidate images, media, voter social status, values, and social networks. Ichiro Miyake expands the concept of partisanship with typology of partisan types: negative, nonpartisan, uninformed, and loyal. Party identification is not strong in Japan, but party images are. Japan seems closer to the European model of party influences being more important than candidate images. Despite the growth in numbers in the first two categories in recent years, partisanship is still the strongest predictor of voting behavior in Japan.

Issues politics can be important in Japanese politics, the authors conclude, but only in the areas of cultural issues and scandals. Many Japanese have no positions on a range of issues and a majority cannot identify a Japanese party as closest to their view on any given issue. Issue voting is less important than in the United States, but on occasion, such as the scandal driven 1989 House of Councillors elections, it can be quite important.

The authors also argue that Japanese voting patterns are very stable and that an ecological realignment (changes in the relative sizes of various groups in Japanese society) based on decline of farmers and other Liberal Democratic party supporters and the increase in new middle class voters occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. The authors correctly note that the European sociological model based on social cleavages simply does not fit Japan, which is organized around the two dimensions of urban-rural and traditional-modern values. Group identity and group-influenced voting is still an important cue for many Japanese voters.

There is an enormous amount of data in this book. For example, there are ninety-seven tables. (The original *The American Voter* had only sixty-one tables and figures.) That is not to say that Flanagan and his associates have created the perfect voting studies book. One major problem is that the foundation for the book's data is a Japanese public opinion survey from 1976. While it is invaluable to have a benchmark point for evaluating Japanese voting behavior, it would have been more useful to have data derived from a general election more recent than six House elections in the past. The authors try to minimize this weakness by noting Japanese voting behavior stability and by providing analyses of the

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1989 Upper House and the 1990 Lower House elections, but, while valuable, they do not quite make up for the 1976 data base.

The 1989 House of Councillors elections is described as Japan's first image election as the ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP) failed to control issues or images in the midst of major scandals. However, it successfully responded just a few months later in the 1990 House elections to win an important victory. The authors see this volatility as a result of the changing nature of Japanese voters who are more subject to media influences and high-intensity short-term issues.

But, when the final remarks are recorded in this book, the same, conventional (and correct from this reviewer's perspective) conclusions emerge. The ruling LDP is unlikely to lose its control of Japanese politics anytime in the foreseeable future, because the Japanese voters can not trust the opposition parties to rule the nation. The Japanese voter is described as seeking to retain the LDP in power with the smallest possible margin of victory to force the party to be more responsive to public demands. The authors claim to see increasing evidence of a demand for change by the Japanese electorate. Alas, as others have also concluded, such change is unlikely to occur short of the breakup of the LDP or the growth of a single large opposition party.

The authors' stated goal was to produce a comprehensive treatment of Japanese voting similar to existing western voting studies. They have clearly accomplished this goal and have produced a book that should prove to be very useful to all students of Japanese politics and for advanced comparative politics courses.

RONALD J. HREBENAR
University of Utah

Emerging Influentials in State Legislatures: Women, Blacks, and Hispanics *by Albert Nelson. New York, Praeger, 1991. 168 pp. $39.95.*

Some political pundits believe that the 1990s will be the era of the great incorporation. Finally, blacks, Latinos (Hispanics), and women will take their rightful place in the political arena. Since state and local governments contain the largest number of electoral slots, the struggle for representation has attracted scholarly attention. Unlike the U.S. Senate, state legislatures must be apportioned according to population. The beneficiaries of *Baker v. Carr* (1962), *Reynold v. Sims* (1964), Voting Rights Act of 1965, and three census counts (1970, 1980, and 1990) have been minorities, women, and urban voters. State houses have more minority and women members than at any time in history. Do minority and women officeholders make any policy difference? Have they been truly incorporated in the policy-making process? Do parties' differences explain the degree of relative incorporation? Using data collected from forty-eight states, Albert J. Nelson measured the policy impact of having blacks, Latinos, and women in state legislatures.

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Nelson found the influence of these new legislators to be more problematic than he expected. Democrats and Republicans treated newcomers differently. Democrat female representatives have been incorporated at a faster rate than their Republican counterparts. Black Democrats, although a member of the majority in some legislatures, did not have much influence over matters of human resource expenditures. Hispanic Democrats and Republicans, although a small part of the sample, did not fare any better than their black counterparts. Nelson attributes this lack of influence in part to the rise of conservative politics during the Reagan years. However, the main source of powerlessness for these newcomers seems to be the institutions themselves. Legislative norms seem biased toward the status quo. In addition, Nelson claims that women are increasingly adopting personal roles and abandoning their symbolic representational roles. He concludes: "Women have moved beyond this role and are pursuing personal and constituent political interests that are often at odds with the liberal orientations of academics" (p. 136). For him this finding is descriptive and normative.

In summary, Nelson's study is only suggestive of the complex and evolving role of these new legislators. The author's choice of a data base limits the types of questions he could ask and the answers the data could provide. For example, we are not told whether black or Hispanic representatives from predominantly minority constituencies behave or vote any differently than those from mixed constituencies. The author does not cite any old literature on role relations in legislatures (for example, James David Barber's *The Lawmakers*, 1965). But it is clear that the demographics of state legislatures have changed. It follows that role definitions have changed. Is there a declining significance of gender and race? Do blacks, Latinos, and women restrict themselves to liberal coalitions? Although the work of Rufus Browning et al., *Protest is Not Enough*, 1984, is cited, there is not much here about the efficacy of coalition-building among these groups. In other words, the reader gets unclear messages from Nelson's study. Is the message that blacks, Hispanics, and women are highly adaptive and not radical reformers? Or is he saying that these newcomers have not had much impact on issues such as education, health, and welfare because of the fiscal crisis? Or is he simply saying that we are electing the wrong people? Nelson shouldn't be tentative about his answers to these questions, which black, Hispanic, and women voters want to know. Students of state politics also want to know. We can only hope that Nelson's next book will tell us more about the plight of these new legislators.

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Wellesley College

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Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings *by James A. Stimson. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1991. 156 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $14.95.*

Reading this elegant little book must be the next best thing to being in a graduate seminar with James A. Stimson, a preeminent analyst of American politics and public opinion. The idea for the book emerged, we are told, from a graduate seminar; and the clarity, patience, insight, and intellectual freedom that are the hallmarks of a good seminar run throughout the finished product.

Stimson's book provides a fascinating complement to another recent work on American public opinion, Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro's *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (University of Chicago Press, 1992). Like Stimson, Page and Shapiro start with a massive historical collection of marginal distributions for policy questions from American opinion surveys. But the uses to which these data are put are remarkably different. Page and Shapiro describe the individual policy time series in exhaustive detail in a volume running upwards of 450 pages; Stimson synthesizes them into a meaningful pattern in about one third the space.

The crux of Stimson's synthesis is the notion of "policy mood" (p. 17) which subsumes the ups and downs in dozens of individual survey items into broad liberal and conservative swings. These policy moods, Stimson finds, are only subtly related to changes in aggregate partisanship, and lead rather than follow swings in ideological identification. As a result, policy moods do not always correspond to popular depictions of ideological climate, especially in the current period of "unnoticed liberalism" (p. 119).

Stimson argues persuasively that policy moods do respond to actual policy outputs. LBJ gave us the Great Society, and the public turned rapidly and decisively away from demanding more liberal domestic policies as a result. Reagan gave us a conservative retrenchment, and the conservative policy mood that had accumulated throughout the 1970s dissipated equally rapidly and equally decisively. Now we are in another markedly liberal period—a product, Stimson believes, of the "Reagan fiscal collar" of tax cuts and high deficits (p. 122–124).

What will happen next? Characteristically, Stimson offers a menu of possibilities (ranging from public resignation to government inaction, to full restoration of the federal revenue base) and a useful caution: "We can extrapolate from time series with hazard. Sometimes we merely push the road forward from what is well known to what is likely. Sometimes that road runs off the side of a cliff" (p. 117).

Pedagogically, Stimson's analysis is exemplary. He begins with pictures of raw marginals for individual policy questions, then proceeds patiently to standardized marginals, to summaries based upon regression analysis, and finally to a summary index based upon his own innovative recursive scaling procedure. When there are discrepancies, he does not hesitate to go back to the unprocessed data to set aside specific issues (most notably, abortion) that don't fit his general pattern, or to overrule statistical anomalies on the basis of political common sense.

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As in any good graduate seminar, there are plenty of insightful digressions. These address everything from common misconceptions about sampling error and the inferential consequences of the sudden abandonment of the Likert response format in the early 1960s to the limitations of the reelection motive for explaining legislative behavior, the impact of Joe McCarthy on apparent trends in tolerance, and the psychology of tax bracket creep.

Stimson modestly describes his book as an "unfinished essay," a temporary stopping point on the way to a more ambitious study of "governments responding to shifting public mood" (p. xxi). Certainly there is more to be done—in connecting policy moods with the perceptions and calculations of working politicians, in fleshing out the implications of the "zones of acquiescence" evident in public responses to policy change, and in establishing the magnitude and regularity of the impact of policy moods on policy outcomes. In the meantime, this interim report is not to be missed.

LARRY M. BARTELS
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Of Power and Right: Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and America's Constitutional Revolution *by Howard Ball and Phillip J. Cooper. New York, Oxford University Press, 1992. 390 pp. $27.95.*

The words "Holmes and Brandeis dissenting" were to the Supreme Court of the 1920s what "Black and Douglas dissenting" were to a later Court. A shared position, however, does not necessarily mean a shared jurisprudential starting point. Matched voting may obscure differences as well as highlight affinities. Black and Douglas, like Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, sometimes arrived at the same result for different reasons.

Ball and Cooper could hardly have chosen a more revealing pair of nouns for their title. For Black, the constitutional populist, the power of the people reposed in the text of the Constitution. Through fundamental law they bestowed authority and imposed limits. For Douglas, the constitutional individualist, the Constitution safeguarded preexisting rights. For Black, the judge's duty was to enforce this popular will in both its positive and negative dimensions. For Douglas, judicial legitimacy rested on solicitous regard for personal liberty, text-based or not. The former's premise was popular sovereignty; the latter's was individual sovereignty. Their philosophies took shape in the process of deciding cases.

The volume is three books in one. As they explore contrasting approaches to constitutional law, the authors examine almost every major constitutional question to confront the Court between 1939 and 1971 (the years Black and Douglas served together). Better still, they tell the story against a backdrop of the Court's internal politics, including the personal and professional relations between Black and Douglas and most of the "brethren." (For Black and Douglas,

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that collective noun includes more than a quarter of all justices who have sat since 1789.) The volume thus contains a wealth of detail of the Court at work. Scarcely an available source seems to have been overlooked.

Nonetheless, organization of the book is puzzling in spots. Development of themes sometimes seems out of logical as well as chronological order. For example, after an opening reference to *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) and a summary of the NAACP's litigation strategy in the 1930s, the authors jump to the racial sit-in cases of the 1960s before returning to the pre-*Brown* litigation and finally to a comprehensive review of *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) itself. There are also two small factual errors: the Court's vote in *Plessy* was 7-1, not 8-1 (Brewer did not take part); Black's separate opinion in *Jackson County Board of Commissioners v. United States* (1939), which so irritated Felix Frankfurter, was a concurrence, not a dissent.

Along with the strength of their personalities and the force and clarity of their convictions, students of the Court are usually quick to point to length of service when assessing the impact Black and Douglas had on constitutional law. Among their colleagues, only William Brennan with nearly thirty-four years and Byron White with thirty (so far) have rivaled Black's thirty-four years and Douglas's thirty-six. Yet, they stand out in another respect. In contrast to the present Court (except for White and William Rehnquist), Black and Douglas came to the Court without appellate judicial experience (Douglas had no judicial experience at all, and Black had served only briefly as judge of a police court in Birmingham). Moreover, of current justices only Sandra Day O'Connor held significant elective office prior to her appointment (Black had twice been elected United States senator). Ironically, the formidable constitutional handiwork of Black and Douglas may have so altered the politics of judicial appointment that those with backgrounds similar to theirs are now likely to be passed over in favor of those whose constitutional values are firmly set or those whose records strongly hint what those values will be.

D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.
Franklin and Marshall College

J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets *by Curt Gentry. New York, Norton, 1991. 846 pp. $29.95.*

From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover *edited by Athan Theoharis. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1991. 370 pp. $24.95.*

These are companion books. Gentry tells the story; Theoharis provides the documentation. Without Theoharis and scholars like him there could be no Gentry. Without writers like Gentry, we would not remember the squalid details of Hoover's reign so well. The juicy bits are all here: Hoover's obsession with race, sex, and orthodoxy, and how the mere threat of his leaks was sufficient to keep most

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politicians in line. Gentry, the journalist, is a master storyteller; Theoharis a champion archivist.

In Gentry's account, Hoover emerges as a malevolent toad who was only comfortable with people he could blackmail. Like Lyndon Johnson, he was an astute judge of ambitious, egotistical, shallow people. He was less adept at understanding statesmen like Martin Luther King. Hoover could go to the races with the likes of Walter Winchell, but King he would try to destroy.

The Victorian roots of Hoover's obsession with smut and his contempt for "uppity blacks" are better explored by historian Richard Gid Powers in *Secrecy and Power*. Gentry is best at revealing Hoover's bureaucratic survival skills and his capacity to manipulate the press and Congress without revealing his hand. For Hoover's impact on the civil rights movement, however, David J. Garrow's *The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.* is most helpful.

Hoover's paranoia about nonconformists and germs make excellent grist for the debunker's mill, and Gentry grinds them exceedingly well. The director's willingness to break the law and his ability to trick his superiors into granting apparent authority for his law breaking are well known and are best documented in the voluminous, but readable, reports of the Senator Frank Church's Select Committee on Intelligence. The same goes for that committee's excellent report on COINTELPRO's (the counterintelligence program's) dirty tricks (and Morton Halperin's *The Lawless Society*). Although Gentry has done a fair amount of interviewing on his own, his chief contribution is to make the extensive research of others immediately accessible to the average reader.

The scale of his project is so immense, however, that it gradually degenerates into Hoover bashing, a popular indoor sport but of limited social value. Hoover may have been a dirty-minded SOB who aspired to police American values, but he was not, as Gentry claims, the sole creator of McCarthyism. Hoover was less of a mastermind than an effective, opportunistic player.

It is true that the director tried to set the parameters of political debate about communism, crime, and civil rights. In so doing, however, he usually gave the American people what they wanted, even if they did not know what they were getting. In this way, he was shielded from popular backlash for decades. The "democratic" nature of Hoover's service is best illustrated by the COINTEL programs we find so despicable today. These did not violate the ethics of either the reporters or politicians who "represented" us in Washington in the 1950s and 1960s. Their public, after all, was still thrilled by the exploits of Herbert Philbrick and Eliot Ness. The press, Congress, and the public did not turn on Hoover until the world view he articulated became obsolete. In the realm of law enforcement, they haven't turned on him yet.

Gentry's book fosters the impression that the FBI's investigative abuses were the product of one sick man. But, as Theoharis concludes, presidents as different as Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush (and attorneys general as reputable as Edward Levi) have successfully obstructed all efforts to tie the bureau down with an effective charter. Like Hoover and their own

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predecessors, they have sought to maximize executive discretion without questioning what it is for.

What is more interesting than the director's sickness is the massive and unquestioning support he received from thousands of FBI agents and their families over the years. Why they did not blow the whistle on him is a subject worthy of analysis across a wide range of disciplines. More interesting still is why, twenty years after Hoover's death, political scientists have yet to incorporate his abuses into their basic courses and textbooks. If we could explain this silence, perhaps we could understand why this sorry history will eventually repeat itself.

CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE
Mount Holyoke College

The Politics of Change in Georgia: A Political Biography of Ellis Arnall *by Harold Paulk Henderson. Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1991. 345 pp. $29.95.*

The Kingfish and His Realm: The Life and Times of Huey P. Long *by William Ivy Hair. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1991. 406 pp. $24.95.*

Both of these biographies assess the significance of a southern politician of unique importance to his state. Georgia and Louisiana in the first half of the twentieth century were by U.S. standards economically and educationally underdeveloped. Both were racially segregated and accustomed to homespun demagoguery. Both were dominated by one-party parochialism. State government in neither commanded esteem beyond its borders and was often deplored within them. And both states, like the other forty-six in the Union, were possessed of distinguishing qualities that separated them from the rest.

Little more links the lives and careers of Huey Long of Louisiana, the subject of many previous books and whose career was ended by assassination in 1935, and Ellis Arnall of Georgia, of whom this is the first full-length published biography and who last held elective office as governor of Georgia in 1947. Their two commonwealths possessed dissimilar cultural heritages, geographic divisions, economic patterns, and social development. Educational attainment was low in both, but conspicuously lower in Louisiana. Periodic obsession with politics was lacking in neither, but political personalities and issues had distinctive flavors. Several Longs followed Huey into politics—including his son Russell, seven times elected to the United States Senate and never defeated. But no Arnalls followed Ellis into political careers. He, like Huey a lawyer, subsequently pursued a diverse career of national as well as local dimension, one that earned him widespread esteem and financial reward. Neither leader left a comprehensive collection of personal papers pertaining to his years in office.

Henderson's biography of Arnall would be welcome under any circumstance. It is the first of book length. It is, however, more than that. The author is fully

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sensible of Arnall's enlightened values, civic vision, skill in pursuit of office, tough exercise of power, and effective capitalizing on the conditions obtaining during his service as governor during World War II. He also reveals the lot of the driving politician at work in an environment of clashing values that obstructs loyalty to counsels of perfection. Political campaigning in rural Georgia in the days of the county unit system for nominating candidates focused a candidate's attention on local constituencies of pervasive parochialism. As a state legislator, Arnall urged Georgia's two U.S. senators to vote against placing the United States under the jurisdiction of the World Court, advocated immediate deportation of alien enemies, and condemned a proposed federal antilynching law. Arnall said that as a state legislator he "did a lot of things in those days that were purely political" (p. 13).

Arnall ran once again for governor, in 1966. The account of his defeat by Lester Maddox (in a race in which state Senator James E. Carter, Jr., came in third) assesses Arnall's assets and liabilities in circumstances significantly changed since his victory in 1942. The conditions of campaigning, the issues, and the political environment were different, and the author's analysis of them contributes to the understanding of Georgia's political evolution. Major in the assets of the book is the patient realism toward political compulsions and personal behavior with which it examines the career of the politician whom many judge to have been Georgia's most far-sighted and constructive governor for most of a century.

At least eight diverse biographical treatments of Huey Long, plus three other books about his assassination, appeared before Hair's excellent, welcome addition. His is less sympathetic to Long and substantially shorter than the most detailed of its predecessors, that by T. Harry Williams, with its valuable use of extensive interviews, published in 1969.

Long wrote when he was twenty-five that at age ten he began to fret that he was too young to run for governor. "I was born into politics, a wedded man with a storm for a bride." A physician who knew all the Longs for decades declared before Huey's death that he was "a twisted psychological type, with that power fixation dating from boyhood" (p. 36). His goal was ever to become president of the United States: at age sixteen he proclaimed he was on his way to becoming governor, United States senator, and president. His rampant ambition, enormous oratorical power, restless spirit, and inexhaustible energy were fortified by an abnormally prodigious memory.

Franklin Roosevelt said privately in 1932, "It's all very well for us to laugh at Huey. But actually we have to remember that he really is one of the two most dangerous men in the country" (the other being Douglas MacArthur) [p. 246]. Long had little systematic ideology to match his ambition, yet tens of thousands of Louisianans—not all of them downtrodden—rallied to his cry. Louisiana was fertile soil in which to strew appeals to bias and feeling and promises of a brighter day. The state's illiteracy rate was the highest in the nation. And Long drew enormous crowds in other states, not just Arkansas, Georgia, and South Caro-

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lina, but Iowa and Pennsylvania and almost anywhere he stumped. He had a growing radio audience, "becoming almost a regular on NBC" (p. 308). Raymond Moley of Roosevelt's Brains Trust said, "I have never known a mind that moved with more clarity, decisiveness, and force" (p. 309).

Long's relentless, comprehensive distortion of democratic processes and obsession with personal power converted Louisiana into "a full-fledged dictatorship" (p. 277). Nonetheless, there was "much he had done for Louisiana" as governor (p. 227). Construction of roads and bridges (and the labor employed in doing so) were joined by improvements in public education (mostly for whites), in night literacy classes (mostly benefiting blacks), in Louisiana State University (where his interest went even beyond the football team), and in hospitals (again benefiting mostly whites). But mixed motives—or, more accurately, undiluted ambition—and dubious results characterized most that he undertook as both governor and U.S. senator. In the end, the questions hang. Could the promises and the consequences possibly have been worth the violations of popular democracy? Would the probable results have been worth the probable costs had Long lived longer? Hair's well written, valuable, comprehensive biography will surely lead most, if not all, to say no.

ALEXANDER HEARD
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The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo *by Saskia Sassen. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991. 397 pp. $39.50.*

The thesis of *The Global City* is that New York City, London, and Tokyo, long-time centers of business and finance, have become very different kinds of cities in terms of their basic characteristics and the roles they now play in international economic affairs. In earlier periods these cities served as sites for corporate headquarters, major commercial banking, and manufacturing. These activities have either relocated or diminished in importance and notwithstanding the changes—corporate headquarters move-outs, the decline of the power of commercial banks, and massive reductions in the size of the industrial sector in urban areas—Saskia Sassen sees New York, London, and Tokyo as being in an ascendant position with respect to world economics. She sees these cities as significantly well situated in terms of the trends and transformations that are occurring; in fact, she sees these cities as becoming important well beyond the economics of their respective nation-states.

These cities have emerged despite the fact that economic activities continue to be globally dispersed with regional centers seeing job growth and increased economic significance. Sassen contends that a number of forces have enhanced central functions at a time of enormous dispersal of production. These three cities retain their advantage as commercial centers with more control needed at central

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sites even as important activities are further dispersed. While this process means fewer employees on central assignment – with back office activities moving out – it also means considerable support for the fewer who work at these places. There is the need for increased control of the global assembly line, with small firms staffed by technically competent experts. The global city becomes the place where specialty skills are increasingly found. These firms have various niches that support the corporate governance function. Once seen as the traditional law, accounting, and advertising firms, they are newer companies whose employees cut across academic disciplines and help give state-of-the-art advantages to highly competitive business. The growth of these enterprises has been most striking in places like New York, London, and Tokyo. These enterprises are true production centers providing the kind of services that are part of the new needs for successful business. Their contribution is observed, analyzed, and reported skillfully by Sassen. This is the knowledge business and it forms the core of strength for the global cities.

Sassen's analysis is quite powerful as she demonstrates how New York, London, and Tokyo have managed to grow and prosper. The real issue for these cities, however, rests in the implications that this growth has for the social and economic conditions within the cities themselves. Economically, the results are basically positive for the emerging global city. The diversification of business and the intensity of competition make the city an important place in which to do business. The well educated, technically proficient employee and entrepreneur stimulate the local economy and attract new activity to the global city. The business district grows; old neighborhoods are transformed into exciting places for new city leaders. Particularly true for New York, Tokyo, and London, Sassen also shows the phenomenon has been at work in regional cities like Osaka and Los Angeles. She gives the global city description quite sparingly.

It is in the area of the social order that is developing within the global city that Sassen's data is the most disturbing. She does not analyze the political consequences of the changes that she has tracked. The data, however, strongly suggest that there ought to be some political difficulties. Sassen asks a basic question: has all this progress resulted in a better situation for marginal city residents? She answers the question for New York, London, and Tokyo in the same way: no! She sees an increasing disparity between the condition of the rich and the poor in these cities, with about two in five of new jobs being for the rich and almost three in five of new jobs for the poor. Clearly the implications for the middle class are profound.

Sassen's work in explaining change while in its midst is quite fine. These are insights that build around a keen understanding of the significant swirl that describes our economy today. These insights are well researched and well presented.

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Yeshiva University

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Leadership Counts: Lessons for Public Managers from the Massachusetts Welfare, Training, and Employment Program *by Robert D. Behn. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1991. 248 pp. $29.95.*

Robert Behn of Duke University has written a richly detailed and conceptually sophisticated case study that is an important landmark in the development of the field of public management. *Leadership Counts* is the story of Massachusetts' voluntary "workfare" program during the days of the Dukakis administration. For scholars of social welfare policy, *Leadership Counts* provides important lessons on the policy issues related to the development of programs to encourage welfare recipients to enter the workforce.

However, as the subtitle indicates, the more important application of this work is to the field of public management. Behn shows how the managers of the Massachusetts program applied the principles of management excellence to their program. He uses a number of vivid examples to illustrate the difficulty of applying some private sector management principles to the public sector. One memorable case was the program's use of a small amount of funding to provide lunches and award ceremonies to reward staff accomplishments. These token rewards cost less than $150,000 yet were repeatedly criticized by the press. Behn notes that the focus on expenditures as a means of evaluating government performance comes because "people cannot agree on the mission of a government agency . . . without an agreement on basic purposes, thinking about government management inevitably focuses on the inputs. How much was spent" (p. 125). Other fundamental management principles such as "doing the doable first" to obtain small early victories, and articulating clear and simple goals are also illustrated and clearly explained.

An important contribution of *Leadership Counts* to the field of public management is Behn's concept of management by groping along, which is essentially Lindblom's concept of incrementalism or muddling through applied to management rather than policy formulation. According to Behn: "Rather than develop a detailed study to be followed unswervingly, a good manager establishes a specific direction—a very clear objective—and then gropes his way toward it. He knows where he is trying to go but is not sure how to get there. So he tries a lot of different things. Some work. Some do not. . . . Finally what works best begins to take hold. This is management by groping along" (p. 133-134).

Behn's other major contribution is his classification of what he has termed policy, administrative, and leadership metastrategies. Behn observes that: "Those who seek to achieve public purposes through government tend to emphasize either policy, or administration, or leadership. Some adopt the Policy Metastrategy and worry about establishing policies or regulations. Others pursue the Administrative Metastrategy and concentrate on creating administrative structures and systems. Still others employ the Leadership Metastrategy and focus on the mission and goals of the agency" (p. 198). Behn's point is that successful programs require all three: realistic policy designs reflecting incentives that do not contradict the

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assumptions of microeconomics; administrative systems that provide the processes and material needed to accomplish work; and leadership that motivates staff to use the available administrative systems to implement well designed policies.

I believe that Behn's three metastrategies encompass a field that I would term macromanagement: the management of policy, administrative systems, and agency-wide leadership and motivation. While I hesitate to use the term micromanagement, since it has pejorative overtones of management that is overly detail-oriented, I believe that a fourth strategy must be developed that focuses on the more prosaic day-to-day issues of management: a field I would term micromanagement. To use Behn's terminology—a "metastrategy" of work. As Behn indicates, the job of top management is to set a vision and leave it to the field managers to determine how to accomplish the agency's mission. The field of micromanagement would be concerned with providing these line managers with insight in how to motivate their staff and how to alter institutional routines and patterns in order to grope in new and positive directions. Micromanagement is explicitly and mainly concerned with developing the capacity to create, change, and implement standard operating procedures.

Leadership Counts provides useful advice to managers at the top of their organizations, as they set about to do what Chester Barnard called infusing the organization with value—articulating mission and a sense of purpose. Behn's detailed explication of the leadership metastrategy is a major step forward in developing a conceptual framework for understanding the work of public managers. A next step would be to integrate the leadership and administration metastrategies.

A final contribution of *Leadership Counts* is that it is a case study of a public sector success. We need to learn from our public sector successes. Behn's work, along with the Ford Foundation's Innovations in Government Award Program and David Osborne's excellent *New York Times* best seller *Reinventing Government*, begin to provide the public sector equivalent of *In Search of Excellence*. We need an empirically-based literature describing and explaining public management. *Leadership Counts* is the best example we have of such a literature. It is an important step forward.

STEVEN COHEN
Columbia University

Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World *by Steven R. David. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 247 pp. $38.50.*

Political scientists fare better as interpreters of the past and present than as prophets of the future. The "probabilistic theory of the polity," to which Gabriel

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Almond summoned us three decades ago remains as elusive as ever. Steven David is only the latest of many victims of the relentless determination of the future to shatter our pretensions to clairvoyance.

This engaging volume on Third World alignment is doubtless one of many whose foundational premises are swept away by the perverse will of the Soviet Union to disintegrate. The analytical framework presumes the stability of the bipolar world system produced by the cold war. In developing his brief for the pertinence of his conceptual approach and in his prescriptions for American foreign policy we find passages that already sound archaic: ". . . the Third World might not be losing as much significance to the Soviet Union as many allege. Indeed, the dismantling of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe could cause Moscow to intensify its efforts in the Third World. . ." (p. 40).

If we direct our vision backward, however, the book supplies us with a stimulating and valuable theoretical framework for interpreting superpower-Third World relationships in the cold war era. David proposes as the explanatory vehicle for understanding shifting patterns of alignment and realignment a concept he terms "omnibalancing." This appealing notion suggests that alignment choices of Third World leaders are above all driven by "the rational calculation . . . as to which outside power is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power" (p. 6). In many Third World states the most dangerous adversaries are domestic, not just hostile members of the international system. This basic fact, combined with the autocratic and personalized nature of rulership in many such polities, gives a distinctive cast to state behavior.

Omnibalancing is advanced as an alternative to such classical theories of international relations as balance of power, bandwagon effect, or ideological preference. David does not wholly dismiss these alternative explanations, but subordinates their effects to the omnibalancing thesis. He is surely cogent in arguing the limits of either balance of power or bandwagoning notions in grasping what drives Third World alignment (or nonalignment) choices. He is less persuasive in arguing the marginal importance of ideology.

To demonstrate the utility of his concept, he explores three cases: Egypt under Anwar Sadat, the Horn of Africa (Somalia under Mohammed Siad Barre, Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam), and the Sudan under Jaafar Mohammed al-Nimeiri. This selection does load the dice: the political leaders selected for scrutiny were nimble opportunists of exceptional partner-changing disposition. Omnibalancing would rest less easily upon Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Ne Win of Burma (Myanmar), or Jawaharlal Nehru of India.

On the whole, the case studies are effectively developed. The author is on firmest ground in Egypt, where the most extensive secondary literature is available. The Sudan case is the weakest; here regional specialists will wince from time to time (for example, we are told that the British deposed the Mahdi in 1885, a most imaginative reconstruction of the crushing defeat by Mahdist forces of the British garrison under General Charles George Gordon at Khartoum).

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Overall, *Choosing Sides* can be read with profit and enjoyment by all those interested in superpower-Third World relations of the cold war epoch.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council *by Christopher C. Shoemaker. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991. 146 pp. $29.95.*

The National Security Council (NSC) staff is a bureaucratic anomaly. Its origins lie in a few deceptively innocent words in the amended 1947 National Security Act, calling for the establishment of a "Secretariat . . . charged with preparing [the] agenda [of the National Security Council], providing data essential to its deliberations, and distributing its conclusions to the departments and agencies." No provision was made then or later for the post that has come to be known as the "assistant to the president for national security affairs."

There was from the beginning, however, a recognition that some mechanism was required to coordinate and integrate the many strands of U.S. national security policy and that the integration of strategy should properly be located at the presidential level, rather than with any single department. The bland words of the enabling legislation in effect left it to the president to determine what the NSC staff would be and how it would be used. The result has been no end of controversy.

Since 1949, this protean bureaucratic creation has successively altered its appearance to reflect, more or less accurately, the personality and style of the presidents it served. Under Dwight Eisenhower, it resembled a military staff. Under John Kennedy, it was an informal, freewheeling think tank. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger formalized the NSC staff as a powerful instrument of policy control, and that model persisted, albeit with significant variations, in the four administrations that followed. It was the Reagan administration, which came into office with the avowed intent of subordinating the role of the NSC staff, that ultimately propelled the NSC staff into notoriety with the Iran-contra affair.

Christopher Shoemaker, himself a former NSC staff member, has written what might be described as a primer on the subject. In a succinct and tightly organized book, he offers an historical overview of the evolution of the NSC staff as an institution, an analysis of alternative philosophies of its organization and employment, a brief discussion of the changing national security environment, and a prescription for the future.

Shoemaker provides a comprehensive list of the various legitimate functions of the NSC staff in ascending order of controversiality, from administration to policy advocacy. Policy advocacy is inevitable, in his view, since the president will select people of substance for the staff "and people of that nature will present their views on issues of importance" (p. 47).

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"In the twenty-first century," he concludes, "the United States will no longer be able to afford the luxury of managing national security with . . . a system beset with patchwork solutions and built from an archaic design" (p. 108). That requires, in his view, a vigorous NSC staff.

Shoemaker is not content with generalities. In the last chapter he spells out in considerable detail his own views about the structure, staffing, and operation of an ideal NSC staff, including a draft presidential directive.

Shoemaker was a member of the NSC staff under President Jimmy Carter (as I was), and Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote the foreword to this book. Not surprisingly, Shoemaker reflects many of Brzezinski's ideas, but his book is much more than a description of the world according to Brzezinski.

Those who regard the NSC staff as a formula for policy abuse will find Shoemaker too uncritical. But even skeptics will find his analysis and prescription informed, thoughtful, and provocative. Any new administration would be well advised to spend a few minutes with this book before deciding how to organize its national security structure.

GARY SICK
Columbia University

Russia Shakes the World: The Second Russian Revolution and Its Impact on the West *by Gary Hart. New York, HarperCollins, 1991. 255 pp. $22.00.*

During 1991, anyone who procrastinated in writing about the former Soviet Union is fortunate; those who wrote and published were unlucky indeed. Gary Hart's book was published in September 1991 and therefore does not cover the attempted coup, the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev, or the disintegration of the Union.

Given this unfortunate timing, one might be tempted to dismiss this book, even though the author was a prominent American senator and presidential candidate. That would be a mistake, for Hart bases his book primarily on a number of interviews that he has conducted with prominent Soviet politicians, editors, academics, and military leaders, including Mikhail Gorbachev, Eduard Shevardnadze, former defense minister and coup plotter Dmitri Yazov, economist Abel Aganbegyan, and former Gorbachev aide Alexander Yakovlev.

These interviews provide an interesting view of a cross section of Soviet leadership, and for that reason may be of interest to scholars. Interviews provide the views of the person being questioned and not the ideas of a speechwriter, so scholars may find useful information in this book. Unfortunately, Hart does not in most cases indicate the date or the circumstances of his interviews, information that would be helpful to scholars in interpreting the responses to his questions.

There are other weaknesses in this book. Hart has previously written several fiction books, and it shows. He has a tendency to get carried away with his own

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prose; for example, the former senator notes, "Revolutions, like children, are not inevitably happy" (p. 16). Or, "Lying deep within the cortex, near the center of the cerebellum of the collective communist subconscious, there were always limits" (p. 226).

Hart is clearly impressed with Gorbachev, contending at one point "not in a generation, a lifetime, or for much of a century has fate produced so significant a national leader as Mikhail Gorbachev" (p. 242). Hart notes that in American political history only Franklin Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln rival Gorbachev's significance. Despite his respect for Gorbachev and to his analytical credit, Hart realized before the attempted coup and the break-up of the Union that Gorbachev's chances of success were small. Hart does not have much respect for Yeltsin, referring to him as "the bumptious Yeltsin" (p. 12).

This book would have been of interest to general readers prior to the events of August 1991; unfortunately for Hart, it was overtaken by events. Nevertheless, the interviews contained in the book will be of interest to scholars of the Gorbachev era in Soviet history.

DAN CALDWELL
Pepperdine University

Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe *by J. F. Brown. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1991. 338 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

J. F. Brown, former director of Radio Free Europe and presently a senior staff member at the RAND Corporation, has written a straightforward political history of the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe. The book describes the collapse of the old regime in each country, and contains chapters on the history of Soviet-East European relations, the importance of Mikhail Gorbachev's new approach toward the bloc, and a concluding chapter on the prospects facing the fledgling democracies of the region.

There are places where one may disagree on Brown's emphasis in discussing individual revolutions or in the significance he attributes to certain events in the history of communist rule in Eastern Europe. For instance, some may dispute the central importance he attaches to Rumania's rejection of Nikita Khrushchev's proposals to create a supranational development strategy for the Soviet bloc in the early 1960s as critical for "the cause of East European sovereignty" (p. 20). Similarly, his chapter on East Germany would have been improved by a discussion of how the phenomenon of internal emigration and the regime's ability to decapitate resistance movements by banishing their leaders to West Germany were important in keeping East German society quiescent. Such concerns, though, are not major; the overall impression the book makes is one of comprehensiveness and balance. Brown has been a close observer of the region for decades, and the breadth of his knowledge and the acuity of his judgments are evident throughout.

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Brown's basic approach to understanding the events of 1989–1990 is through high politics rather than ground level developments. This is reflected in the book's sources—mostly press accounts, Radio Free Europe Research reports, official statements, and the secondary literature on the region for the last twenty years. This is both a strength and a weakness of the book. Its attention to opposition groups and movements is kept to the bare minimum necessary to flesh out his top-down recreation of events. Readers will have to turn elsewhere to get a full picture of the social forces that defeated the region's communist parties and are now the critical political actors in each country.

His approach is most effective in discussing the Balkan countries, and these chapters are the best in the book. This region is clearly Brown's first love, and he has a knack for describing both the cruelty, corruption, and self-adulation of dictators such as Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, Nicolae Ceausescu in Rumania, and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. The chapter on Bulgaria is particularly welcome, because of the sparse attention paid to developments there. Brown brilliantly uses humor to describe the final days of Todor Zhivkov's thirty-five years in power. He sums up the sad state of Balkan communism by citing a local joke describing Zhivkov as "the only man who had ever written more books than he had read" (p. 189). The chapter on the early stages of the disintegration of Yugoslavia is also well done. Brown had already pinpointed the major axes of conflict in the civil war several months before it broke out. It will come in handy for anyone trying to fathom this country's ongoing and bloody self-destruction.

Surge to Freedom is a welcome addition to growing literature on the revolutions of 1989–1990 in Eastern Europe. It is well organized and written so it will serve nicely as one of the major texts in advanced undergraduate lecture courses or to introduce graduate students to the recent history of the region. It will probably not be the last word on the revolutions of 1989–1990, because much primary research still needs to be done. Nevertheless, researchers will want to have this book on their shelves for handy reference.

MICHAEL BERNHARD
The Pennsylvania State University

Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland *by Lawrence Goodwyn. New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. 466 pp. $24.95.*

The author claims that virtually all extant literature on Solidarity got the movement wrong. Coming from an historian who specialized in American social movements and whose credentials as a Polish specialist are unknown, this is heady stuff. Previous scholarship, Goodwyn argued, relied almost exclusively on official party sources. As a result, "Until the emergence of Solidarność dramatically

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altered the entire trajectory of social evidence, what passed for domestic and foreign sociopolitical scholarship on Poland was largely speculative, inherently descriptive, and, most limiting of all, necessarily reliant on inferences drawn from the public actions of the ruling party" (p. xvi). Until Goodwyn learned Polish, "in-depth sociological studies of the Polish people were impossible for anyone to conduct" (p. xvii). Those who tried were fated to make grave errors, the most important being "the failure to research the interior of the workers' movement" (p. 414, n. 33). There existed, therefore, a "'blank' on sociological inquiry into social activity in Poland" that caused Arthur Stinchcombe's injunction "to have an enhanced application to Poland watchers: 'We must get social reality into the discipline'" (p. 426, n. 29).

Even scholars focusing on the Polish working class could not grasp the social reality. Poor George Kolankiewicz, "a scholar accustomed to working with party sources" (wrong!), viewed Solidarity movement building "preponderantly through elite sources" (p. 448). His Polish colleague Witold Morawski's research was "typical of the 'view from afar' that dominates scholarship on Poland" (p. 402, n. 39). Jadwiga Staniszkis got the roughest treatment: "The remarkable discovery about Polish scholarship on Solidarność is not that a sociologist such as Jadwiga Staniszkis can attempt a book-length study based almost entirely on static abstractions, but rather that so many other students of Poland share in her unsubstantiated behavioral assumptions that she is sometimes taken with a modicum of seriousness" (p. 443). Even deceased sociologist Stefan Nowak was not spared: Goodwyn (wrongly!) ascribed to him cultivation of a "research habit" that used elite sources to the exclusion of empirical data collection (p. 426, n. 29).

What are the better studies of Solidarity? Goodwyn points to Trotskyist Chris Harman as one of few with "any degree of ability to write about the Polish populace as an aggregate of people comprising highly differentiated social milieus" (p. 403, n. 61). Harman's one tendentious book, published in 1974, did not deal with Poland specifically. By contrast, Alain Touraine's methodologically sophisticated work on social movements receives scant reference. Goodwyn goes on to impute to Poland watchers such reductionist etiologies as "the 'transforming' act the Pope performed on the Baltic coast" (p. xxv) or that "the spread of the Baltic strike was an achievement of Radio Free Europe" (p. 394, n. 14).

The author's vignettes of Poland's key political actors do most to compromise the quality of the book. His most charitable descriptions of Warsaw intellectuals are of Bronislaw Geremek and Tadeusz Mazowiecki; still, "early on—Mazowiecki and Geremek did not know how to read the scenes in the Lenin Shipyard. . . . What they saw on the Baltic coast was the state. Most immediately, they saw the guns of the state" (p. 29). As for Adam Michnik, "his analysis did not by any means reflect an informed knowledge of what had happened in working-class Poland during the postwar era" (p. 322). "He also misread the politics of 1968 and 1970" (p. 324), and to the task of "building the mass base of a movement, Michnik had little or nothing to contribute" (p. 323). Jacek

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Kuroń "did not see the experiential progression of working-class self-activity in Poland from 1945 through 1980" (p. 207), and it was "almost as if the moment he read the first Gdańsk demand in his Warsaw apartment, his brain clicked off" (p. 365). About writer Ryszard Kapuściński: "Kapuściński's words might help keep one spiritually warm on a long totalitarian night, but they offered no encouragement to creative activity in the light of day" (p. 138). About novelist Kazimierz Brandys: "Brandys wrote about Soliderność [sic] with surprising brevity considering its transforming impact on Polish life. His style was a bit leaden. Perhaps, in light of his distance from popular life, such was the only style he could summon" (p. 190). Cardinal Wyszyński was "quite forthright in his support of Gomulka's regime" while having a "profoundly proprietary sense" about the nation (p. 317). Primate "Józef Glemp generated events in a new way: the Church prospered as the nation declined" (p. 320); more than that, he displayed "a penchant for aggressive blundering" (p. 331). About Zbigniew Bujak: "The international information network radiating from Warsaw intellectual circles put a visible 'spin' on Polish politics that emphasized Bujak's actual and symbolic role" (p. 335). Goodwyn cannot restrain himself from even taking a cheap shot at Hungary's Imre Nagy: "His was a politics of flash cards" (p. 85).

A clique of Warsaw intellectuals was the source for the malicious misrepresentation of Solidarity: "Though it was pleasant to enjoy the stage scenery and the gesturing worker actors, the essential task was to filter out the noise in order to hear a sophisticated Greek chorus of intellectuals and churchmen chanting somewhere off stage. In this manner, the world's scholars have unintentionally constructed a fantasy play called 'The Origins of Solidarnosc' that is a parody of the authentic drama" (p. 369). Goodwyn's anti-intellectualism is vulgar and badly misplaced: "Under the guns of the Soviet army, communism had been institutionalized in Poland by intellectuals. They had profited as a class under it much more than workers had, and it had taken intellectuals much longer to see through the party and go over into opposition" (p. 36). Conversely, the repository of political wisdom was the industrial working class. Writing of the 1970s, Goodwyn concluded: "The central cultural reality in Poland was that no one outside the working class saw what was happening" (p. 133). In the formation of Citizens' Committees in 1989 and the Solidarity governments that followed, he underscored the departure away from workers' democracy: "the elite committee represented the final triumph of the often attempted, always thwarted bid of Warsaw intellectuals for control of the popular movement" (p. 346). Increasingly "the activist intelligentsia in Poland . . . lived in a dream world of *Szlachtan* [sic] dimension" (p. 354).

Polish scholars are likely to find this an ill-tempered, pretentious, and self-indulgent book. Its claim to have discovered the real causal agents of Solidarity—collective memory and the self-organizing experience of the working class—is banal, since many specialists in addition to Roman Laba, Trotskyites, and *ouvrieristes* have acknowledged them. Readers may find the introduction thought-provoking and the chapter on 1956 self-activity informative. But depiction of postwar Polish politics in terms of class struggle between oppressed

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workers and conniving intellectuals is one of many poor judgments that results from Goodwyn's own circumscribed experiential knowledge of the country.

RAYMOND TARAS
Tulane University

Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil *by Mehran Kamrava. New York, Routledge, 1990. 174 pp. $47.50.*

Kamrava's book is one in a considerable line attempting to explain the Iranian revolution, but it manages to contain several novelties. The early summary of previous explanations of modern revolution and their relevance to Iran is good and useful, as is the author's thoroughness in covering the chief economic, social, and political factors behind the revolution. The author seems inclined to accept the younger generation of Islamic revolutionaries at face value. Thus we are told again the old story that Ali Shariati "studied sociology at the Sorbonne under the orientalist Louis Massignon," whereas no hard evidence has ever been presented that he ever studied either sociology or with Massignon, who did not teach sociology. Shariati's degree was from a different branch of the Sorbonne, for a pedestrain thesis in Iranian philology done under the linguist Gilbert Lazard. Similarly, we are told that Abol Hassan Bani Sadr deliberately delayed submission of his dissertation to the Sorbonne to avoid having to return to Iran and face possible imprisonment. While it may be true that he did not want to return to Iran, there is no indication that he had a dissertation in hand ready or nearly ready to submit should the Iranian political climate improve.

Kamrava's book is brief but quite comprehensive and especially to be recommended for those who have not read much about the Iranian revolution. Although the author speaks of social, economic, and political causation, and gives a running account of main events, he is probably at his best in describing the positions and intellectual contributions of the revolutionary parties. The book is a contribution to a crowded but important field.

NIKKI R. KEDDIE
University of California, Los Angeles

The Changing Soviet System: Mono-organisational Socialism from Its Origins to Gorbachev's Restructuring *by T. H. Rigby. Brookfield, VT, Edward Elgar, 1990. 256 pp. $47.95.*

Today one is tempted to read Rigby's book through the prism of cataclysmic change that occurred in the Soviet Union. Not often can political scientists witness

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historical events that enable them to check their theories and conceptions. In Soviet studies this is the period beginning with Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to reform the Soviet system and ending with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. After what has happened one would be tempted to judge political analysis by its ability to predict and explain the evolution and dissolution of the Soviet system. Rigby's book, no doubt, stands to this criteria.

It is an impressive result of forty years of research on the origins, nature, and evolution of the Soviet sociopolitical order. In polemic with the advocates of the totalitarian model, the author develops his concept of "mono-organisational socialism," that is, a society in which all social spheres are managed by formal, hierarchical organizations; the Communist party integrates all other organizations in a united whole; politics is structured around official hierarchies and concealed from public view; the system is legitimized by Marxism-Leninism; power, status and reward are determined by formal position within the centralized organization; tradition and exchange (market), nonetheless, play some role in governing social activities. This concept probably, will not cover all dimensions of the Soviet system, but it is a useful tool for analyzing its development, main features, and dynamic.

In a detailed historical overview Rigby traces specific Russian origins of mono-organizational socialism in Russian statist and authoritarian tradition. At the same time he demonstrates that at least since the abolition of serfdom two potential societies were developing in the womb of the society of late imperial Russia: market-organizational society similar to the capitalist West and unique mono-organizational society. He then presents historical, ideological, and psychological reasons explaining why the Bolsheviks, mortal enemies of the tsarist autocracy, in fact inherited and reproduced (though indirectly) major elements of mono-organizational society.

Another important and well argued conclusion in the first chapters of the book is that the Soviet experience did demonstrate certain viability and relative efficiency as a particular model of noncapitalist modernization and industrialization. But what are the limits of this viability and efficiency?

Here Rigby develops an important concept of modernization-by-delayed-but-massive-response as the main vehicle of Russian/Soviet societal dynamic in the pre-modern period and during industrialization based on centralized organization and management. Unfortunately, this is history. New stages of technological revolution do not demand centralized large-scale management but self-regulatory mechanisms generating their own immediate tasks in terms of broad social goals. But centralized organization is incapable of giving place to spontaneous forces from below, in large part because of the implications this would have for the monopolistic role of the Communist party.

Chapter 9, "Gorbachev and the Crisis of Mono-organisational Socialism," deserves special attention. We are presented here with the analysis of economic, social, and political sources of the deep structural crisis of the Soviet system in the 1980s and first serious attempts of its systemic reform. Domestic malaise

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(increasing inefficiency of the bureaucratic command economy, widening technological gap, crisis in agriculture, spread of social and moral pathologies, etc.) together with the new unfavorable external environment (NATO's response to match Leonid Brezhnev's military build-up, the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], failures in Soviet Third World policy). All this resulted in a traditional Russian/Soviet history type of crisis: external threats and internal disorder combined with economic and technological backwardness. A traditional remedy would be to call for a new revolution from above to execute centralized forced-pace modernization, something which no longer fits the requirements of the third industrial revolution. Hence these are catch-22 attempts to radically reform Soviet system from the top and within the limits of the system itself, bringing to life radical reformists from below who aim to transcend the limits of the system, thus destroying it altogether.

Rigby traces main stages in the evolution of Gorbachev's strategy of reforms – from the initial drive for order and discipline and attempts to revitalize the mono-organizational system to *perestroika* per se, restructuring of the political and economic system. As a result of *glasnost* and democratization, forces for reform were unleashed in the society and rudiments of a democratic polity emerged in the USSR.

But does this mean an end to mono-organizational socialism? In the beginning of 1990 (when the book was completed) neither the author nor anybody else could yet give a clear-cut answer to this question. True, as the author puts it, certain structures of mono-organizational socialism were destroyed, police-backed monopoly of the party was eroding, formal representative bodies were being transformed from docile instruments of the party-state bureaucracy into quasi-democratic institutions, the nomenklatura system was severely weakened, there were varied (though ineffective) moves away from the bureaucratic command economy, shifts in official and unofficial thinking completely undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet system, etc. But the outcome was still unclear.

In one of the most interesting pages of the book, Rigby suggests several possible future scenarios: first, a conservative coup against Gorbachev; second, conservative coup by Gorbachev; third, assumption of autocratic powers by Gorbachev to preempt a conservative coup and ensure the continuation of his restructuring program ("enlightened authoritarianism"); fourth, triumph of radical reformers with the outcome of quickest demolition of the remnants of mono-organizational socialism (although not necessarily the surest guarantee of democracy and national well-being); and finally, Gorbachev, holding power, continues the restructuring, and the emerging pluralistic patterns of economic, political, social, and cultural life take root.

Events that were soon to happen demonstrated that these were all very real possibilities and almost all them were tried one way or the other. According to Rigby, the most probable seemed to be some combination of the second, third, and last scenarios. Reality instead presented us with some combination of the first and fourth, that is, an attempted conservative coup resulting in the triumph

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of radical reformists. But this is no reason to reproach the author, because the whole political situation in the Soviet Union was (and still is) largely unpredictable; our knowledge of the regularities of post-communist dynamics is still very limited.

We can only agree with Rigby's final conclusion that the mono-organizational socialism has proved a false path for humanity. Yet this hardly heralds the end of history, since no one can exclude its rediscovery as some kind of the barracks socialism or the utopian ideology of the new poor who, along with the new rich, seem to be one of the products of the social dynamic in the era of post-communist politics.

ANDREI MELVILLE
Moscow University

Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements *by James DeFronzo. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1991. 336 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $16.95.*

The author explicitly intends that this text be accessible to students and citizens with no background in political science. One of his major goals is to use the study of revolution as an introduction to world politics. DeFronzo's clear analytic framework suits those goals. He argues that five "critical factors" produce revolution—mass frustration (construed very broadly), elite division, unifying motivation, government crisis, and a permissive international situation. He does not try to explain the conjunction of these factors. Obviously, this will not resolve the theoretical debates, but the list of factors is viable and serves the purpose at hand.

The cases chosen are Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and South Africa. The accounts are loosely structured around the five critical factors but include additional subjects of interest such as the career of Ho Chi Minh. DeFronzo has the admirable knack of conveying a good deal of information in a highly readable, concise manner. Each chapter has a summary, bibliography, and a list of appropriate films (with guidance on where to find them). The histories are followed up to 1991, connecting revolutionary events to current affairs.

DeFronzo is sufficiently even handed to mention crimes and blunders of both pre- and post-revolutionary regimes. He more frequently seeks to mitigate ugly post-revolutionary events. He is most lenient with the revolutionary side of the actual struggle, omitting the killing of the czar, and describing the Iranian purges as limited to SAVAK and the army.

The book does not serve students with a strong background in comparative politics or area studies as well as it does beginners. The very short theoretical discussion and DeFronzo's five critical factors smooth out the contentious world of revolution theory, but more advanced students deserve a deeper look at the controversies. Relevance to current events is valuable, but excluding the French Revolution while including South Africa is hard to justify when studying revolution on its own terms.

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Some details of the case histories are problematic. DeFronzo gives Nicaraguan diplomacy sole credit for the Central American peace. He analyzes the Iranian clergy as an abiding source of opposition to the shah, overlooking the government subsidies that thousands of them took until just before the revolution. The motive for obedience to the Confucian order is described as "reward in the afterlife" (p. 63).

DeFronzo provides clarity, readable accounts, and wide accessibility. He mentions, but does not explore, the great complexity of the subject.

SCOTT COREY
University of California at Berkeley

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

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

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

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

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